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Abstract 
An examination of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its policy of complementarity 
in the context of the presumption, that for complementarity to be effective, the national 
courts will have to undertake the majority of the investigations and prosecutions of 
extraordinary crimes. This will then be discussed in terms of the current setup whereby 
national courts are permitted by Article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998, to apply their own 
penalties when conducting trials at the national level. The analysis serves to highlight that 
the current situation is not conducive to proportionate or consistent sentencing or 
penalties, as the death penalty may still be applied by national courts, whilst in accordance 
with human rights norms, the ICC only has custodial sentences available to its judges. In 
addition to this the discussion highlights that many national jurisdictions where the crimes 
take place are in need of capacity building so as to rebuild or to reinforce their legal systems 
to a level where they are able to seek justice for themselves. This leads into a discussion of 
the potential for outreach whereby the ICC may also be able to lead by example and take 
the opportunity to impart their sentencing objectives and procedural norms, in an attempt 
to facilitate consistent and proportionate justice at both the national and international level, 
so as to aid the fight to close the impunity gap. The case study of Rwanda will be used to 
reinforce the hypotheses and to serves a real life example of how involvement in capacity 
building can also lead to legal reform. 
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MPhil Thesis 
Chapter 1:  Introductory Chapter 
1.1 Background and Study Rationale 
The International Criminal Court (ICC), upon which this thesis will centre, was created in 
1998 by the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute 1998)1 which 
began its work on 1 July 2002, after the statute was ratified by a minimum of sixty States.2 
The aim of the court is to take the work of the ‘ad-hoc’ tribunals and courts of Rwanda, 
former Yugoslavia and Sierra Leone a step further, so as to create the permanent criminal 
court that was envisaged as early as 1937 by the League of Nations.3 
 
The main objective of the ICC is to try the key perpetrators of the most serious crimes 
known to man, crimes so shocking that they are considered to breach the concepts of ‘Jus 
Gentium’4 (law of the people)5 and Human Rights; more specifically the crimes of genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.6 Whilst these crimes may 
appear to be crimes that should be dealt with at the national level, because they often occur 
within a sovereign State boundary,7 they are considered to be crimes of concern to the 
international community for the following reasons. Firstly, due to being extraordinary in 
terms of the scale, with the high numbers of people killed, raped, exiled or displaced from 
their homes, they become global issue rather than State matters, as they pose a threat to ‘… 
                                                          
1
 17 July 1998, The Statute of Rome of the International Criminal Court was adopted by 120 States, at the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the UN headquarters. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 
2
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Art 126 states that the court shall come into force on the ‘... 60
th
 day following the date of 
the deposit of the 60
th
 instrument of ratification ...’ 
3
 League of Nations Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court, League of Nations OJ 
Special Supplement No 156(1936) LN Doc C.547 (I) M.384 (I) 1937.V (1938) 
4
 Jus Gentium – A roman concept, taken to mean the law of the people, which is considered to be common to 
all civilised societies: Geoffrey Robertson Q.C,  Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (3
rd
 
edn, Penguin 2006) 1 
5
 Elizabeth A Martin (eds), Oxford Dictionary of Law (5th edn, OUP 2003) 274 
6
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 Arts 6- 8bis 
7
 Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou & Annika Jones, ‘Complementarity after Kampala: Capacity Building and the 
International Criminal Court’s Legal Tools’ (2010) 2 GoJIL 791, 794 
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international peace and security.’8 Because crimes of this nature and magnitude are often 
deemed a threat to international peace and security because if no action were taken to 
stamp out the culture of impunity9 that is inherent in crimes of this type, then it is likely that 
they would cross borders as occurred in Rwanda where the conflicts and violence spilled 
over into Uganda and Burundi.10 Secondly the devastating impact of such crimes, which 
often occur during an internal conflict and very frequently result in the State being 
decimated or at the very least crippled,11 thus causing social and economic crisis. Another 
factor is the moral offensiveness of the crimes and their very nature being one that shocks 
and disturbs,12 given that whole sections of a society are singled out for persecution simply 
because of their race, religion, social or tribal group. Therefore in summary, these are 
crimes that cannot go unpunished and the ICC as well as its predecessors exist so as to close 
the impunity gap13 and ensure that at the very least ‘…those bearing the greatest 
responsibility…’14 do not go unpunished. 
 
Indeed the ICC and the concept of an international court or tribunal to prosecute for 
atrocities is not a new concept, as illustrated by William Schabas who indicates that 
evidence of trials of this nature can be traced back as far as 1474 to the trial of Peter von 
Hagenbach;15 in addition to this there are the more recent International Military Tribunals 
that took place in Tokyo and Nuremburg following the Second World War. However, a lot 
has changed since the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials took place and the most notable change 
                                                          
8
 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Chap VII 
9
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Preamble, Paras 3 & 4  
10
 Nicholas J Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (OUP 2000) 211-
212 
11
 Ariel Meyerstein ‘Between Law and Culture: Rwanda's Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality’ (June 2007) 32 (2) L 
& Soc Inquiry 467, 468 
12
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Preamble, Para 2 
13
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Preamble, Para 5 
14
 LIU Institute for Global Issues, Conference Report, ‘Vancouver Dialogue on the Impunity Gap’  Global Justice 
Program (4 April 2004) 2 < 
http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/4Apr2004_VancouverDialogue.pdf> (Accessed on  
12/09/2014) 
15
 William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 1 
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is that the death penalty is no longer at the disposal of the international courts and ad-hoc 
tribunals, which can be attributed to the growing trend towards abolition of the death 
penalty across the globe.16 This trend exists because the use of the death penalty is deemed 
contrary to human rights norms as illustrated by the various international treaties that 
protect human rights and aim to abolish the death penalty.17 Thus the meaning and impact 
of these international treaties will be explored in greater depth during the second chapter 
of this thesis, but all that needs to be noted at this point is that as illustrated by the 
exclusion of it as an available penalty from the Rome Statute 1998,18 the death penalty is no 
longer available at the international level when prosecuting war crimes, genocide, crimes 
against humanity and aggression. 
 
Subsequently this thesis will focus on exploring what does the removal of the death penalty 
as an available penalty mean for the ICC? Especially when considered in the context 
whereby not only is the ICC prosecuting the most shocking atrocities known to man19 but 
that the ICC does so only as a court which is complementary to national courts and whereby 
some States will still be issuing the death penalty whilst the ICC can only issue a custodial 
sentence of fine.20 The reason some States will still apply the death penalty when 
prosecuting crimes that also fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC (as per Articles 6 – 8bis of 
                                                          
16
 Hood R, ‘Towards Global Abolition of the Death Penalty: Progress and Prospects’ Le Death Penalty Project 
Lecture (21 January 2010) 5-6 
<http://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/assets/12/original/Towards_Global_Abolition_of_the_Death_Penalty_
by_Prof_Roger_Hood.pdf?1273573377>  (Accessed on 01/10/2011) 
17
 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty (adopted 8 June 1990) 
OAS Treaty Series No 73 (1990) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-
American System, OEA/Ser L V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 80 (1992), Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms concerning the abolition of the death penalty 
(adopted 6-10 December 1982, entered into force 28 April 1983) ETS No 114, as amended by Protocol No 11 
(entered into force 1 November 1998) ETS No 155, Protocol No 13 to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, concerning the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances 
(adopted 3 May 2002, entered into force 1 July 2003) ETS No 187  and Second Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty (adopted 15 
December 1989, entered into force 11 July 1911) UNGA Res 44/128, 1642 UNTS  414  
18
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 Art 77 
19
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Preamble, Para 2 
20
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 
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the Rome Statute 1998), is due the death penalty still being an applicable penalty within 
their national legislation and Article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998 permits States to apply the 
penalties available within their national law when prosecuting the crimes also covered by 
the ICC. Because the ICC is a court established by a multilateral treaty (which currently has 
122 member States)21 rather than a UN resolution giving it primacy over a particular 
situation or State, the will potentially have many situations in which it is required to 
investigate and prosecute and has therefore been created as a court that is complementary 
because no single court could take responsibility for conducting investigations and 
prosecutions of atrocities that occur around the globe.  
 
Justice is a key component of the work of the ICC as highlighted by the final paragraph of 
the Preamble to the Rome Statute where it is stated that the ICC is ‘Resolved to guarantee 
lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice.’22 Sadly the current 
situation is that whilst the ICC and national courts have been ‘… given a very free hand’23 
when it comes to sentencing determination,  the national courts have even greater freedom 
as they may also have the death penalty at their disposal and how this impacts on the 
standard of justice, is the second main theme of this thesis. Various academics such as Mark 
Drumbl,24 Jane Stromseth25 and Barbara Hola26 have highlighted that the current situation 
whereby national courts may have different sentencing objectives and subsequently may 
give harsher or in some instances more lenient sentences27 than the ICC judges, could be 
                                                          
21
 122 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Out of them 34 are 
African States, 18 are Asia-Pacific States, 18 are from Eastern Europe, 27 are from Latin American and 
Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western European and other States. Information taken from: 
<http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.as
px>  (Accessed on 29/03/2013) 
22
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9, Preamble, Para 11 
23
  William A Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (4th edn, CUP 2011) 331 
24
 Mark A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law  (CUP 2007) 68-69 
25
 Jane Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law 
in Post-Conflict Societies?’ (2009) 1 HJRL 87, 89 
26
 Barbara Hola, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
(2012) 4(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 3, 3 
27
 Mark A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law  (CUP 2007) 69 
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detrimental to the shared objective of ensuring that at least the most culpable are brought 
to justice to facilitate ‘… restoration and maintenance of international [and national] peace 
and security,’.28 However as Barbara Hola highlights,29 unless there is consistency in the 
sentencing objectives of both the ICC and the national courts, then there will be 
inconsistency in the justice facilitated and Barbara Hola asks what kind of justice would this 
be, as consistency is ‘… fundamental …’30 to justice. 
  
Interlinked with the consistency of sentencing objectives is the fact that should there start 
to be vast inconsistencies between the sentencing of the ICC and the national courts, then 
this could cause two things to happen. The first is that there is a greater risk of the penalty 
not being proportionate to the crime, because although there is no penalty that could said 
to be truly proportionate to the gravity of the crimes covered by Rome Statute 1998, if 
national courts sentence offenders deemed to have committed crimes of a lower level and 
moral gravity to death, then surely this would undermine any trials conducted by the ICC? 
Especially as the ICC, by its very nature of being a complementary court that steps in as a 
last resort31 and will subsequently investigate the higher ranking offenders, who are 
deemed to be at the centre of the crimes and should therefore proceed on the logic that the 
higher the gravity of the crime,32 the harsher the penalty should be. Following that principle 
it would mean that the ICC should be handing out some of the harshest penalties, yet the 
current situation is that the national courts are more likely to have the harsher penalties at 
their disposal. Thus because the ICC is not permitted to issue a sentence of death this 
creates and interesting paradox and the Rwandan case study will be used to highlight what 
this paradox can mean for the ICC in reality. 
                                                          
28
 Barbara Hola, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
(2012) 4(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 3, 6 
29
 Barbara Hola, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
(2012) 4(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 3, 3-6 
30
 Barbara Hola, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
(2012) 4(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 3, 3 
31
 Dalila V Hoover, ‘Universal Jurisdiction Not so Universal: Time to Delegate to the International Criminal 
Court?’(2011-2012) 73 Eyes on the ICC 73, 98 
32
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 Art 78 (1) 
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Nonetheless, this thesis does not propose that the ICC should look to have the death 
penalty added to the list of its available penalties as provided for in Article 77 of the Rome 
Statute 1998, nor does it propose that the ICC should try to bully States into following its un-
codified sentencing practice. Indeed what this thesis will propose, is to examine whether the 
ICC can utilise its unique situation as a complementary international court to lead by 
example33 and through a combination of outreach and by bringing the situations to the 
attention of the global community, attract assistance for capacity building from NGO’s and 
other States. In doing this, the ICC along with NGO’s and other States will have the 
opportunity to help re-establish the rule of law, because often a State in the aftermath of 
atrocities is a State that will have a  weakened, corrupt or virtually decimated legal system in 
place.34 And this would be an ideal time to help the State rebuild its legal system and re-
establish the rule of law in a manner that complies with internationally accepted norms of 
justice,35 thus increasing the chance of consistency between the ICC and the national courts 
of involved States.36Having now established a broad sense of the issues this thesis will seek 
to explore and critically analyse, it is now to a more detailed breakdown of the chapter 
structure and how the themes identified above will interlink. 
 
1.2 The Global Death Penalty Abolition Trend 
 Whilst over the recent years there has been a growing wealth of literature speculating and 
hypothesising how successfully the ICC will function as a complementary court and the 
lessons it can draw from its predecessors such as the ICTY and ICTR, one notable gap in the 
literature appears to be that very little attention has been paid to the issues that may arise 
as a direct result of the member States being able to apply their own penalties, which can 
                                                          
33
 Drumbl MA, Atrocity, Punishment and International Law (CUP 2007) 6 
34
 Meyerstein A, ‘Between Law and Culture: Rwanda's Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality’ (June 2007) 32(2) L & 
Soc Inquiry 467, 468-469 
35
 Jane Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law 
in Post-Conflict Societies?’ (2009) 1 HJRL 87, 88-89 
36
 Barbara Hola, ‘Sentencing of International Crimes at the ICTY and ICTR: Consistency of Sentencing Case Law’ 
(2012) 4(4) Amsterdam Law Forum 3, 23-24 
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also include the death penalty. Given the growing trend towards abolition for all crimes, as 
will be established in the chapter dealing with the abolition of the death penalty, it seems 
that the situation the ICC finds itself in is a difficult one. This difficult situation is because the 
ICC will ‘... initiate prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the crimes. 
On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for the lower-
ranking perpetrators …’37 meaning that potentially the those who stand trial before the ICC  
will be subject to more lenient sentences than those in the national courts. And this is 
problematic because as Mark Drumbl has highlighted in his book ‘Atrocity, Punishment, and 
International law’ when national courts apply sentences that are harsher than those 
available at the international courts, then it becomes ‘… difficult to make the extraordinary 
criminal, who may be responsible for the deaths of hundreds … actually spend more time in 
jail than the ordinary criminal who murders one person for profit.’38 This is not ideal 
because when those found guilty of extraordinary crimes are given more lenient sentences 
than ordinary criminals, it potentially undermines the value of the justice because if the 
punishment is not in some way proportionate to the gravity of the crime, then it will neither 
serve a retributivist or deterrence goal of justice as is often cited by international courts as 
being their objective, nor will it aid reconciliation which is also cited by to be a purpose of 
punishment39 by the ICC and often national courts, because the victims are left feeling that 
justice has not been served when the penalty is not proportionate to the crime.40  
 
Thus this thesis will attempt to explore the problems and obstacles that the death penalty 
being retained by some national legal systems may bring to the ICC and the objective of this 
exploration will ultimately be to seek to propose how the ICC could seek to overcome these 
difficulties. Therefore the by expanding upon the global debate of the death penalty and 
exploring what obstacles remain to its global abolition, it is hoped that it will provide some 
                                                          
37
 Office of the Prosecutor ( ICC), ‘Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor’ (September 
2003) [hereinafter Policy Issues] 3 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf>   (Accessed on 10/08/2012) 
38
 Mark A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law  (CUP 2007) 69 
39
 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Trial Chamber II – Sentencing) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23 May 2014) 3 
40
 William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law  (3rd edn, CUP 2002) 45 
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context for the difficulties that may arise for the ICC and the other research questions of this 
thesis. 
 
 The issue relating to the death penalty and its retention at the national level will be 
addressed in two ways. Primarily it will be achieved through a critical assessment of 
academic commentary, international treaties which will focus on the American Convention 
on Human Rights (ACHR),41 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Human Rights Convention),42 the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)43 and their additional protocols that seek to abolish the 
death penalty, will be examined in an attempt to ascertain why some States party to the 
Rome Statute 1998 still continue to use the death penalty. It will also involve a brief 
exploration of the social, political and cultural influences upon the retentionist States, in a 
bid to ascertain why there is such a disparity of penalties at the national level. Secondly this 
chapter will look at historical texts such as the travaux preparatoires for the Rome Statute 
1998, so as to trace the logic behind the decision taken in the Rome Statute 1998, to 
remove the death penalty from the penalties available to the international court (ICC). 
 
In addition to gaining an overview as to the general trends towards the use of the death 
penalty, the reasoning behind Rwanda’s decision to abolish the death penalty in 2007,44 so 
as to align itself with the ICTR and its accepted standards of punishment, will be assessed in 
the case study chapter. This will be undertaken through an analysis of the various organic 
laws passed in Rwanda during 2007 that were created specifically to facilitate transferral of 
cases from the ICTR under Rule 11bis of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
                                                          
41
 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force July 18 
1978) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser L 
V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 25 (1992) 
42
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (European Human Rights 
Convention) (Rome, adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) TS 71 (1953) Cmd 8969 
43
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) 
44
 Organic Law No 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 (Death Penalty Abolition Law) 
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(1995),45 some of the case law of the ICTR on decisions of transferral to Rwanda under Rule 
11bisI and also through critical analysis of key texts, such a Mark Drumbl’s work on 
punishment in international law46 and others such as El Zeidy47 and Silvia D’Ascoli48 which 
will be used to explain why the harsher penalties at the national level (as facilitated by 
Article 80 Rome Statute 1998) than the penalties provided for in Article 77 of the Rome 
Statute 1998, serve to undermine the justice of the ICC.  
 
1.3 Complementarity and Outreach 
As mentioned previously, the ICC is a ‘complementary’ judicial body to those of the 
domestic courts of the countries in which the crimes took place or those which have a 
sufficient interest in the prosecution (universal jurisdiction) as clarified in the Preamble to 
the Rome Statue 1998 where it is stated that the ICC will be ‘... complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction.’49 However, the Rome Statute 1998  is virtually silent about what 
exactly ‘complementarity’ involves and to what extent it is to be applied and it is also rather 
vague in its definition of when it is to be invoked, as will be illustrated by a brief examination 
of Article 17.50 In addition to looking at what the Rome Statute says about how the ICC is 
intended to act as a complementary court to the national courts, an analysis of  various ICC 
papers and documents will be undertake to assess how the idea of complementarity has 
changed since the ICC first became active. One of the key areas for this assessment will be 
the Review Conference at Kampala which took place between the 31 May and 11 June 2010, 
where the term ‘positive complementarity’ was affirmed as being the ICC’s current stance. 
Positive complementarity and what it entails in reality will be analysed through a critical 
                                                          
45
 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and Evidence UN Doc ITR/3/REV.1 (1995) 
(entered into force 29 June 1995) Rule 11bis 
46
 Mark A Drumbl, ‘Punishment, Post genocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda’ (2000) 75(5) NYL Rev 
1221 & Mark A Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law  (CUP 2007) 
47
 Mohamed M El Zeidy, ‘From Primacy to Complementary and Backwards: (Re)-Visiting Rule 11bis of the Ad 
Hoc Tribunals’ (2008) 57 Int’l & Comp LQ 403 
48
 Silvia D’Ascoli, Sentencing in International Criminal Law: The UN ad hoc Tribunals and Future Perspectives for 
the ICC (Bloomsbury Pub 2011) 
49
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
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analysis of ICC documents relating to the Kampala Review Conference51 and also through 
analysis of the various academic literature available on the subject, such as works by William 
Schabas,52 William Burke-White,53 El Zeidy54 and Katharine Marshall55 as well as various 
other works that discuss the complexities of complementarity and what it entails in reality.  
 
In relation to the principle of ‘complementarity’ within the context of this thesis, it will be 
explored with the following two questions in mind. The first questions posed will be if 
complementarity places the majority of the burden for the investigation and prosecution of 
these extraordinary crimes upon the national courts and these national courts are 
potentially giving harsher penalties than the ICC, then what does this mean for the status of 
the ICC and its justice? Secondly as will become evident during the course of the critical 
analysis of academic commentary on the subject of complementarity and the materials from 
the Review Conference in Kampala (2010), many of that States in which the crimes take 
place, are also in great need of capacity building before they could reasonably be described 
as being in a position to undertake prosecutions themselves. Which leads into the subject of 
outreach and the potential the ICC has for through outreach and education to ‘… whittle 
away operational differences between national modalities and [international] norms …’.56 
And in doing so, the ICC would then be able to ensure that death penalty is removed from 
available national penalties and that the national sentencing objectives more closely follow 
their own, so as to ensure more consistent and hopefully proportionate sentences for the 
                                                          
51
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extraordinary crimes prosecuted.57 
 
Linking in to this identified issue of the potential for outreach, it should be noted that the 
ICTR only began to realise the significance of outreach once  it had it begun its prosecutions 
for the Genocide in Rwanda during 1994. Rwanda at this point was in the aftermath of an 
internal conflict that resulted in Genocide and as direct result of this had what could only be 
described as a decimated legal system,58 as illustrated by the following figures (see table 1 
below). 
 
Table 159 
 
 
Table 1. Above taken from the Journal of the American Bar Foundation: Law & Social      
 
The table illustrates that the Rwandan judiciary and legal profession, had been virtually destroyed by the 
genocide and internal conflict of 1994. 
 
In response to this realisation the ICTR created ‘outreach programmes’ specifically designed 
to help rebuild Rwanda’s legal system and to help re-educate not only legislators, but the 
few remaining legal professionals, so as to facilitate Rwanda’s quest to attain its own justice 
for the many victims of the genocide. Thus having explored the principle of 
complementarity and the potential for influencing national legislation and process when 
                                                          
57
 Jane Stromseth, ‘Justice on the Ground: Can International Criminal Courts Strengthen Domestic Rule of Law 
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58
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59
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& Soc Inquiry 467, 468  
Prior to Genocide                           Aftermath of Genocide 
758 Judges      244 Judges 
70 Prosecutors      12 Prosecutors 
631 Support Staff     137 Support Staff 
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assisting with capacity building, it neatly leads into the next chapter of the thesis, where the 
reasons for proportionality and consistency in sentencing are essential to justice, so as to 
highlight why this should be a key consideration for the ICC when undertaking its outreach 
activities.60  
 
1.4 Proportionality and Consistency 
Having established that proportionality and consistency are fundamental to the process of 
justice required by the ICC and national courts when seeming to close the impunity gap,61 
this chapter will explore the paradox created by Article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998, where 
it is stated that, ‘Nothing in this part affects the application by States of penalties prescribed 
by their national law, nor the law of States which do not provide for penalties prescribed in 
this part.’ A paradox whereby there is the potential for great inconsistencies between the 
sentencing of the national courts and the ICC, as well as no discernible proportionality 
between the gravity of the offence and the punishment given. 
 
Moreover, this also links back to the ICC’s objective which is to act as an international court 
that is complementary to the national courts, that can step in to take legal action when 
States are unable or unwilling to do so themselves. This objective is something which seems 
highly improbable given that there is no alignment of penalties for the crimes between the 
ICC and its member States and how can such varied legal systems possibly hope to ensure 
that justice is brought about in a consistent and proportionate manner. Perhaps then, the 
ICC should use its position to lead by example62 and act as a benchmark for the legal 
systems of not only those States who require capacity building, but to also set a precedent 
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for the well-established national legal systems.63 Because as has already been established, 
these are not ordinary crimes which are dealt with on a daily basis, meaning even the most 
established legal system will not be overly familiar with dealing with these types of crimes. 
 
 Furthermore, the current situation where there it is unlikely that there will be consistency 
between sentencing practice of the ICC and the national courts, also undermines some of 
the key legal philosophies of punishment and their purposes, such as the retributivist theory 
that a penalty should be proportionate to the crime, deterrence theory whereby the 
punishment must be swift and certain64 and also the established legal principle of ‘Nulla 
Poene Sine Lege’,65 which provides that there can be ‘No punishment except in accordance 
with the law.’66 The purpose of exploring the different philosophies of punishment is to 
illustrate that when courts have differing sentencing objectives due to applying varying 
theories of punishment, they are also likely to come to very different determinations as to 
what is deemed an appropriate sentence for similar crimes; which will be highlighted in the 
chapter prior to this one, it is not an ideal situation when trying to stamp out impunity. 
 
This chapter will initially through a discursive analysis of the various theories of punishment 
review what they key objectives of punishment are, so as to highlight the wise ranging 
objectives that could be being pursued by the ICC and the national courts. The key texts that 
will be used here will range from some of those considered to be the founders of 
punishment theory such a Cesare Beccaria,67 Jeremy Bentham,68 to the more modern 
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interpretations of H L A Hart69 and Andrew Von Hirsch.70 Once the theories of punishment 
have been established so as to provide a context in which it is illustrated how varied 
sentencing can be depending on which punishment objectives the courts are seeking to 
apply, it is then to an assessment of how this has caused problems for the ad-hoc tribunals, 
with particular reference here to the inconsistent sentencing practice of the ICTY. Case law 
of the ICTY will be discussed and compared to illustrate disparities in sentencing, such as the 
disparity between Prosecutor v Biljana Plasvic (Sentencing Judgement) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 
February 2003) and Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic (Judgement) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999), which 
highlights vast variances, that certainly cannot be conducive to the attainment of justice.71 
 
Finally this chapter will also take a look at what this means for the ICC and will do so through 
a mixture of secondary sources such as academic commentary, most of which will be journal 
articles from academics such as Barbara Hola,72 Mark Drumbl73 and Dragana Radosavljevic,74 
by comparing the sentencing rationale of the two cases that the ICC has completed to date75 
and by assessing the relevant section of the Rome Statute 1998 and its Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (2002) in order to ascertain what guidance is given to the judges of the ICC. 
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 As Jeremy Sarkin has noted, ‘… the study of punishments in international criminal law is one 
area that remains underdeveloped.’76 Whilst there are many journal articles that tackle the 
worrying lack of codification and consistency of the penalties handed out by the ICTR and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), there appears to be 
very little literature that focuses on the ICC, although the ICC does have slightly more 
comprehensive penalty guidelines provided for in Articles 77  and 78 of the Rome Statute 
1998,77 with additional guidance given in Rule 145 of the Rule of Procedure and Evidence, 
which is more guidance than its predecessors had.  Research has shown Mark Drumbl’s 
book78 to be the only comprehensive assessment of the function and issues surrounding 
penalties in international criminal and national law, which also identifies the new issues that 
have arisen following the creation of the permanent ICC. In addition to Drumbl’s fairly 
comprehensive study, there are now journal articles highlighting the potential flaws of 
complementarity such as the potential for inconsistent and proportionate justice as well as 
the fact that much work to rebuild or educate the legal systems of the States involved is 
required before complementarity can function and these are by academics such as Venus 
Baghi and T R Maruthi79 and even Cherif Bassiouni80 who has been described as the ‘… 
father of international criminal law …’.81 Which, illustrates that this thesis is addressing a 
timely issue that is of growing concern amongst the international legal world and will take a 
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real life example as a case study to illustrate how all these concerns about the relatively new 
ICC and what it needs to achieve through outreach before complementarity can be 
effectively applied and to also avoid repeating the mistakes of the ad-hoc tribunals. 
 
1.5 The Rwanda Case Study 
As the ICC has not been in existence for a substantial period of time and has thus not 
completed many prosecutions to date, it will be difficult to assess the impact which the 
disparity of penalties may have on the ICC’s status amongst its member States and those 
States in which it is seeking to carry out investigations and prosecutions. However, this lack 
of co-operation from States as a result of their lack of respect, for what they might view as a 
‘paternalistic’ response ‘... [towards] weaker States, which serves only to assuage the West’s 
guilt at inaction ...’82 can potentially undermine the effectiveness of the ICC, as has been the 
case with the African Union when in 2010 they appealed to African States not to cooperate 
with the ICC over the arrest warrant of President Bashir of Sudan.83 Similarly in 2011, the 
African Union supported and encouraged Kenya’s request to delay the ICC trials of six 
Kenyan suspects, because Kenya now claimed it wanted to prosecute them within their 
national courts, despite failing to do so in 2007-2008.84 The reasons cited by Kenya for this 
sudden change of opinion on prosecuting the six high ranking political figures initially 
identified by the ICC, were that they felt that by conducting the trials in their domestic 
courts it would ‘… boost [their] efforts [for] peace, justice and reconciliation as well as 
uphold [their] national dignity and sovereignty; and prevent the resumption of conflict and 
violence.’85 But their capability to do so impartially and fairly given the political ties of those 
being accused to those currently in power in Kenya, makes it seem more likely that they 
                                                          
82
 Jeremy Sarkin, ‘Book Review of Mark A Drumbl: Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law ’ (2007) 30 (4) 
Hum Rts Q 1028, 1037 
83
 Alana Tiemessen, ‘Does the ICC Need to Reconcile with Africa? Bensouda Comes out Swinging’ (Justice in  
Conflict, 25 May 2012) < http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/05/25/does-the-icc-need-to-reconcile-with-africa-
bensouda-comes-out-swinging/> (Accessed on 22/08/2014);  International Justice Desk, ‘AU: Still Fighting with 
the ICC’ (Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 14 February 2012) < http://www.rnw.nl/international-
justice/article/au-still-fighting-icc> (Accessed on 22/08/2014) 
84
 - - ‘African Union Backs Kenya Call to Delay ICC Case’ (BBC News Africa, 1 February 2011) < 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12332563> (Accessed on 22/08/2014) 
85
 Ibid (BBC News Africa, 1 February 2011) 
17 
 
wanted to conduct their own sham trials and added to this, the African Union has over 
recent years made accusations that the ICC is singling out Africa whilst ‘… ignoring war 
crimes elsewhere in the world …’86  and of their being a ‘… pro-Western, anti-African bias 
…’.87 This does not portray the ICC in a positive light or signal that there is much respect and 
subsequently little promise of cooperation from the African States where its services and 
guidance are required most; these issues have been highlighted as the ICC’s two most 
significant challenges by Fatou Bensouda, the new ICC Prosecutor during an interview in 
May 2012.88 
 
However, by carrying out a comparative study between the ICTR and the domestic Rwandan 
courts, it will be possible to illustrate the potential problems that the ICC may encounter, as 
it begins to complete trials and investigations of its own alongside complementary 
prosecutions in national courts, such as lack of consistency and proportionality in penalties, 
as well as the realisation that much work is necessary before many of the States under 
investigation by the ICC are in a position to help themselves. The reason Rwanda has been 
chosen as a comparative study, is due to the fact that at the outset of the prosecutions for 
the genocide in 1994, the Rwandan courts freely gave out death sentences,89 whilst the ICTR 
like the ICC only had imprisonment at its disposal for those help most culpable. 
Furthermore, the Rwanda case is a timely and well documented example, which also 
illustrates many parallels to the ICC, such as the difficulties encountered when prosecuting 
alongside national courts that have very different ideas on suitable penalties for the same 
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crimes and also highlighting the importance of establishing the rule of law90 and imparting 
the norms of international law to the national level so as to try and facilitate some 
consistency in approach.91 In addition to this, both the ICTR and the ICC have or will be 
involved in prosecutions where the successful trials and what is deemed appropriate 
sentencing by those affected, could be the difference between helping a State repair itself 
or could spark a return to further conflict and bloodshed.92  
 
Thus the case study on Rwanda will begin with a brief overview of the events leading up to 
the genocide and the events the discussions leading to the creation of the ICTR, which will 
involve an analysis of UN Security Council Resolutions,93 correspondence between the 
Rwandan representative and the UN,94 academic commentary95 and also some additional 
sources such as the invaluable true stories from the victims, recorded by Philip Gourevitch.96 
Then once the correct context has been established an examination of the structure and 
work of the ICTR will be made and will be closely followed by a comparison of what 
happened at the national level in Rwanda to bring about justice for the crimes of genocide. 
This will also involve an examination of the Statute of the ICTR (Resolution 955) and the 
provisions it contained on the sentencing objectives of the ICTR, which then be compared to 
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the more codified Organic Law No 08/96 of 30 August 199697 where levels of sentence for 
certain types of crime were pre-determined.98 In addition to this a comparison of the 
national efforts to achieve justice and those of the ICTR, also serves to illustrate that 
especially in Africa where the vast majority of ICC investigations are currently taking place, 
then alternative traditional methods may be employed, that do not necessarily fit in with 
the standard ideals of justice as employed by the ICC. 
 
 This will then lead into the issue of the death penalty and the obstacles it caused to the 
transferral of cases from the ICTR under Rule 11bis,99 whereby all of the themes of the 
thesis, such as the need for pro-active outreach including capacity building and education, 
the necessity of adherence to human rights standards when prosecuting the crimes covered 
by the ICC and also the reasons why consistency and a level of proportionality in sentencing 
are important. These topics will be analysed using a mixture of primary sources such as UN 
resolutions,100 the Organic Laws of Rwanda; with particular attention to the law reforms of 
2007101 and an abundance of academic commentary. What is most timely and relevant 
about the Rwanda case study is that the death penalty was a major obstacle to the transfer 
of cases from the ICTR102 and as this thesis looks to see what problems the application of the 
death penalty by national courts when prosecuting in manner complementary to the ICC will 
have for the retributive and deterrence values of justice as well as seeking to highlight how 
this obstacle may eventually be overcome. It should be noted however, that the availability 
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of resources relating to the outreach work of the ICTR and how much of its work can be 
attributed to the legislative changes that occurred in Rwanda from 2007 onwards, is very 
scarce and therefore this thesis attempts to bridge that gap to some degree and based on 
the information known, to also make predictions about what the ICC may need to do in 
order to avoid some of the difficulties the ICTR had to overcome. 
 
The overall aim Rwanda case study is to understand how it was possible to align the 
penalties of a decimated and war torn State, such as Rwanda, with those of the ICTR and to 
highlight that the alignment of penalties not only made the facilitation of justice far more 
effective with increased co-operation between the national and international courts, it also 
ensured that the victims would feel that justice would now be served in a more consistent, 
proportionate and impartial manner.103 
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Chapter 2: Global Trend Towards Abolition of the Death Penalty 
The latest statistics from Amnesty International in their report entitles ‘Executions and 
Death Sentences in 2012’, show that there are currently 97 countries that have completely 
abolished the death penalty,  35 that are abolitionist de facto, 8 that have abolished it for 
ordinary crimes, with 58 remaining retentionist  and only 21 of those countries actually 
carrying out executions during 2012.104 When contrasted with the fact that only 15 
countries had abolished by 1950,105 it becomes clear that in the latter half of the last 
century and especially the last two decades,106 there has been an increase in the number of 
countries abolishing the death penalty altogether; with many more that have abolished it in 
practice or are considering a moratorium. 
 
It is evident that there is a global trend towards complete abolition of the death penalty, 
both at the national and international level as illustrated by the fact that none of the recent 
ad-hoc tribunals or courts and nor the ICC have had the death penalty as an available 
penalty; one which has gathered growing momentum over the past two decades.107 
However, what is less clearly defined is what drives this trend and the question of whether 
complete global abolition is a realistically attainable goal. Whilst the global tend towards 
abolition of capital punishment could be described as more of a human rights issue, rather 
than the issues surrounding the ICC and its complementary prosecution of atrocities which 
this thesis will be addressing, an overview of the abolitionist trend and the driving factors 
behind the reform is necessary to put the content of this thesis into context. More 
specifically, to highlight the peculiarity of the Rome Statute 1998 in Article 77 allowing 
States to retain the death penalty within their domestic law and permitting them to apply it 
when prosecuting for offences covered by the statute. However, before embarking upon an 
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examination of the various reasons given for the growing abolition momentum, it is 
necessary to look to the four key international instruments that can be described as being at 
the core of the global trend towards abolition. 
 
In the years directly preceding the Second World War the attitude in Europe let alone the 
rest of the world could hardly have been described as abolitionist. As illustrated by the 
eagerness with which the post war tribunals of Tokyo and Nuremburg handed down death 
sentences to the Nazi and Japanese war criminals.108 Similarly some of the countries which 
now champion the abolitionist cause, such as the UK and France, continued to use the death 
penalty within domestic criminal law as a penalty for murder until the late sixties and early 
seventies.109 Clearly illustrating the fact following the Second World War many countries, 
whom now champion the abolition cause, were not primarily concerned with abolition of 
capital punishment, is the Universal Declaration of Human rights.  
 
2.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration) was adopted by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on the 10 December 1948 and was never intended 
to be a binding treaty, simply more of an authoritative declaration of ‘… certain 
aspirations.’110 However the Universal Declaration has since its inception ‘… gained binding 
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character as customary law at a later stage …’111 and serves as the starting point for what is 
the exploration of the global trend towards abolition. However an overview of how the 
Universal Declaration came into being, the preparatory discussions and various 
amendments made to the final version of Article 3 (The Right to Life), only serve to illustrate 
that it never intended abolition of capital punishment to be interpreted from a reading of its 
Article 3.  
 
 The Universal Declaration was conceived prior to the end of the Second World War and is 
believed to have stemmed from the United States State Department, who had envisaged an 
international bill of rights, loosely based upon its own American Bill of Rights.112 Whilst 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration states, ‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person.’113 This clearly makes no reference to any exceptions to this right, which 
is ambiguous and could be interpreted as being abolitionist. However examination of the 
other articles together with the background information known about the various drafts and 
the discussions that took place amongst the drafting committees, show that whilst the 
Declaration did not intend to abolish the death penalty, it did intend to create some 
customary international norms, that would restrict it. For example Article 5 of the Universal 
Declaration states that, ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment …’114 is often cited by those arguing against the death penalty, 
especially in relation to the length of time spent on death row whilst awaiting execution. 
Similarly Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration, whilst not directly making any 
reference to the death penalty, do put in place procedural norms that provides those facing 
the death penalty with some degree of protection, by ensuring that procedural fairness is 
upheld in criminal trials and that death penalties cannot be applied retroactively. All of 
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which being legal principles that went on to be affirmed in international legal treaties in the 
years that followed.115 Similarly a brief assessment of the discussions of the drafting 
committee, particularly those of the third committee, serve to illustrate that whilst many 
acknowledged that the death penalty was increasingly being considered as a morally 
reprehensible act during times of peace, to include any such suggestion of such a view 
within the Declaration would be ‘premature’116 and could potentially make it difficult for 
many States to accept such an obligation.117 Therefore, whilst the Universal Declaration 
does not expressly mention abolition of the death penalty, it must be noted that it played a 
pivotal role in establishing the customary norms that form the basis of the international 
treaties that have followed; which have set about pushing for abolition. 
 
Having established that the Universal Declaration did not directly approach the issue of 
abolition of the death penalty, but instead laid the foundations of the principles that 
indicate ‘… a climate that advocated, in the name of democracy and freedom, the 
protection of citizens from the power of the state …’;118 we now turn to look at some of the 
international treaties that have subsequently followed the Universal Declaration. The 
creation of theses treaties and covenants which sought to push the boundaries and 
establish the customary norms relating to the use of the death penalty, can be interpreted 
as being indicative that the global opinion on the death penalty was set to change; as was 
affirmed by the creation of the International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights, 
which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1966119 and was intended to be binding. 
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2.2 The ICCPR and Second Optional Protocol 
The International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) like the Universal 
Declaration does not directly address the issue of abolition of the death penalty, in fact its 
stance on the application can be said to be very similar to that of the Universal Declaration.  
For example the ICCPR in Article 6(1) states that ‘Every human being has the inherent right 
to life’ which is very similar to the Universal Declaration’s, wherein  Article 3 states that 
‘Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.’120 However the ICCPR does 
illustrate progression on the path towards abolition, as unlike the Declaration it does 
expressly make reference to the death penalty in Article 6, where it makes restrictions upon 
the application of the death penalty. These restrictions take the form of a vague limitation 
upon its use only for ‘… the most serious crimes in accordance with the law…’121 and the 
bolder prohibition against it being applied to pregnant women and those who were under 
the age of eighteen when they committed the offence.122  Nonetheless, the most 
progressive statement in the whole of the ICCPR is that made by Article 6(6) where it is 
stated that ‘Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of 
capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.’ 
 
The above statement as expressed in Article 6(6) is undoubtedly a sign that the momentum 
of the abolitionist movement was finally beginning to gather pace.123 Furthermore, it should 
be noted that the ICCPR is binding upon all States that have ratified it, unlike the Universal 
Declaration, which was never initially intended to be binding, but has since ‘… gained 
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binding character as customary law…’.124 However, whilst it is intended to be binding upon 
all those who have ratified the covenant, it should be noted that some States, such as the 
United States of America have made reservations to Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR125 at the 
time of ratification which took effect from the 8 September 1992.126 Not only do such 
reservations undermine the intended purpose of the ICCPR, it also contravenes Article 4(2) 
of the ICCPR, which states that ‘No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 
15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision.’ This simply serves to illustrate that whilst 
the ICCPR and other international treaties, are intended to be binding upon those who ratify 
them, they are only effective to the extent that States are willing to apply them and given 
States continued reluctance to surrender their sovereignty and it should be noted that these 
reservations are not uncommon. However, in turning now to the Second Optional Protocol 
(SOP) to the ICCPR,127 we see that international treaties are further restricted by the fact 
that there is no necessity to sign up to them, merely a moral sense of duty and sometimes a 
political benefit; a fact that is clearly illustrated when it is noted that not all of the States 
whom have ratified the ICCPR have ratified the Second Optional Protocol. 
 
The most obvious explanation as to why fewer States have opted to ratify the SOP is that 
unlike the ICCPR, the SOP is clearly intended to bring about abolition of the death penalty, 
whilst the ICCPR through article 6(6) merely ‘… points … in the direction of abolition of the 
death penalty.’128  The SOP, which was adopted twenty three years after the ICCPR, via UN 
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General Assembly Resolution 44/128 of 15 December 1989,129 clearly illustrates that in the 
twenty three years that had passed between the two there had been a marked shift in 
attitudes towards capital punishment, seeing a shift from a desire by a few mostly European 
and South American States to encourage others to follow their abolitionist ideals, to a 
definitive ‘… international commitment to abolish the death penalty.’130 Unlike any of the 
previously discussed international instruments, the SOP to the ICCPR does not seek to 
restrict the application of the death penalty nor does it seek to ensure procedural fairness 
where capital punishment remains in force. In stark contrast it unequivocally requires that 
in order to be able to ratify it, that State must have abolished the death penalty.  Article 1(1) 
of the SOP to the ICCPR clearly says that, ‘No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to 
the present Protocol shall be executed’ which is a dramatic leap from the language of the 
ICCPR that merely suggested that abolition was desirable, through attempts to restrict the 
scope of the penalty and the categories of people eligible to it application. However, once 
again like the ICCPR and the Universal Declaration, there is no mandatory requirement that 
States should ratify the SOP to the ICCPR, but it does nonetheless serve to illustrate that the 
abolitionist cause was gathering momentum and support. 
 
2.3 From International to European 
Europe has often been cited as the champion of the abolitionist cause and given that 
membership to the European Union now comes with the prerequisite of complete abolition 
of the death penalty,131 it certainly seems fair to say that if not the definite champion of the 
abolition, it is most certainly one of the most influential. However before going into greater 
depth on the European Union and its conditions for membership, a brief examination of the 
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)132, its Sixth and Thirteenth Protocols and 
how they have contributed to the abolitionist cause will now be undertaken. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) like the ICCPR and Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, does not set to abolish the death penalty, as is evident from the fact that 
the only reference to the death penalty is in Article 2(1) where it is stated that, ‘No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
the conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.’133 This is not surprising 
given that the ECHR was created on the 4 November 1950,134 when the majority of 
European and other States across the globe, considered the death penalty to be an 
acceptable form of punishment, especially for murder and also in consideration of the 
proximity to the Second World War and the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials. However, the 
Sixth Protocol, which was created on the 28 of April 1983 and came into force on the 1 of 
March 1985 after being ratified by the requisite number of States, makes a dramatic leap 
from Article 2 of the ECHR, as an examination of the Sixth Protocol will illustrate. 
 
It is worth noting, that the need for an abolitionist piece of legislation within Europe was 
acknowledged as early as 1973, when the Consultative Committee of the Council of Europe 
sent a draft resolution aimed at abolition, to the Committee on Legal Affairs.135  This trend 
towards abolition has been identified as being in part due to the fact that capital 
punishment was increasingly being viewed as contradicting Article 3 of the ECHR, which 
prohibits cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. By May 1980 the European Ministers 
of Justice also felt that Article 2, which lawfully permits the retention of the death penalty, 
                                                          
132
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (European Human Rights 
Convention) (Rome, adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) TS 71 (1953) Cmd 8969 
133
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  (European Human Rights 
Convention) (Rome, adopted 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) TS 71 (1953) Cmd 8969 
Art 2(1)  
134
 European Convention on Human Rights entered into force on the 3 September 1953 
135
 European Committee on Legal Affairs, ‘Motion for a Resolution on the Abolition of Capital Punishment’ 
(May 18 1973, 8th sitting) OJC Doc 3297 Proposed by Bergegren, Wiklund, Aasen, Stewart, Dankert,, Radinger, 
Renschler, Bohman, Sjonell, Waag and Hansen. 
29 
 
was contrary to the actual practice of the majority of European States, who had by this point 
in time,136 become abolitionist or were in the processing of becoming abolitionist. As a 
result of this acknowledgement it was decided that new human rights norms needed to be 
established and that the ECHR needed to be made consistent ‘… with the new trends in 
criminology and criminal law…’,137 which would also reinforce the true meaning of Article 3 
of ECHR. 
 
Following in the footsteps of the United Nations and the ICCPR, the European Committee of 
Ministers felt that the most successful way of introducing abolitionist legislation, was via an 
optional and subsequently an additional protocol to the existing human rights instrument. In 
September 1981, the European Committee of Minsters instructed the Steering Committee 
on Human Rights138 to draft an additional protocol to the ECHR. Subsequently in September 
1982, only twelve months later, the draft protocol was approved and formally adopted at 
the 354th meeting of the European Committee of Minsters in December 1982.  
 
Whilst it may seem a relatively short and easy process of drafting and approving what would 
become the Sixth Protocol to the ECHR, it must be remembered that this had been in the 
offing since the European Committee on Crime and Problems first raised the issue of 
evolving norms in human rights law and global attitudes towards the death penalty in 
1957139, as well as an investigation that was led by the famous scholar and lawyer, Marc 
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Ancel. This was a subject that gained greater momentum from 1973 onwards when the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe sent a draft resolution proposing abolition 
of the death penalty, to the Legal Affairs Committee.140 The resolution, was spurred on by 
the recent decision of the United Kingdom’s House of Commons141 approval to the 
continued application of the private members bill abolishing the death penalty for murder in 
the United Kingdom; and compounded by the growing census that the death penalty was 
viewed as ‘… inhuman and degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the ECHR.’142 
Following this the Legal Affairs Committee, which was headed by Bertil Lidgard, submitted a 
revised report to the European Consultative Committee in 1976, which identified a single 
fundamental issue, which was ‘What is the right whereby men presume to slaughter their 
fellows?’143 
 
The report also noted that the United Nations had progressively moved towards an 
abolitionist stance and were keen to follow. However the momentum of this abolitionist 
movement was lost following the objections of the British delegates at the meeting of the 
Legal Affairs Committee in January 1976, as it was felt that the timing was not appropriate 
and it was feared that to push the issue too early could lead to the failure of any attempt to 
create European norms abolishing the death penalty. 144Nonetheless, the issue only lay 
dormant for a few years before it was reignited by the Amnesty International Conference of 
December 1977. 
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Having now established a bit about the background of the European journey to the 
abolitionist stance and the creation of the Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, which entered into 
force on the 28 April 1983 after being signed by twelve member States145, it is to the 
wording of the protocol and its applied interpretation that we turn, in order to ascertain the 
European stance on the death penalty. The Preamble to the Protocol No 6 to the ECHR 
states: 
Considering that the evolution that has occurred in several member 
States of the Council of Europe expresses a general tendency in 
favour of abolition of the death penalty; 
 
This Preamble clearly illustrates that Protocol No 6 to the ECHR was created due to a 
growing consensus among the member States of the Council of Europe that the death 
penalty was no longer considered an acceptable method of punishment. As affirmed by 
Article 1 of the Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, which states that ‘The death penalty shall be 
abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed’; if read in isolation this 
would suggest that the European attitude was one of complete abolition. However, when 
Articles 2 and 5 are considered, it becomes clear that whilst Europe was most certainly at 
the forefront of the abolitionist movement, it was also restricted in the same ways that the 
UN was when it created the Second Optional Protocol and the Inter American Commission 
when it created the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in 1990.146 In the 
sense that the drafters of all three abolitionist optional/additional protocols, acknowledged 
that whilst in principle the only way to create a truly abolitionist legislative instrument, 
would be to prohibit the use of the death penalty for all offences and both during peacetime 
and times of war. However, at the same time they were pragmatic enough to realise that 
the only way to guarantee States that were newly abolitionist or abolitionist de facto, would 
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sign up to the additional protocols, was to deal only with abolition during peacetime, so as 
not to appear too radical and off putting. As is clearly illustrated in Article 2 of Protocol No 6 
to the ECHR, which states: 
A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in 
time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances 
laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. 
 
The language of Article 2 expressly gives the States permission to retain and apply the death 
penalty for crimes committed in times of war or when war appears imminent, so long as it is 
codified within that State legislation. Furthermore, Protocol No 6 to the ECHR does not 
expand further upon its definition of the situations that could be classed as an ‘… imminent 
threat of war …’147; nor does it make reference to whether or not the conflict or threat of 
conflict must come from an outside State, thus leaving States open to apply the death 
penalty for offences committed during internal conflicts. Yet another compromise, inserted 
in order to encourage even States that were uncertain about abolition to consider ratifying 
Protocol No 6 to the ECHR. 
 
 
Following on with the theme of compromise, Article 5 (1) of Protocol No 6 to the ECHR also 
allows States that choose to ratify the protocol, further flexibility in relation to how and 
where within their territories they choose to apply the protocol. Whilst Article 5 (2) of  
Protocol No 6 to the ECHR allows for States to ‘ … extend the application of [the] Protocol to 
any other territory specified in the declaration …’ at a later date, suggesting that the 
drafters were simply allowing States greater flexibility in the hope that it would encourage 
expansion of the abolitionist ideology on a staggered basis. These appear to be acceptable 
and understandable compromises, given that they are aiming at gradual expansion of the 
abolitionist movement. However, in stark contrast is Article 5 (3)148 which states that those 
                                                          
147
 Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty (adopted 6-10 December 1982, entered into force 28 April 1983) 
ETS No 114, as amended by Protocol No 11 (entered into force 1 November 1998) ETS No 155 Art 2  
148
 Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
concerning the abolition of the death penalty (adopted 6-10 December 1982, entered into force 28 April 1983) 
ETS No 114, as amended by Protocol No 11 (entered into force 1 November 1998) ETS No 155    
33 
 
who have ratified the protocol are given permission to withdraw areas of territory from 
being bound by the protocol, so long as they do so by sending notification to the European 
Secretary General. Whilst this is shocking given the strong abolitionist sentiment that swept 
through Europe following the aftermath of the Second World War. It must be understood in 
the relevant context, which is that the Protocol No 6 to the ECHR was the earliest of the 
three main abolitionist additional or optional protocols and as such, ‘… was a seminal 
development in the abolition of the death penalty …’,149 that led the way for both the 
United Nations and the American States to follow. Therefore it is only logical that the later 
protocols would seek to go one step further and prohibit reintroduction of capital 
punishment once it has been abolished, nonetheless neither seek to go as far as to prohibit 
the use of capital punishment during times of war. 
 
 
Furthermore, in 1989 the European Parliament adopted the ‘Declaration of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms’,150 where Article 22 unequivocally states ‘The Death Penalty shall be 
abolished’;151 illustrating an evolving and more definitive attitude towards making the death 
penalty and relic of the past within Europe. The rights and protections set out in the 
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms are afforded to all citizens of the 
European community and are not to be ‘… interpreted as implying any right to engage in any 
activity aimed at restricting or destroying  the rights and freedoms set out …’152 within the 
declaration. The growing European stance, whereby complete abolition is the only 
acceptable option, has been further highlighted in recent years by complete abolition having 
been made a prerequisite of membership to the European Union153 as facilitated by the 
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creation of Protocol No 13 to the ECHR (2003),154 which calls for the death penalty to be 
abolished in all circumstances (generally States have abolished the penalty in ordinary law, 
but retained it for war crimes and piracy). In addition to this there has been an increase of 
cases where European member States have refused to extradite criminals to countries 
where they may potentially face the death penalty or other forms of treatment that would 
be held to violate the protections afforded them under the ECHR. This principle was 
established in the case of Soering v UK App no 14038/88 (ECtHR 7 July 1989), where the 
European Court of Human Rights upheld Soering’s claim that to extradite him to the USA, 
where he would potentially face the death penalty and therefore be exposed to a long 
period awaiting execution (the death row phenomenon)155 ‘…would expose him to a real 
risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set by Article 3[ECHR].’156 Whilst the principles 
established in Soering v UK157 have gone on to be used more frequently in cases opposing 
deportation for illegal asylum seeking, it nonetheless serves to illustrate that the European 
Court of Human Rights is opposed to sending those residing within Europe, back to States 
where they risk torture or cruel and unusual punishment; as Soering v UK158 has illustrated 
awaiting execution for long periods of time on death row, satisfies this criteria. 
 
 
Having established that Europe played an central role in the abolitionist movement 
following the Second World War due to a drastic change in attitude towards cruel and 
degrading forms of punishment, which can partly be attributed to abhorrence felt towards 
the shocking treatment of war criminals, Jewish people, Gypsies and many other 
unfortunate sectors of society by the Nazis;159 and also in part due to the evolution of social 
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and cultural norms where there was a growing aversion to pain and suffering.160  It is now 
the American States that we turn in order to assess the final of the three treaties and its 
additional protocols, which have helped to shape the global abolitionist trend. 
 
2.4 The American Stance 
As has previously been illustrated there are many parallels between the abolitionist 
instruments of the European Union and those of the United Nations, so it does not come as 
a surprise that the Inter American instruments also have many similarities and appear to 
have followed a similar chronological path of development. It therefore seems appropriate, 
to start with the period following on from the Second World War, as this has clearly been 
highlighted as the period in which human rights and abhorrence for capital punishment first 
came to the head of political agendas. The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,161 
was adopted by the Organisation of American States at the ninth international conference 
of American States in Bogota, Colombia in 1948. It must be noted that the Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man, makes no reference at all to the death penalty, in fact there is a 
strong resemblance to the Universal Declaration of Rights created by the United Nations. As 
is illustrated by the fact they both state that, ‘Every human being/everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and the security of his person.’162 
 
The only difference between the wordings of the two declarations is that the Universal 
Declaration uses the phrase ‘everyone’, where the American Declaration uses ‘human 
being’, a negligible variation of wording. Similarly both Declarations make no direct 
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reference to the death penalty, unlike Article 2 (1) of the ECHR (1950),163 which gives the 
sentence of death given by a court of law as an exception to the right to life, as well as an 
exception when death occurs due to lawful self-defence or in the course of lawful arrest and 
when necessary to quell riots. Again illustrating that Europe was has at the forefront of the 
abolition movement following the Second World War. However, it is worth noting that 
whilst the American Declaration does not expressly prohibit the death penalty, it does 
prohibit the use of ‘…cruel, infamous or unusual punishment’ as stated under the Right to 
Due Process of Law.164 Furthermore it should be noted the working group which created the 
American Declaration decided in light of the travaux preparatoires (preparatory works) to 
remove any direct reference to the death penalty, which had in any event only been 
considered for ‘serious crimes’, due to a lack of consensus amongst State parties.165 So as to 
make the declaration acceptable to all Inter- American States, some of who were then and 
still are strong advocates of the death penalty. This justification for the removal of the issue 
of capital punishment was expressed by Commissioner Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, when 
he explained ‘… [that] there was a consensus to delete any reference to the death penalty 
from Article 1 in view of the differences that existed among the States on this 
matter.’166However it has been suggested that whilst the American Declaration is ‘… 
textually silent on the death penalty, [it] is a norm that prevents arbitrary use of capital 
punishment’167 an issue that was debated in the case of Roach & Pinkerton v  United States 
(Case No 9647, Res No 3/87) Inter-American Court of Human Rights (22 September 1987) 147, 
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where the Commission of American States held that the American Declaration was silent 
upon capital punishment, but emerging customary norms were not.168  
 
Having established that the American Declaration makes no express reference to the 
abolition of the death penalty, but has been construed as suggesting that customary norms 
restricting its arbitrary usage has emerged it is not surprising that like the United Nations 
and Europe, the Organisation of American States over time came to feel that an agreement 
that was more binding in nature was necessary in order to ‘… advance the protection of 
human rights in the Western hemisphere …’.169 At the Fifth meeting of Consultation of the 
Ministers of Foreign affairs, which was held in Santiago (Chile) between August – September 
1959, it was decided that the necessary steps to make such advancement should commence 
and the Inter-American Juridical Committee was engaged to prepare a draft convention. The 
first draft that was given serious consideration by the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, was that put forward by Uruguay, which in paragraph two of the section 
dealing with the right to life, stated: 
The Contracting Parties shall abolish capital punishment. Reservations to this provision shall 
be admitted solely on condition that the sentence of death may be imposed only as a 
penalty for exceptionally serious crimes and pursuant to the final judgement of an 
independent and impartial regular court, which will satisfy due process of law, and in 
accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the commission of 
the crime.170 
However this Uruguay draft was abandoned in July 1968 when at a special session of the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, it was decided to bring the text of the ‘right to 
life’ provision closer to the text of the ICCPR. Whilst the revised draft was not as definitively 
abolitionist as the Uruguayan initial draft, due to what Uruguay acknowledged to be 
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‘unavoidable compromises’171 in order to appease the staunch retentionists of the death 
penalty, additional sections were added in which it is stated that ‘The application of such 
punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply …’172 and 
that ‘The death penalty shall not be re-established in States that have abolished it.’173 Thus 
making the provision into one that was forward thinking; looking towards a future in which 
abolition would become the norm, whilst at the same time not seeking too many radical 
changes so as to ostracise the staunchly retentionist States.  
 
In addition to the above mentioned restrictions upon signatory States, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)174 also stipulates several other conditions for the 
application of the death penalty, which can be described as proactively abolitionist, as they 
seek to clearly reduce the scope of those who it may be applicable to. The first of which is 
Article 4 (4) of Chapter II of the ACHR, which states the following about the death penalty, 
that ‘In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related 
common crimes’, something which the USA has refused to agree to, based upon the 
argument that this would interfere with their right to execute anyone who assassinated as 
US president.175 Secondly Article 4 (5) of the ACHR makes further restrictions by stipulating 
certain categories of people, who are to be exempt from the death penalty, which includes 
those under the age of 18 or over the age 70 at the time the crime was committed and 
pregnant women. Again this is clearly an attempt at gradual abolition by requiring 
retentionist States to slowly make changes and as a result of this, slowly decreasing the 
sections of the population that are eligible to receive the death penalty. However, a brief 
                                                          
171
 OAS ‘The Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights’ (San Jose, Costa Rica) Doc OEA/Ser 
K/XVI/1.1 Eng Doc 6 (1969) 2 
172
 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force July 
18, 1978) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser L 
V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 25 (1992) Art 4(2) 
173
 Ibid (American Convention on Human Rights) Art 4(3) 
174
 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered into force July 18 
1978) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser L 
V/II.82 Doc 6 Rev 1 at 25 (1992) 
175
 OAS ‘The Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights’ (San Jose, Costa Rica) Doc OEA/Ser 
K/XVI/1.1 Eng Doc 6 (1969) 1-2  
39 
 
overview of the effect the ACHR has had upon those States which have ratified it, will 
illustrate whether or not the intended goals have been attained. 
 
The ACHR which came into force on the 18 July 1978 following ratification by eleven States, 
has to date been ratified by a total of 25 States. However it should be noted that the USA 
has signed but not ratified the ACHR and several other States have ratified the ACHR but 
have made reservations to the articles pertaining to the death penalty. For example both 
Barbados and Trinidad & Tobago have ratified the ACHR but made reservations to Article 4 
(5) as it contradicts their domestic legislation.176 More surprising is the fact that, in-line with 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1979)177 neither reservations have been 
objected to within the 12 month period and therefore are now permitted to stay, 
furthermore in 1982 (just twelve months after ratification) Martin Marsh was executed by 
Barbados for a crime he committed whilst seventeen years of age,178 a clear contravention 
of Article 4 (5) of the ACHR. However, it should be noted that Barbados made no such 
reservations when it ratified the ICCPR in 1973, which contains an identical provision 
restricting the age groups that are eligible to be sentenced to death. This coupled with the 
fact that the USA has signed but not ratified the ACHR, would seem to suggest that despite 
the compromises that were made during the drafting of the ACHR, so as to make it 
acceptable to those States still retaining the death penalty, the ACHR is still too drastic for 
them to accept. Therefore it is not surprising that there have been many cases brought 
before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and the Inter- American Court of 
Human Rights disputing that the terms of the ACHR have been clearly breached.179  
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Similarly the UN International Law Commission has conducted a lengthy and in-depth study 
of the issues surrounding reservations not only to human rights treaties, but to all treaties, 
so as to clarify the stance that should be taken in the current legal climate and to clarify the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969).180 This study has culminated in the 
creation of the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties,181which closely follows the 
Vienna Convention (1969) and has sought to ‘…fill the gaps of the [Vienna Convention] and 
…removing the ambiguities in the existing rules, but without embarking on their 
amendment.’182 As is evidenced by the fact that guideline 3.1183is a direct reproduction of 
Article 19 of the Vienna Convention (1969)184  and like the Vienna Convention (1969), the 
ILC Guidelines of 2011185 have chosen not to deal with human rights treaties separately, but 
have instead incorporated the special circumstances created by human rights treaties 
involving the rights or obligations of third parties are considered with the insertion of 
guideline 3.1.5.6.186 Guideline 3.1.5.6 sets out how States or the bodies that oversee the 
adherence to the treaties should assess the permissibility of a reservation to a treaty 
containing interdependent, by providing the following guidance: 
To assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a treaty 
containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations, account shall be taken of that 
interdependence as well as the importance that the provision to which the reservation 
relates has within the general tenour of the treaty, and the extent of the impact that the 
reservation has on the treaty. 
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This is a direct expansion of Article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention, which provides 
guidance on what should be considered when determining whether a reservation to a 
multilateral treaty that also creates third party rights, is permissible or not. However, the 
most interesting point of the ILC Guide (2011)187 is that of guideline 4.5.3, which has been 
described as creating a middle ground188between the stance taken by the UN Human Rights 
Commission (UN HRC) in General Comment No. 24189 on how to deal with reservations that 
are deemed to be invalid and the extreme opposite view taken by the USA and the UK190 to 
the view expressed by the UN HRC in General comment No. 24. The UN HRC in General 
Comment No. 24 took the view that should a reservation be found to be invalid, then the 
treaty would simply continue to apply to that State, but ‘…without benefit of the 
reservation.’191 Whilst is stark contrast the USA and the UK felt that a policy of 
‘severability’192 should be undertaken whereby if the reservation is found to be invalid, then 
so is the ratification of the entire treaty.193  
 
However the ILC Guide (2011) has taken on board both extremes and found a middle 
ground, whereby in guideline 4.5.3 states that whether a State is bound by the treaty 
without the benefit of the reservation that had been deemed invalid, depends upon 
whether the State has expressed an intention as to ‘…whether it intends to be bound by the 
treaty without the benefit of the reservation or whether it considers that it is not bound by 
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the treaty.’194 And in guideline 4.5.3.2 the ILC states that when a State has made no 
expression at all, then they will be deemed to be bound by the treaty without the ‘…benefit 
of the reservation.’195 This stance taken by the ILC is interesting, as it clearly aims to bind as 
many States as possible to the treaties to which they freely become a party to, but without 
the ability to hide behind reservations that undermine  ‘… the object and purpose of the 
treaty.’196 In the case of Barbados as mentioned above, it is likely that in relation to the 
execution of Martin Marsh, because the reservation197 makes no expression that without 
the reservation to Article 4(5) of the ICCPR (1966) they do not wish to be bound to the 
ICCPR (1966), then it would likely be held that the ICCPR fully applied to Barbados and in the 
execution of Martin Marsh, they had breached their legal obligation. 
 
As previously mentioned the Organisation of American States stance on the abolition of the 
death penalty, closely followed that of Europe and the UN, therefore it is unsurprising that 
by 1986 some of the more staunchly abolitionist States felt that the current ACHR with its 
many reservations was simply not enough to ensure that abolition would occur. In the 1986- 
1987 annual report of the Inter- American Commission, they suggested creating an 
additional protocol, similar to that of the ECHR or the ICCPR, whereby the death penalty 
would be abolished for all crimes except for certain military crimes during times of war; 
subsequently in 1987 the Inter-American commission was instructed to review a draft 
additional protocol and on the 8 June 1990, by Resolution 1042 of  the twentieth regular 
session of the Organisation of American States, General Assembly, the additional protocol 
was adopted.198 The protocol of the ACHR is far shorter than that of the ICCPR of the ECHR 
and is more similar to the SOP to the ICCPR than the Protocol No 6 to the ECHR, as it is 
intended to exclude the death penalty at all times, whilst providing for an exception to be 
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made during times of war.199 Whilst the ACHR Protocol is noticeably shorter than its 
European and UN counterparts, it seems to afford the same level of guidance and 
protection. The ACHR Protocol states that when the death penalty needs to be applied 
during times of war, it must be applied ‘… in accordance with international law, for 
extremely serious crimes of a military nature’,200 which clearly makes reference to the 
third201 and fourth202 Geneva Conventions and also their additional Protocols.203 Sadly to 
date only thirteen States out of a potential thirty two have ratified the ACHR Protocol and it 
is not surprising that the steadfast retentionist States such as the USA, Jamaica and Trinidad 
& Tobago have neither signed nor ratified the Protocol. However, only time will tell if the 
ACHR and its Protocol relating to abolition of the death penalty can be classed as being 
successful, because unlike Europe at the time of the creation of Protocols No 6 and No 13 to 
the ECHR, the Inter-American States have far more States retaining the death penalty and 
who are also applying it than Europe did, therefore making it a much larger challenge for the 
American States, that Europe. 
 
 
2.5 Social and Political Factors 
Having explored the various international pieces of legislation that can be attributed with 
having created what can only be described as a wave of abolition which peaked during the 
last twenty years, it is also vital to explore the question ‘Is the Death Penalty Dying?’204 This 
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question favours historical and political explanations as to why the use of the death penalty 
is in decline and it has often been noted that as society has evolved, so too has our distaste 
for the ‘Spectacle of Suffering’;205 the most notable illustration of this being the removal of 
executions from public places, which begun in the 1830’s in New England.206It should be 
noted that since this date, the vast majority of executions have taken place mostly behind 
prison walls, it would seem unlikely that any retentionist State could argue that they merely 
retain the death penalty for deterrent effect, as something which does not shock the 
conscience of those it is intended to deter is unlikely to have little or no effect. Furthermore, 
given that we are now living amongst a generation where the death penalty is fast becoming 
a ‘…barbaric relic of the past…’207 is not unreasonable to expect that, ‘… the final destination 
is approaching when all countries will have agreed that the killing of captive criminals should 
be outlawed forever.’208 
 
However for this to become a realisation, it has been implied by many such as Roger 
Hood,209 G Stephanie L Kent,210 James Unnever and, Eric Neumayer211 as well as many more 
legal and political theorists that ‘… the continuation of the abolitionist trend is contingent on 
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a further spread of democracy around the world …’.212 The logic behind this argument 
assumes that in democratic States, there is a more balanced society and a lesser disparity of 
wealth and social standing, even amongst the minority groups.213 Which in turn is supposed 
to create a society where there is no desire to suppress the minorities by means of force 
and violence, as they are given an equal voice due to the way in which democracy allows 
everyone to have their say,214but as always there is an exception to the above theory, which 
is the USA. However, as to why the USA despite being a staunch global advocate of human 
rights and a proud democratic nation it still continues to be one of the main global 
advocates of the death penalty,215 as subject which this thesis neither has the time or the 
relevancy to explore in any depth. Nonetheless, it is argued that without the fear and need 
for suppression the desire for harsh and incapacitating punishments lessens and thus we 
find States more willing to abolish the death penalty.216  
 
Closely linked to the belief that democracy is linked with the willingness to relinquish the 
use of the death penalty, is the argument that States with a more prosperous and 
developed economy are more willing to use non - lethal incapacitating or rehabilitative 
forms of punishment;217 such as imprisonment for life or at the very least long periods of 
time. This argument is based on the idea that States with struggling economies often choose 
capital punishment rather than lengthy prison sentences to protect society from the most 
dangerous of criminals because it is the cheaper option, due to incarceration being a costly 
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choice of punishment.218 However in direct contradiction to the view that States which are 
democratic and economically well-developed tend not to retain the death penalty, sits the 
United States of America (USA); which sits alongside States such as China, Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, as the most prominent users of the death penalty globally. What is noticeable about 
this group of States who have been attributed with carrying out the majority of death 
sentences in recent years, the top five in 2012 of which were China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia 
and USA, with Yemen not too far behind,219 is that the USA is the only State within this 
group that is a democratic nation and one that is also actively ‘…championing human rights 
in other countries…’220  
 
However, it should be noted that whilst America is the ‘exception’ to the general trend of 
abolitionist States being democratic, economically sound and at the very least aware of the 
basic human rights of their citizens, there does seem to be some indication that the USA 
may be coming around to the abolitionist ideal. As indicated by the fact that by the 18 
September 2014,221 only thirty executions have been carried out in the USA which seems to 
indicate a marked decrease in the number of executions carried out, compared to a peak of 
ninety eight executions carried out during in 1998.222 This trend towards a decline in the use 
of the death penalty as a form pf punishment within the USA is also supported by the fact 
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that of the thirty223 executions carried out in the USA during 2014, they took place in only 
seven of the thirty four States within the USA that currently retain the death penalty and of 
these seven, only three224 have executed more than one person during 2014.225 There are 
many complex and varied explanations as to why this trend has occurred, such as the 
religious fervour of the southern States, the racial disparity that still remains between the 
white ruling classes and the ever increasing black minority. However this thesis is not the 
place to discuss these issues in any great depth, as the sole purpose of this chapter has been 
to merely provide a brief overview of the general global trend towards abolition of the 
death penalty, so as to provide background information and to place the key argument of 
the thesis in the correct context. 
 
Moreover, all  that remains to be said in relation to the death penalty and its role in both 
international and domestic law is that it is an ancient regime  that is slowly being eradicated 
through the growing ‘… acceptance of international human rights principles …’,226 which is 
being aided by the growing trend for democratic States where the minority in power no 
longer seek to suppress the masses, but where they aim to give them a voice and treat all 
with respect, dignity and what have  become commonly accepted as our inalienable human 
rights. Finally in relation to the American ‘exception’ all that remains to be said, is that 
should they choose to join Europe and the majority of other democratic nations around the 
globe who have abolished the death penalty, then we could well see ‘… a whole new 
momentum [on] the global abolitionist campaign …’,227 which could very well signal the start 
of the end for the death penalty. Subsequently this could potentially give the ICC the 
necessary confidence to apply pressure to States not to use the death penalty when 
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prosecuting crimes that potentially fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, thus facilitating 
greater consistency between the national and international prosecutions. However, until 
the ICC has been in existence for a greater period of time and had subsequently completed 
many more successful prosecutions, this may be a little too ambitious an aim, but one 
nonetheless, that should be forgotten as the ICC has the potential to lead the way in 
illustrating that the death penalty no longer has a place in a world that fights to uphold 
respect for human rights.  
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Chapter 3: The Principle of Complementarity 
The principle of complementarity is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as ‘A relationship or 
situation in which two or more different things improve or emphasize each other’s 
qualities.’228 Which if applied in a legal context simply means that two or more legal bodies 
work together by using their strengths to achieve a common goal. However in the context of 
the ICC it is a principle that allows the ICC and the domestic courts to work together to 
ensure that:  
… [T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not 
go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at 
the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.229 
More specifically in relation to the ICC, it is a principle whereby the ICC given its limited 
resources and the vast numbers of cases it could potentially investigate and prosecute, it 
acts as a court of ‘last resort’230 to step in where the State is ‘… unwilling or unable 
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.’231 Whilst the Rome Statute 1998 
does not expressly make reference to the principle of complementarity it does define the 
ICC as being a body that shall be considered ‘… complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions …’;232 it is Article 17 of the Rome Statute 1998 that sets out when the ICC is 
required to intervene and is thus the most important body of text when discussing the 
principle of complementarity in the context of the ICC. In order to ascertain why the ICC has 
chosen to pursue a principle of being complementary rather than opting for primacy as 
adopted by the ICTY and ICTR, an overview of the drafting of the Rome Statute 1998 will be 
necessary. 
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3.1 Drafting of the Rome Statute 1998 
Whilst the notion of an International Criminal Court was first raised on the 9 December 1948 
by the UN General Assembly;233which subsequently set the International Law Commission 
(ILC)234 the task of drafting a resolution to create an international criminal court, that would 
conform to Article VI of the Genocide Convention,235 this section will skip to the post - Cold 
War efforts and drafts. Due to the fact that during the Cold War, efforts to draft a statute to 
create and international criminal court were put on hold, but following the fall of the threat 
of Communism, followed by the atrocities occurring in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia 
international attention was once again reminded that following the horrors of the Second 
World War, the UN and its member States had sworn to change the globe from one where 
there was a ‘… culture of impunity to a culture of accountability.’236 Momentum in support 
of international accountability for crimes against humanity grew throughout the 1990’s with 
the creation of the ICTY in 1993 and the ICTR 1994. The perceived need for these ad-hoc 
tribunals and outside intervention to bring the perpetrators to justice, stemmed in part 
from the globalisation of media coverage and what could be perceived as a weakening of 
the age old doctrine of sovereignty.237 As the days where news travelled slowly and the 
earth had time to absorb spilt blood before the rest of the world could be made aware of it, 
were long gone238 and so too were the once sacred boundaries of State sovereignty and the 
legal protection this afforded the States from the intervention of others outside their 
sovereign boundaries.239  
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More significantly the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, which are currently in the final 
phases of their completion strategies, served to highlight the need for a truly supranational 
and permanent legal body that can intervene and bring to account those who commit the 
gravest crimes known to mankind, when the States in which they occur are ‘unable or 
unwilling to …’240 to do so themselves. Subsequently in 1994 the UN General Assembly 
decided to pick up where the ILC had left off and used their draft as a starting point. The ILC 
had envisaged an international court much like the ICTY and ICTR,241 in that it had created 
its draft so as to give the ICC supremacy. However the Ad Hoc Committee of the UN noted 
concerns from States regarding this principle and as a compromise suggested a principle of 
‘complementarity’ where the ICC could only exercise jurisdiction where ‘… domestic courts 
were unwilling or unable to prosecute …’242 and they were keen to strike a balance that 
ensured ‘… not only to safeguard the primacy of national jurisdictions, but also to avoid the 
jurisdiction of the court becoming merely residual to national jurisdiction …’,243 a somewhat 
tricky balance to attain.  Following on from the work of the Ad - Hoc Committee, the UN 
General Assembly formed a Preparatory Committee, which was made up of member State 
delegates, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and an assortment of other 
international organisations. This Preparatory Committee met on five occasions over the 
course of 1996 and 1997, they finally submitted what became known as the ‘Zutphen 
draft’;244 which with a few alterations became the basis of the final draft that was submitted 
to the Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries245 that meet on the 15 June 1998 in 
Rome. 
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The draft submitted in Rome, contained many variations and wording options, however the 
issue of complementarity had largely been resolved at the Preparatory Committee stage 
and remained uncontested at Rome.246 In contrast, the issues of definition of crimes and 
matters relating to jurisdiction when the offender was not a national of a member State, 
were a focal point of the discussions and debate that took place in Rome.247 Furthermore, 
due to time constraints at the Rome Conference and a general desire to avoid a Rome 
Conference Part II, the Drafting Committee in Rome were prohibited from making any 
alterations to Articles 5-21 of the Rome Statute 1998, so the issue of complementarity 
remained unchanged.248 This was not surprising, given that multilateral treaties are often 
approved in the final stages by diplomatic representatives of the various member States, 
who have little legal knowledge and are therefore ill equipped to create legislation of any 
level.249 
 
Thus in summary, the reason the ICC was created as a court to complement rather than 
have primacy over the national courts can be explained in a few simple and brief points. 
Firstly, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, who were designed to prosecute those guilty of crimes 
against humanity in just one particular State, the ICC has been created to act as a court of 
‘last resort’250 on a global scale.251 Therefore, the ICC follows a principle of being 
complementary rather than seeking to assert primacy over all crimes that potentially fall 
within its jurisdiction. Secondly State sovereignty, which despite significant advances in 
international law within the last fifty or so years where a ‘… state sovereignty orientated 
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approach [having] been gradually supplanted by a human-being orientated approach …’252 
many States still show a strong desire to retain their sovereign rights. Therefore it is not 
surprising, that whilst many States are more than happy to be a member of the ICC, it is 
highly unlikely that they would ever have signed had they felt that their sovereign right to 
prosecute their own nationals or crimes that were committed within their territories; would 
be seriously impinged. Finally the most effective method of justice is not always achieved by 
an international body, which is both culturally and geographically far removed from where 
the crimes took place and where the victims and offenders reside.253 It is often the case, 
that domestic routes for justice provide a greater opportunity for healing and restorative 
justice,254 as well as the added bonus of it being far cheaper and providing easier access to 
evidence and witnesses. 
 
3.2 How Does the Rome Statute Define Complementarity? 
Having now established why the drafters of the Rome Statute 1998 chose to opt for a 
principle of complementarity for the ICC rather than one of primacy as advocated by its 
predecessors (the ICTY and ICTR), it is time to examine what exactly the statute says about 
complementarity and how it is to be applied in practice. Article 17255 sets out the ‘issues of 
admissibility’ and defines when the ICC can take action and it is here that we will begin our 
assessment of how the Rome Statute 1998 defines and applies the principle of 
complementarity. The essence of complementary and what this means to the ICC and the 
way in which it interacts with the national courts of its member States, is defined by Article 
17 (1) (a) and (b), which state: 
‘The Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: 
                                                          
252
 Frederica Goia, ‘State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction & Modern International Law: The Principle of 
Complementarity in the ICC’(2006) 19 LJIL 1095, 1099 
253
 Victor Peskin, ‘ Courting Rwanda: The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme’ (2005) 3 JICJ 
950, 953 
254
 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, ‘Reconciling Fractured Societies: An African Perspective on the Role of Judicial 
Prosecutions’ in Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent (eds), From Sovereign Impunity to International 
Accountability: The Search for Justice in a World of States (UN Uni Press 2004) 216 
255
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 Art 17 
54 
 
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution; 
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State 
has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted 
from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;’ 
From this, it can be understood that the ICC will only step in to intervene where an eligible 
State with jurisdiction over the matter is ‘unwilling or unable’ to carry out the investigation 
or prosecution. The insertion of the word ‘genuinely’ merely serves to emphasise the fact 
that the ICC will also be willing to step in and take action, when it feels that the investigation 
or prosecution is a sham designed to protect a person from genuine proceedings.  
 
An example of where the ICC has stepped in due to feeling that the State is unwilling to take 
action themselves, can be seen in Kenya where under Article 15 of the Rome Statute 1998256 
the Prosecutor initiated prosecutions based upon his own initiative and the grounds of their 
being a ‘reasonable basis’.257 Initially six arrest warrants were issued for high ranking 
political figures within the Kenyan State Party,258 for example Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta who is 
the current President of Kenya and Mohammed Hussein Ali, the then Commissioner of the 
Kenyan police.259 Whilst six individuals were initially detained in 2011, on the 23 January 
2012 the ICC subsequently declined to confirm charges against Henry Kiprono Kosgey and 
Mohammed Hussein Ali260 and then in March of 2013 charges were also withdrawn against 
Francis Kirimi Muthaura, as the Prosecutor felt that there was not a ‘… reasonable prospect  
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of conviction at trial.’261 However it should be noted that this is not a sign that the ICC is 
backing down from its commitment to hold people to account for the atrocities occurring in 
Kenya; as was illustrated by the fact that on the 2 October 2013 the Pre-Trial Chamber 
unsealed an arrest warrant against Walter Osapiri Barasa262 a journalist who has been 
accused of ‘… corruptly influencing …’263 witnesses, which is a first for the ICC going after a 
person for witness tampering. Furthermore, Kenya is technically capable of carrying out the 
prosecutions in the sense that it has a fairly comprehensive legal system in place,264 but 
given the level of violence and corruption within the State coupled with the high powered 
political status of those being prosecuted, it is easy to understand why a State could 
reasonably be expected to provide a genuine investigation and prosecution, nor would they 
have any desire to do so.  
 
In contrast to the situation in Kenya, where the Office of the Prosecutor took the initiative 
to initiate proceedings, in Uganda the investigations came about following a self - referral to 
the ICC in 2003,265 from the Ugandan President Yoweri Musevnei in a what has been 
described as bid to try and bring the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the negotiation 
table.266 This assertion that the self-referral was nothing more than a tactic by the Ugandan 
government to ‘… isolate the LRA from foreign backers and drive it to the negotiating table 
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…’267 has been reinforced by the fact that whilst the Office of the Prosecutor conducted its 
investigations and attempted to detain Joseph Kony and his four key LRA members,268 the 
Ugandan Government began peace negotiations with the LRA, culminating in the 
‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation’,269 which was intended to ensure that LRA 
leaders would be prosecuted through ‘national legal arrangements’.270 The peace 
agreement was envisaged to incorporate a mixture of formal justice and the more 
traditional Ugandan conflict resolution Mato Oput (to drink from a tree), which were 
believed to carry a greater potential for restorative justice271 and had also controversially 
hoped to include immunity from arrest for Joseph Kony and his key figures, had President 
Museveni succeeded in convincing the ICC to make the arrest warrants disappear.272 
However, the ICC refused to drop the arrest warrants and despite Uganda’s attempts to 
regain control and deal with the crimes and ongoing civil war at a national level, plus the 
fact Joseph Kony refused to sign the ‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation’273  
which in turn meant that the ICC actively resumed its proceedings, so to date neither the 
ICC or Uganda have been able to detain any of the key LRA figures. It has been questioned 
whether the ICC’s refusal to drop its own proceedings against the key figures of the LRA, so 
as to allow the Ugandan pursue their alternative methods of accountability via the 
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‘Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation’274 in an attempt to facilitate reconciliation 
and restore peace, was contrary to the principle of complementarity?275 It was contrary in 
the sense that whilst Uganda were now showing willing and able276 to take action for 
themselves, given the unconventional nature of the method chosen it was not considered 
‘…criminal proceedings as such for the purpose of assessing the admissibility of cases before 
the International Criminal Court, but they are an important part of the fabric of 
reconciliation…’.277 However, within Africa  which happens to be where the all the current 
ICC investigations278 are situated, these types of unconventional proceedings that focus on 
truth and reconciliation are the preferred method,279 meaning that States who are taking 
action of the unconventional form, will be deemed as showing an ‘ … unwillingness to 
prosecute.’280 
 
The guidance given by the Rome Statute 1998 as to what constitutes ‘unwillingness’ or 
‘inability’, is very brief and vague given that this is such a crucial part of the ICC’s decision 
making process, as to whether or not they should investigate and prosecute. Article 17(2) of 
the Rome Statute 1998 states that a State will be found ‘unwilling’ if the national 
proceedings are merely taking place in order to ‘… [shield] the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court …’,281 where there is a 
‘… unjustified delay in proceedings which… is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice;’.282 In addition to these two conditions dealing with instances where 
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States are strategically shielding the accused, the article also states that where ‘… 
proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially …’283 and this 
too will constitute evidence of unwillingness. Similarly section 3 of Article 17, gives an 
equally broad definition of what the ICC will deem to be evidence of ‘inability’, by stating 
that this will be determined when the court considers that:  
… due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the 
State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings.284 
This is probably the most sensible of all the preconditions for admissibility to ICC 
investigation and prosecution because more often than not, in a country that has been host 
to any of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC, it is highly likely that there will no 
longer be a functioning legal system in place, as was the case in Rwanda following the 
genocide.285 Furthermore, if there is still some form of functioning legal system in place, it is 
highly plausible that it will be somewhat diminished in resources and finances and quite 
likely to be politically corrupt and therefore in no position to carry out such complex, high 
profile and politically sensitive investigations and prosecutions, as was the case in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) when it made a self-referral to the ICC in March 
2004.286 However this is not to suggest that primacy would necessarily be a better option, as 
very few States would have been likely to have become party to a treaty that created a 
court that would have primacy over such crimes, as to do so would be too great an 
impingement upon their sovereignty and would create an even more difficult situation than 
currently exists.287  Moreover, one small paragraph seems ill equipped to deal with such a 
complex matter and further examination of the Rome Statute 1998 provides no further 
explanation or guidance on the matter or ‘inability’ or ‘unwillingness’. 
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Whilst no further expansion of the test of ‘inability’ or ‘unwillingness’ is provided within the 
statute, there are other sections that deal with the issues that may arise once the ICC has 
deemed a State unwilling or unable. For example Article 18 provides a ‘… further procedural 
filter to the benefit of States sovereignty …’288 by setting out the conditions in which a State 
may take ownership of an investigation and prosecution, which it can do by notifying the ICC 
of their current or past investigations of the same persons, within a month of receiving 
notification from the ICC of their intention to launch an investigation.289 Furthermore, 
Section 5 of Article 18 of the Rome Statute 1998 puts in place a procedural safeguard, by 
stipulating that after a period of six months the Prosecutor has the right to investigate the 
State’s proceedings in order to determine whether they are genuine and adequate. 
Similarly, Article 19 sets out the grounds upon which a State may make a challenge to an 
investigation or prosecution being undertaken by the ICC and provides some guidance as to 
how this is to be progressed from the Pre-Trial Chamber to the Trial Chamber and possibly 
the Appeals Chamber as a last resort. Whilst Article 19 does not expand upon what 
complementarity really is, it should be noted that it highlights the ‘… severe tension 
between the powers of the Prosecutor, and the priority of States in the complementarity 
regime.’290 
 
To surmise what has so far been established about the principle of complementarity as it is 
enacted by the ICC, is that it is a principle whereby the ICC will only step in where the State 
is unable to do so, due to having an insufficient legal system or a corrupt legal system, 
alternatively the ICC will also seek to complement the national courts when a State is 
unwilling to take action themselves, despite having the mechanisms in place to facilitate 
justice. However, one issue that the Rome Statute 1998 fails to address, is how the ICC can 
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realistically complement a legal system that is intrinsically different from its own? As 
William Schabas highlighted: 
… [A]s originally conceived, the term ‘complementarity’ may be somewhat of a misnomer, 
because what is established is a relationship between international justice and national 
justice that is far from ‘complementary’. Rather, the two systems function in opposition and 
to some extent with hostility vis-à-vis each other.291 
 Which is something that Schabas has described as potentially causing more friction than the 
policy of primacy established by the ad-hoc tribunals, because at least primacy does not 
enquire as to the ‘…failure or inadequacy of the domestic system.’292 Whilst in contrast 
complementarity either assumes that a national legal system is capable but is failing to do 
its duty to seek justice, or as is more likely to be the case the situation will be that the 
national legal system will be in need of rebuilding or strengthening, which is something that 
Barbara Hola293 and Jane Stromseth294 have highlighted as being key to the ICC being able to 
continue its work. Stromseth puts forward a very convincing argument wherein she states 
that ‘… capacity-building is important because, in the long-term, domestic justice systems 
that are capable of delivering reasonably fair justice and that enjoy public confidence are 
crucial to preventing future atrocities and to building a stable rule of law.’295 And indeed this 
is especially relevant for the ICC which works on a principle of complementarity, because 
the more effort that is put into ensuring the rule of law and the legal systems are 
strengthened at the national level,296 then in the long-term the ICC will be ensuring that the 
level of cases able to be dealt with by the national courts will not spiral out of control to 
such a level that the ICC could not cope.  
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 Whilst the principle of complementarity does lay the responsibility of investigation and 
prosecution with the national courts in the first instance, this is not always an ideal situation 
because as Schabas stated above, the national and the international legal systems are often 
in ‘opposition’297 to one another, as has been highlighted by the death penalty debate. For 
example nineteen298 of the one hundred and twenty two member States of the ICC still 
retain the death penalty, so how can a court that views life imprisonment as an extreme 
penalty realistically complement legal systems that may give the death penalty? It is not 
surprising that given the ICC is established by a multilateral treaty, it excludes the death 
penalty because there are many States that would not become have signed the treaty had 
the Rome Statue 1998 not reflected the current trend in international human rights law; as 
was explored in great depth during chapter two of this thesis, so as to provide a grounding 
for issues such as this. However, if the ICC were to aim to help strengthen the rule of law at 
the national level as proposed by Barbara Hola, then through education and leading by 
example, a relationship could potentially be established wherein a consistent approach to 
sentencing may develop between the national and the ICC’s prosecutions299 as a by-product 
of the outreach work that is essential to maintaining the ICC as a complementary court. 
 
 In addition to the issue of national courts often requiring capacity building being an 
obstacle to the principle of complementarity as discussed above, El Zeidy300 has noted that 
the statute of limitations poses another obstacle to the principle of complementarity in that 
is serves to highlight yet another area where the ICC and the national legal systems may 
differ. A statute of limitations is an act ‘… which proscribes the periods within which 
proceedings to enforce a right must be taken or the action is barred.’301 The Rome Statute 
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1998 bars all statutes of limitation upon the crimes within its jurisdiction,302 which can 
potentially become an obstacle when a member State does have a statute of limitations 
within its domestic legislation for that same offence as ‘…how can the International Criminal 
Court be ‘complementary’ when the State has a statute of limitations on an offence that the 
International Criminal Court does not?’303 Because this would mean that whilst a State 
would no longer be able to prosecute the crimes due to the passing of the ascribed period 
of time in which action can be brought, the ICC will have no such restrictions and may well 
find their workload increased substantially, as this now provides another circumstance 
under which the national courts may be ‘unable’ to carry out their own investigation or 
prosecution.304 
 
The issues or discrepancies between the national and the international legal systems at 
odds with one another as highlighted above, are simply a few of the many questions which 
the Rome Statute 1998 remains silent upon. However the Office of the Prosecutor has over 
recent years come to acknowledge, them to be obstacles standing in the way of the ICC 
attaining its ultimate goal of bringing an end to impunity, through facilitating the member 
States to help themselves bring an end to the culture of impunity.305 Having now looked at 
the rather scant and vague provision given to the issue of complementarity provided within 
the Rome Statute 1998, it is to the real life implications of the implementation of the 
principle that we must now look, in attempt to understand why complementarity has 
evolved into what is now more commonly known as positive complementarity.  
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3.3 A New and Evolving Kind of Complementarity 
This terminology was confirmed at the ICC Review Conference at Kampala in 2010;306 whilst 
the conference focussed mainly on setting out the definition for the new crime of 
aggression as covered by the amended Article 8 of the Rome Statute 1998, there was also 
much discussion about the need for complementarity to move away from the two 
dimensional black and white text form of the principle as stipulated in Article 17. It was 
identified at Kampala that complementarity needed to evolve in order to be a more realistic 
principle which acknowledged whilst there are many instances where a State’s judiciary may 
be willing to take legal action; they sadly are unable to do so due to a multitude of factors. 
This was succinctly summarised by William Schabas, who wrote that the new concept of 
‘positive complementarity’ which has emerged is one where:  
… a more benign relationship with national justice systems is encouraged [whereby] The 
Court, and other States Parties not involved in the prosecution itself , are to cooperate with 
the State concerned in provision of technical assistance.307 
 
This new drive to get other States to help put the State concerned into a position whereby it 
can possibly carry out its own investigations and prosecutions, stems from the realisation 
that the ICC has neither the financial resources or the manpower to keep up with the 
growing number of ICC eligible crimes that are coming to light. Which has led the ICC and 
the Office of the Prosecutor to realise, that they have to help improve the States within 
which these crimes occur, so as to educate against the reoccurrence of the cultures of 
impunity and strengthen the rule of law308 if they realistically want to bring an end to it as is 
stated as one of the ICC’s goals in the Preamble to the Rome Statute 1998.It has been 
suggested that: 
In the eyes of some the ICC should also provide technical assistance and capacity building 
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support to national criminal justice systems in their pursuit of investigations and 
prosecutions for international crimes.309 
This is a sentiment which once the ICC came into full effect and began to embark upon 
investigations and prosecutions, became very apparent to the Office of the Prosecutor310 
and was strongly reaffirmed at the Kampala Review Conference, where it was stated: 
… that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures 
at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation …311 
This is something that became evident whilst undertaking investigations in the DRC, 
following a self- referral by President Joseph Kabila in 2004, which was vague in that it 
neither stated whether the DRC was unwilling or unable to proceed.312 Whilst some have 
argued that the act of self- referral was merely an underhanded way of getting the ICC to 
carry out the Congolese government’s ‘dirty work’,313 it is also fairly plain to see that the 
DRC is not really equipped to deal such high profile and politically complex cases. As was 
affirmed by William Burke-White, who remarked on there not being anything in the DRC for 
the ICC to complement, due to the fact that in 2004 the judiciary of the DRC were neither 
politically or financially impartial, there were few functioning courts (for example in the 
entire oriental province and there was only one fully functioning court) and those courts 
which did exist were ill equipped and lacked basic amenities such as typewriters and copies 
of their own legislation.314  
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As has already been made clear, the ICC does not have the resources to bring an end to the 
culture of impunity alone, it is merely there to act as a ‘… court of last resort …’315 when 
States either fail to take action or are unable to do so for themselves. Therefore it is not 
surprising that as early as 2003 the prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno- Ocampo316 
acknowledged that in order for the ICC to succeed it needed to be more than just a court, 
that it needed to ‘… also shape national processes through normative and legal influence, as 
well as advice or technical assistance.’317 This evolved form of complementarity will see the 
ICC step slightly outside its remit and help the failing States to strengthen and in some cases 
rebuild their domestic legal infrastructures or in the very least encourage assistance from 
other State parties or NGO’s,  because by helping these failing States to help themselves,318 
the ICC would be giving itself a fighting chance of stretching its somewhat limited resources 
to impact upon the majority of human rights abuses across the globe and bring an end to 
the culture of impunity.319 
 
3.4 The Implications of Positive Complementarity 
This new approach to complementarity was first formally named as ‘positive 
complementarity’ by the Prosecutor in his 2006 Report on Prosecutorial Strategy (14 
September 2006),320 where it was stated: 
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… [T]he Office has adopted a positive approach to complementarity, meaning that it 
encourages genuine national proceedings where possible; relies on national and 
international networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation.321 
The focus of this progressive form of complementarity was to ‘… empower the national legal 
systems …’322 however, the extent to which the ICC should play a part in this was not clearly 
defined until the Review Conference in Kampala in June 2010; where in addition to 
establishing the new crime of aggression (as detailed in the new Article 8 of the Rome 
Statute 1998) the issue of positive complementarity was also discussed at great length 
also.323 At Kampala it was noted that States incapable of undertaking their own prosecutions 
would create an ‘impunity gap’324 that the ICC could ill afford and concluded that the most 
effective way to ensure that this impunity gap would be slowly closed, was by encouraging 
‘… States to assist each other to fight impunity where it began, i.e. at the national level… 
[because] the role that the Court could play in positive complementarity was limited by the 
nature of the institution and its resources.’325 A sentiment which was affirmed at the 
Assembly of State Parties where in a conference review paper created following Kampala,326 
it was stated that positive complementarity in the form of ‘… capacity building …’327 was 
required to facilitate complementarity from the domestic courts if the impunity gap were to 
be bridged.328 It is worth noting that fairly recently the ICC has been criticised for being too 
costly in light of the number of convictions it has achieved, as was illustrated in a Forbes 
article that questioned was the ICC worth it in light of having spent $1billion (US dollars)over 
a duration of 12 years, resulting in only two convictions.329Similarly a BBC News article in 
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2012330 made a direct comparison between the ICC and the ICTR, reporting that the ICTR 
which had an annual budget of $257 million (US dollars) in 2012 and had completed a total 
of fifty trials since its establishment in 1994,331 whilst in contrast the ICC had a budget of 
$140 million (US dollars) and had only reached one verdict in a period of ten years.332 This 
does pose the question as to whether the ICC is cost effective, given that the figures would 
seem to suggest that the ICC is too far stretched and caught up in ‘…complex political, 
diplomatic and military matters that should not be reduced to criminal prosecutions.’333 
Which is an issue that ties into this thesis, because of the States the ICC has to date 
investigated or sought to initiate prosecutions, few have been capable or in a position either 
practically or politically to take on their ‘… duty to exercise [their] criminal jurisdiction …’.334 
Therefore, it is easy to understand why at the Review Conference in Kampala, it was made 
explicitly clear that the all capacity building, technical assistance and financial aid should 
come from fellow States335 or NGO’s as is more often the reality, as the ICC was openly 
acknowledging that it cannot achieve its objectives alone, making complementarity 
superfluous unless the States involved are able to progress to such a level with their 
national jurisdictions following assistance from NGO’s or other States, so that they are able 
to help themselves. Nonetheless, there have been some examples where the ICC can be 
described as being directly involved in positive complementarity. 
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An example of where the ICC has been described336 as being directly involved in positive 
complementarity through its preliminary examinations, which are hoped to either trigger 
the State in which the crimes took place to take action at the national level, or highlights the 
inability of that State and its need for assistance with capacity building, so as to eventually 
facilitate the State to be able carry out its own prosecutions.337 Some promising examples of 
this can be seen in the situation between Libya and the ICC, where the Libyan government 
was the first State to submit an admissibility challenge under Article 19 of the Rome Statute 
1998,338 seeking to retain the right to prosecute Abdullah Al-Senussi and Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi339at the national level. The Libyan government was successful in its challenge of 
admissibility against Abdullah Al-Senussi and on the 24 July 2014 the ICC Appeals Chamber 
unanimously decided that he was currently subject to national proceedings ‘…by the Libyan 
competent authorities and that Libya is willing and able genuinely to carry out such 
investigation.’340 However in the case of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, the ICC has declined Libya’s 
challenge of admissibility and on the  21 May 2014 the Appeals Chamber upheld the earlier 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of the ICC, where it was stated that the ICC and domestic 
investigations did not cover the same case against the defendant.341 Therefore, this serves 
as an example that signals ‘…the creation of a culture of justice, not a dominant court that 
imposes justice. Libya may be the first step towards this culture’342 a culture that is essential 
to the success of the principle of positive complementarity, as the ICC simply cannot do it all 
on its own. 
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Another excellent example of this wider reaching principle of complementarity, can be seen 
in the work that the Office of the Prosecutor has been carrying out in Kenya, where 
following the decision to investigate on 31 March 2010343 the investigations have been 
considered to not only signal that justice will be served fairly and in accordance with the 
‘Rule of Law’, but it has also acted as a ‘catalyst’344 for wider social, legal, political and 
economic reforms. This in part, is due to the fact that once a case becomes the 
responsibility of the ICC, it simultaneously is brought the situation to the attention of the 
world at large, which not only places a stigma upon a State that is viewed in the eyes of its 
peers not to be able or willing to bring the perpetrators which can spur them into taking 
action, where previously they would have stood by and let an external body (the ICC in the 
current context) carry the burden. Alternatively as occurred in Kenya, the global media 
attention the ICC intervention resulted in, brought assistance from NGO’s which provided 
the impetus and the resources to kick-start reform in Kenya, so as to avoid the global stigma 
of being branded a ‘failing state’.345  
 
3.5 The ICC Outreach and Beyond 
Whilst the ICC has limited capacity and resources to assist with capacity building, the Legal 
Tools Project which is free and easily accessible, via the ICC website,346 is significant in that 
they ‘… [are] freely available in the public commons, the Tools democratize access to 
international criminal law information, thus empowering practitioners and levelling 
preconditions for criminal justice in both richer and materially less resourceful countries.’347 
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These readily available resources348 go some way to providing the basic tools and relative 
information for States to be able to help them, to be able carry out their own investigations, 
as ‘… access to legal information is the bread and butter of lawyers.’349 The Legal Tools 
which are a work in progress and were first initiated in 2002 and continue to be added to, 
comprise of: 
 Elements Commentary – ‘… a commentary on each element of the crimes and legal 
requirement of the modes of liability in the ICC Statute …’350 
 Means of proof Documentation – ‘… a detailed digest of international criminal 
jurisprudence showing the type or category of facts which could potentially 
constitute evidence…’ 
 The Case Matrix – Is ‘… a unique law-driven case management application that 
provides an explanation of the elements of crimes and legal modes of liability for all 
crimes in the ICC statute …’351 In basic terms, this means that it is a ‘how to guide’, 
which can be used to teach others how to successfully prosecute the crimes that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC, in a manner that is similar to the way in which the 
ICC would conduct a prosecution. 
 Legal Tools Database – This contains over 40,000 documents and consist of ICC 
documents and preparatory documentation, primary legislation, indictments, 
judgements and decisions from a variety of international and national bodies/courts 
(which includes Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTY, ICTR and many of the other contemporary 
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international tribunals/courts) and finally relevant research and papers published by 
academics and various other websites.352 
 
In summary the Legal Tools Project is fairly comprehensive and is an easily accessible 
repository of information that can be used to help rebuild and re-educate even the most 
decimated of legal systems, so long as the right economic support and political reformation 
coincides, however these are factors which are beyond the control of the ICC and are reliant 
upon goodwill of the various NGO’s and States currently involved continuing to do so.353  
 
One notable difference between the ICC Case Matrix and the ICTR’s is that it is a software 
platform, rather than an online repository of information, meaning it is a free resource that 
can be made available to legal professionals who do not have access to the internet but 
simply have access to some form of computer, which is invaluable given that access to the 
internet is not common in developing or post-conflict States. However, access to the 
internet is not always the main obstacle to accessing and utilising this kind of invaluable 
information, other factors such as lack of regular electricity, access to computers and lack of 
legal training so as to be able to understand and apply the legislation and case law 
provided,354 are obstacles worth noting. However, the success of this for now at least lies in 
the hands of State parties and NGO’s, as it is highly unlikely that in the foreseeable future 
that the ICC will have either the money or the manpower to take on more of a capacity 
building role, rather than its current stance as a court of last resort and a provider of 
information and educational tools. However if positive complementarity continues to be 
actively pursued with the same zeal as it has until now,355 then Louis Moreno-Ocampo may 
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see his dream  come to fruition, whereby:  
[T]he success of the ICC [is] judged not by its number of prosecutions, but by the 
number of international prosecutions avoided because of the increased functioning of 
domestic legal systems.356 
 
Furthermore, should the ICC achieve Louis Moreno-Ocampo’s dream, whereby the national 
courts of the States currently under investigation are in a position where they have 
increased functioning, then we would find ourselves in a world full of ‘… state[s] with strong 
judicial institutions and respect for the rule of law … [which are] arguably less likely to reach 
the level of societal upheaval in which international crimes are most often committed.’357 
 
 
As illustrated by the Strategic Plan for Outreach of 2006,358 the ICC certainly has been far 
more organised and dedicated to ensuring the dissemination of information about the ICC’s 
work to the people within the affected States and the ICC evidently seems to have learnt the 
importance of outreach from the mistakes made by the ICTY and ICTR, which did not make 
outreach and capacity building a priority until a few years into their mandate.359 
 
 
In addition to the ICC’s dedication to dissemination of information to the affected 
communities, a report drafted by Denmark and South Africa360 in preparation for the 
Kampala conference illustrated, there were already many European and NGO’s initiatives in 
place that were seeking to educate or rebuild  the legal systems of the affected states.361 
Some of the most notable projects detailed in this report, include the Avocats Sans 
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Frontieres ‘Integrated Project on Fighting Impunity and the Reconstruction of the Legal 
System in the DRC’,362 which has received funding from the EU, The Belgian Government 
and The MacArthur Foundation.  This project has been running training sessions in the DRC 
for the Congolese judiciary and legal professionals; the success of the project became 
evident in 2007, when the new skills acquired through the training enabled some Congolese 
magistrates to undertake approximately a dozen prosecutions, by applying the Rome 
Statute directly.363Another remarkable effort at capacity building has come from the State 
of Denmark, which has taken at least 165 Ugandan magistrates364 to Denmark, to provide 
them with proper legal training, they have also physically built court houses in Kampala and 
other areas of Uganda, they have continued to have a presence within the country since 
they opened a Danish embassy in Kampala in 1994 and with the assistance of NGO’s have 
provided legal aid.365 All of these are the necessary precursors and groundwork that is 
required in these conflict torn states, before the ICC can begin to conceive of undertaking 
any complementary investigations of prosecutions. However if the ICC takes an active role in 
supervising and monitoring these programmes as well as possibly providing the materials, 
then they may be able to influence the way in which the various legal professionals 
undergoing training, apply the law when they return to their respective States to apply it in 
their own trials at the national level. 
 
An excellent example of where the national courts, have been ill equipped to provide legal 
investigations and prosecutions complementary to the ICC, has been in the DRC. Despite the 
many instances of aid and assistance from NGO’s, such as Avocats Sans Frontieres,366 the 
DRC has been struggling with internal conflict, right up until 2012 and is still far from settled 
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now. One of the most notable obstacles to justice in the DRC has been the lack of any 
national legislation equipped to deal with the prosecution of the crimes covered by the 
Rome Statute. The current situation is a piecemeal one, where the State has failed to enact 
a new piece of legislation that encompasses all of the Rome Statute offences, and at present 
crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes are dealt with by the Military Criminal 
Code367 and Military Judicial Codes of 2002.368 Not only is this very peculiar in the sense that 
military and not national legislation has been left to deal with crimes of such magnitude that 
are clearly criminal and not military in nature, but is also illustrative of the fact that not 
many courts in the DRC can at present undertake the prosecutions that are necessary to be 
complementary to the ICC. A further paradox is created by the fact that all crimes which 
took place prior to 2003 are to be dealt with by the 1972 DRC Military Justice Code,369 which 
unfortunately has very limited definitions of the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes.370 Thankfully the 2002 Military codes371 have a virtually identical 
provision for the crime of genocide, as the Rome Statute and whilst they have slightly more 
restrictive definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the military judges who 
have received training from NGO’s like Avocats Sans Frontieres have chosen to directly 
apply the Rome Statute.372 This is possible due to the DRC being a monist legal system, 
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meaning that international law can be directly applied373 and also because Article 215 of the 
2006 Congolese Constitution states that, ‘Duly concluded international treaties and 
agreements shall have, following publication, higher authority than laws, provided each 
treaty or agreement is applied by the other party.’374 
 
This ad-hoc approach to legislating for these crimes is less than ideal and certainly will not 
be conducive to ensuring consistency, as some judges may decide to apply the Rome Statute 
definition, where others will use the Military Code definition, but it does serve to illustrate 
that when they receive training from NGO’s or the ICC, then they will be more inclined to 
follow the ICC’s approach.  
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Chapter 4: Proportionality, Penalties and the ICC 
William Schabas has stated that the judges of the ICC ‘…have been given a very free hand 
…’375 when it comes to the sentencing of those brought before its judges. This comment 
from Schabas stems from the fact that the Rome Statute 1998 is silent upon the purpose of 
the ICC’s sentencing and apart from a brief mention in the Preamble, where it is stated that 
the aim is to’… put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes.’376 The statement suggests deterrence as being 
an objective of the ICC penalty regime, but it is certainly not to be interpreted as meaning 
deterrence is central to the punishment aims of the ICC or that it will play any significant 
factor in sentencing determination.377 The lack of any clarification as to what is the true aim 
of ICC sentencing jurisprudence is can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, as the ICC is 
intended to act as a court of last resort to one hundred and twenty two legally and socially 
diverse member States, it is highly likely that the Rome Statute 1998 has remained silent on 
this topic, so as not to cause offence to any State or to deter other States from future 
ratification378 simply because the ICC does not share in its punishment objectives. And 
secondly it could in part be due to the fact that international law is always evolving and the 
drafters of the Rome Statute 1998 may have intended the ICC’s positive law to remain silent 
upon issues such as sentencing determination, so as to allow the judges of the ICC the 
flexibility to follow what becomes the accepted norms for the sentencing of these relatively 
new types of crimes.379  
 
 
 
4.1 Why is the ICC’s Sentencing Jurisprudence Vague? 
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‘Because the law seeks justice … it is natural to ask which … legal doctrines …’,380 are most 
likely advance the pursuit of justice, which is why this chapter will explore the theories of 
justice in order to establish why the ICC and the national courts are unlikely to have similar 
penalty policies when pursuing justice. The ICTY and ICTR, which have often been viewed as 
precursors to the ICC, have stressed the need for consistency and a clear penalty objective 
both in relation to their own sentencing and particularly in relation to the ICTR; there has 
also been desire for there to be some level of proportion and consistency between the 
sentences of the ICTR and the Rwandan National courts.381  An excellent example of this is 
illustrated in the Prosecutor v Tadic (Sentencing Judgement) IT-94-1-S (14 July 1997) ILR 286 
(1999) where ICTY Judge McDonald held retribution and deterrence to be at the heart of 
their penalty policy;382 similarly in the Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Judgement and Sentence) 
ICTR-96-3  (6 December 1999) before the ICTR, it was stated that deterrence and retribution 
were central themes of their sentencing policy,383 thus illustrating that the same objectives 
were driving the sentencing determinations of both the ICTR and the ICTY. Whilst it is 
neither desirable nor realistic to have rigid penalty scales for crimes, given the scope for 
variations from crime to crime, at least when the factors driving the sentencing decisions of 
courts are similar then it is possible that there will be some symmetry and proportionality.   
 
However these tribunals are only concerned with bringing to justice those who committed 
crimes in one single State, namely the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and are therefore able 
to more easily ‘… have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
courts …’384 as they only had to consider the sentencing practice of one State when making 
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their own sentencing determinations. In contrast the ICC must aim to at least to some 
degree appease the penalty goals of a wide range of States because if the sentences handed 
out by the ICC intend to have a positive effect at the local level where the crimes took place, 
then ‘…close attention must be paid to factors such as local historical experience, local 
customs and sensibilities, and sometimes even existing loyalties.’385 This can become 
problematic when the State involved does not view deterrence and retribution as the key 
aims of justice, but instead focus on truth, reconciliation or simple incapacitation as the end 
result may be that tensions arise between the victims who may merely want the violence to 
cease, whilst the ICC may be viewed as only being concerned with bringing the leaders of 
that violence to justice.386  
 
Increasingly truth and reconciliation have become central themes of justice within the 
African States, as they have often been viewed this as the only way to rebuild their war torn 
States, where corruption and violence is still rife.387 For example, Sierra Leone,388 Uganda389 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo,390 have all chosen truth and reconciliation over 
retribution and deterrence in their search for justice to the human rights abuses that have 
taken place within their boundaries and have often granted pardons and amnesties to those 
offenders who may still be in positions of power. This decision to forgive and learn from 
lessons of the past is driven by a desire to move forward in which it is believed that:  
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It is only through generating such understanding that the horrors of the past can be 
prevented from occurring again. Knowledge and understanding are the most powerful 
deterrents against conflict and war.391 
 
Furthermore, the culpability of the lower level offenders in human rights abuses often is not 
black and white, as is more commonplace with case of the vast majority of ordinary crimes, 
in the sense that the culpability of the perpetrators is often clouded by the circumstances 
that led to them committing the crimes. More specifically, in these States where internal 
conflict has been rife for many years and genocide and war crimes have become the norm, 
many of those who are perpetrators of the crimes are often also victims, as they have had 
little option but to act in that manner to save their own life, or that of a loved one. 
However, truth and reconciliation are not a viable aim for the ICC as its job is to ensure that 
the key perpetrators of these extraordinary crimes as seen to pay for the harm they have 
done, and a forgiveness, truth and reconciliation committee just would not be seen to be 
doing that job, especially in the eyes of the Westernised world. Nonetheless the existence of 
these alternate methods for dealing with the crimes that are often advocated at the 
national level and ‘… operate in tension with retribution.’392 And therefore also operate in 
tension with the ICC, in the sense that a State may be left feeling that the ICC has unjustly 
intervened or interfered because truth and reconciliation are not viewed as justice under 
the current international legal system, once again highlighting problems that can arise when 
objectives of the national systems and the ICC are not aligned. 
 
The penalty policy of the ICC is dealt with in Part 7 of the Rome Statute 1998, mainly in 
Article 77, which states that the two main penalties handed out by the ICC will be: 
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 
30 years; 
(b) Or 
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(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.393 
 
Whilst the two maximum sentence durations available to the ICC seem to contradict one 
another when viewed in isolation, because one would seem to suggest an aversion to 
lengthy sentences, whilst the other offers the longest available sentence. However, when 
viewed in the context of the discussions between the member States at Rome in 1998 and 
discussions prior to the Rome conference, then the life imprisonment penalty option can be 
seen as a halfway measure that has been placed within the statute to appease the member 
States that still advocate the death penalty, such as the Arabic, Islamic and Caribbean 
States.394 Nonetheless, whilst a life sentence can be said to have the same incapacitating 
effect as a death sentence and has been argued by advocates of human rights to be equal to 
the death penalty,395 in the sense of it being cruel and unusual and depriving the person of 
their liberty for the duration of their life, the Rome Statute does provide a sentencing 
review once 25 years of the sentence has been served. This is provided for in Article 110, 
where it is stated that only the ICC has the right to make a decision to reduce any 
sentence396 and that ‘When a person has served … 25 years in the case of life imprisonment, 
the ICC shall review the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced.’397 As to 
whether Article 110 of the Rome Statute will result in very few life sentences actually 
meaning life imprisonment, remains to be seen, as to date only two convictions have been 
secured and neither of which exceeds a sentence of more than 14 years.398  
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In addition to this already ambiguous sentencing policy, Article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998 
states that, ‘Nothing in this Part effects the application by States of penalties prescribed by 
neither their national law, nor the law of States which do not provide for penalties 
prescribed in this part.’ Once again we see a direct compromise to the abolitionist direction 
of the ICC’s penalty stance, so as to not discourage those States that retain the death 
penalty from ratifying the Rome Statute 1998 and aiding the ICC in its global fight to ‘bring 
an end to impunity’.399 This flexibility permits member States to apply their own domestic 
penalty policy, meaning there is certainly going to be a wide and diverse range of penalties 
handed out to those tried both by the ICC and the national courts. A fact that has been 
pointed out by my academics400 and most aptly put by Dragona Radosavljevic, who wrote 
that: 
The omission [of the death penalty] significantly destabilizes the impact of the ICC 
sentencing law and inevitably leads to inconsistencies within the court’s jurisprudence as a 
well as among the ICC states parties …401 
The destabilisation referred to above by Dragana Radosavljevic makes reference to the fact 
that the ICC, who will generally only prosecute those held to be most culpable whilst in 
general the national courts will try the lower ranking perpetrators and may well give harsher 
sentences that the given by the ICC to the more culpable. And this inconsistency not only 
highlights that there may well be doubts as to whether the ICC’s sentences are 
proportionate to the crime, but it also as Barbara Hola has noted potentially undermines the 
whole concept of justice as Hola purports that ‘One of the fundamental principles of justice 
is consistency - like cases should be treated alike …’,402 which is the view this thesis also 
takes. So what does this diverse and uncertain range of penalties mean for the quality and 
proportionality of the justice metered out by the ICC and the member States? One thing is 
for certain, whilst the current penalty arrangement between the ICC and its member States 
remains in place, there will be a lack of consistency of sentences and as a result of that, it is 
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not likely that there will be any ‘proportionality’ between the penalty and the gravity of the 
crime.403 
 
4.2 What is Proportionality and Why is it Important? 
That a punishment should ‘fit the crime’ and be proportionate to the wrong or harm 
committed is a key factor of retributive justice and this is a criminal principle that can be 
traced back as far as Ancient Greece and Anglo Saxon times;404 but is most commonly 
known to many through the ancient biblical legal principle of Lex Talionis, which in its most 
basic definition means ‘…an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.’405 Whilst this is often 
viewed by modern society to be a harsh, barbaric and a primitive stance,406 many neglect to 
realise that far from being cruel and extreme, this ancient principle in reality signified a 
crucial ‘turning point’407 in the constantly evolving field of lawful punishment signalling a 
move towards ‘… a policy of restraint and it sanctified proportionality as a moral principle of 
punishment …’,408 where the level of punishment is commensurate with the gravity of the 
crime. 
 
Indeed the principle of Lex Talionis, is one that formed an integral part of the Kantian 
retributive model, where Kant purported that Lex Talionis was the only principle by which it 
was possible to ‘… assign both quality and quantity of a just penalty.’409 What he meant by 
this is that not only should the punishment be proportionate to the ‘blameworthiness’ of 
the offender, but there should also be a proportionate correlation between the level of 
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harm caused and the punishment.410 The retributive model, often referred to as ‘just 
deserts theory’ is quite possibly the leading penalty theory and the most commonly used by 
judges across the globe,411 as was asserted in the Tadic sentencing judgement412 before the 
ICTY, where the tribunal affirmed that ‘…the modern philosophy of penology [states] that 
the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime…’.413 This definition 
provided by the ICTY sentencing judges, is merely a modern take on the more traditional 
retributivist theory, which also serves to affirm that this is the preferred penology for the 
international courts and tribunals, including the ICC, who is likely to look to its predecessors 
the ICTY and ICTR for jurisprudence and sentencing guidance, given that the Rome Statute 
provides very little guidance.414 Therefore it would seem logical to expand upon the theory, 
in order to explain, why proportionality, clarity and consistency in due process in the 
sentencing determination of the ICC is imperative. 
 
4.3 Just Deserts Theory and Retribution 
It must be noted that whilst there are a multitude of retributivist theories, such as R A Duff’s 
theory of ‘communication and reconciliation’,415 the ‘unfair advantage theory’ as advocated 
by Sher416 and the original ideal of retributivism as envisioned by Kant and H L A Hart’s 
‘modern retributivism’,417this chapter will focus on the ‘just deserts’ retributivist theory in 
an attempt to assess why proportionality, is so fundamental to the ICC and its penalty 
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praxis. Especially given that, ‘Punishing human rights violations with penalties proportionate 
to the gravity of their crime has become a norm of international law.’418 
 
The reason for this being that the ICTY and ICTR have sought to ensure that the perpetrators 
received their ‘just deserts’ and that the punishment as previously stated in the Tadic 
sentencing judgement,419 would ensure that the penalty not only sought to fit the crime, but 
also that it was befitting of the circumstances in which the crime occurred. However, there 
is no penalty in existence that could be deemed truly proportionate to the gravity of the 
crimes committed by those that will stand trial before the ICC or any other similar court or 
tribunal.420  And this is a form of ‘just deserts’ theory that has been described by Andrew 
Von Hirsch as ‘just deserts in an unjust society’ 421 where the offender is punished not based 
on their moral deserving, but the based on what is considered to be deserving when 
considered in the context of the actual circumstances surrounding their crime. This indeed 
would be an exemplary basis for establishing the blameworthiness of the types of offender 
that are likely to be brought before the ICC,422as the crimes over which the ICC has 
jurisdiction are complex in nature, meaning that moral gravity of the offence will often be 
cloudy at the best of times because crimes of this nature are crimes of mass participation 
and ‘…Individual perpetrators are often risk-averse and would not act without a context of 
authorization from authority figures, peer co-action, and victim vulnerability.’423 
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Furthermore, given that the ICC is still very much in its infancy, it is highly likely that it will 
follow its more localised counterparts, the ICTY and ICTR when developing its own penalty 
praxis and opt for the modern form of ‘just deserts’ theory as its sentencing rationale. 
 
However, before embarking upon a more in-depth discussion of the ‘just deserts’ school of 
retributivism, which is one of the central, if not the primary punishment objective of the ICC 
as was established in the sentencing determination of the two cases that the ICC has to date 
completed and convicted the perpetrator,424 a brief examination of the ICC’s sentencing 
determinations will be undertaken. The ICC, in the Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Trial 
Chamber I - Sentencing) ICC-01/04-01/06 (10 July 2012) appeared to take an almost scientific 
approach to ensuring that the sentence handed out was fitting, consistent and 
proportionate by looking to establish a ‘… consistent baseline’425 which they held to be 80% 
of the statutory minimum426 sentence available, which was then to be adjusted in 
accordance with Rule 145 (mitigating and aggravating circumstances of the individual).427 
Whilst in contrast, the ICC in the more recent Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Trial Chamber II – 
Sentencing) ICC-01/04-01/07 (23 May 2014) appeared to take a more traditional retributivist 
stance when they stated that the punishment needed to inevitable so as to express society’s 
disapproval and to ‘…satisfy thirst for vengeance …’;428 in addition to this, they felt that by 
the sentence being proportionate to the crime it ‘… helps to encourage the convicted 
person’s return to society.’ It should also be noted that in addition to the retributivist 
sentencing rationales given in the Germain Katanga429 sentencing hearing, it should also be 
noted that Trial Chamber II of the ICC also made reference to deterrence430 and 
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reconciliation431 in their sentencing rationale. 
 
Having now established that the two sentencing determinations of the ICC were both 
concerned in some way the crime be proportionate to the crime, it is essential to establish, 
why proportionality is central to the retributivist school of thought. One of the key 
proponents of the retributive belief that the penalty needs to be in some way proportionate 
to the crime is H L A Hart; who succinctly summed it up when he stated that, 
‘Disproportionate sanctions pose the risk… of either confusing common morality or flouting 
it and bringing the law into contempt.’432 Here Hart talks about disproportionate penalties 
having one of two effects, the first being that it would confuse the ‘common morality’ in the 
sense that to give a disproportionate penalty, would only confuse the general public as to 
the moral culpability of the offence. Whilst in contrast the second reason he gives is more 
concerned with State authority, procedural fairness and consistency, because without this 
Hart argues that the citizens of a State, may lose respect for the legal system and view those 
who administer justice disproportionately with contempt.433 Furthermore, Hart argues that 
the judiciary often feel that it is their duty to award a punishment that reflects the public 
abhorrence of the act, an idea that he supports with a quote from Lord Denning, who stated 
that, ‘… the punishment for grave crimes should adequately reflect the great revulsion felt 
by the great majority of citizens …’.434  
 
Similarly ICC Trial Chamber II in the Germain Katanga sentencing hearing 435 cited 
expression of ‘… society’s disapproval of the crimes committed and their perpetrator …’436 
as being one of the two main functions of their sentencing. However, the ICC in the Germain 
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Katanga437 sentencing hearing make reference to the need for the punishment to be 
inevitable rather than harsh to a level commensurate with the harm done by the 
perpetrator,438 but it should be noted that proportionality does also factor into their 
sentencing determination, as is illustrated by the statement that, ‘The punishment must 
thus reflect the gravity of the offence itself.’439Whilst it is not possible to issue a sentence 
that is truly proportionate to the gravity of such crimes as those that are brought to justice 
before the ICC, it does appear from the sentencing decisions of the two cases that the ICC 
has to date completed, that they are trying to scale the sentences according to the gravity of 
the crimes.440 
 
Like Jeremy Bentham, Hart believed that people act voluntarily and that when they commit 
a wrong that is morally culpable, they should receive a punishment that ‘… must in some 
way match, or be the equivalent of the wickedness of his offense …’.441 Moreover, Hart 
believed that the state of mind ‘mens rea’ was a key element in determining the moral 
culpability of the offender or something that should be taken into consideration, when 
deciding what punishment befits the crime. Hart’s view of proportionality in punishment, 
was an advancement of the ancient principle of Lex Talionis, whereby rather than doing to 
the offender what he has done to others, the aim is to find a punishment ‘... that should in 
some sense be equal to or proportionate to the wickedness of the crime.’442 For Hart the 
very essence of what he terms the ‘modern form’ of retributive thinking, is a philosophy 
that holds that proportionality is achieved when the ‘…relative gravity of punishments is 
[able] to reflect the moral gravity of offences.’443 This simplistic view of retributivism as 
described by Hart, carries many of the traits that are central to the ‘just deserts’ theory of 
punishment, as illustrated by the quote below: 
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The ‘just deserts’ theory of sentencing advocates that punishment should be proportionate 
to the seriousness of the offense committed. Advocates of the just deserts philosophy 
emphasize the importance of due process, determinate sentences, and the removal of 
judicial discretion in sentencing practice444 
The above statement encapsulates the very essence of what ‘just deserts’ theory is,  or what 
is otherwise known as retributivist penal theory; in summary, it is a penal policy that is not 
dictated by judicial discretion, but by fairness, morality and proportionality. The term ‘just 
deserts’ is self-explanatory, in the sense that in purest terms it seeks to give the offender, 
the punishment of which they are ‘deserving’ and by deserving it means ‘morally 
deserving’,445 as there is a common desire in human nature to ‘… to inflict punitive 
measures on wrongdoers, which is motivated by just deserts …’.446 
 
Retributivism can be traced back to the Enlightenment period447 and the scholarly writings 
of Cesare Beccaria448 and subsequently Immanuel Kant.449 Both of which held great belief in 
social contract theory, where it was purported that punishment merely existed to ‘… 
restrain men from encroaching upon the freedom of one another …’.450 This was very 
innovative for its time, as prior to this all men were not held equal before the law and often 
the punishment would not fit the crime, but would more likely vary dependent upon the 
social status of both the offender and the victim,451 especially where the offender was of a 
higher social standing than the victim. Similarly ‘just deserts’ theory is a logical progression 
of the original retribution theory of punishment, whereby we now see that in accordance 
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with social conscience there is also a concern with not only addressing the physical and or 
actual harm done, but also with the moral reprehensibility of that wrongful behaviour. 
 
It has been suggested that, ‘In criminal law circles, the accepted wisdom is that there are 
two and only two true justifications of punishment-retributivism and utilitarianism.’452 
Whilst this statement may seem a narrow stance to take, it generally does form the basis of 
conventional ideals of justice, although it should be noted that reconciliation also can be 
found in the sentencing rationale of the modern courts and was expressly stated to be a 
secondary aim of the ICC in the Germain Katanga sentencing judgement.453 Moreover, 
justice always seeks to either punish an offender to a level commensurate with the harm 
that they have caused and that which they are deserving of (this being the retributivist 
stance) or alternatively because the punishment or incapacitation is for the greater good of 
society as a whole (utilitarianism). The theory of utilitarianism is one that will be discussed 
at greater length later on the chapter. However, this section will focus on retributivism as it 
is one of the most commonly used penal theories advocated by the ad-hoc  international 
tribunals, which the ICC is likely to follow in the footsteps of when forming its own penal 
policy and praxis. 
 
To surmise, ‘just deserts’ theory is a modern advancement of the original Kantian retributive 
theory in which punishment merely served to attempt to ‘… restore the wrong that has 
been committed.’454 Whereas ‘just deserts’ takes this a step further and also seeks to ensure 
that the reprehensive moral nature of the wrong committed is acknowledged and is a factor 
that is attributed when weighing up the form of punishment deemed appropriate and 
proportionate. This has been described by Andrew Von Hirsch as ‘censure’, which is ‘… [an] 
expression of judgement, plus its accompanying sentiment of disapproval.’455 Therefore by 
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placing a degree of moral deserving into the proportionality methodology it makes the 
proportionality element of the penalty also about recognising the victim in the proceedings. 
Furthermore, ‘just deserts’ is also concerned with clarity and codification: 
The aim of  distinguished and codification of crime and punishment is to make sure that a 
defendant is sentenced to neither more nor less than what he deserves ... [furthermore] the 
sentence accorded to a crime should reflect the serious of the offences.456 
 
The idea that the penalty regime for crimes, be clearly codified so that the offenders or 
potential offenders can unequivocally know what punishment they will receive should they 
carry out the illegal act, coupled with the ideology that punishment should be in some way 
proportionate to the crime or harm done, is an age old principle that is central to the ideal 
of justice and one that ‘... has proved so alluring that, in many parts of the Western World, it 
is one of the main goals of sentencing.’457  
 
Having now established what proportionality is and how it is intended to function in order 
to facilitate retributivism, it is worth mentioning that there are two sub-divisions of 
proportionality. The first of which is known as ‘ordinal’ proportionality and is best explained 
by Andrew Ashworth and Matt Matravers, as a form of proportionality where the ‘… 
penalties be scaled to the comparative seriousness.’458 This form of proportionality can be 
broken down into three subsections, the first of which requires that there be ‘parity’, so as 
to ensure that people who are convicted of similar offences are also found to ‘…deserve 
penalties of comparable severity’459 thus ensuring consistency. Secondly, there needs to be 
a form of ‘rank ordering’460 in which the punishments are placed on a scale that serves to 
illustrate a ranking of the crimes in accordance with the perceived seriousness of that crime. 
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Finally in order for ordinal proportionality to be fully attained, there must also be spacing or 
a scaling of the penalties, that is not only proportionate to the gravity of the crimes, but also 
the moral censure of the wrong committed and harm done.461 In summary ordinal 
proportionality exists when there is a ‘… scale or tariff of punishments and offences …’462 
and the punishment that is deemed fitting is ‘… proportionate to the relative wickedness or 
seriousness of the crime.’463 And the sentencing hearing in the Germain Katanga case would 
seem to be an excellent illustration of  ordinal proportionality in  practice, as the  ICC often 
made reference to attempting to ensure that the sentence is not only proportionate to the 
gravity of the crime,464 but that it also reflects society’s moral censure465 of the crimes 
committed. Whilst In contrast to ordinal proportionality ‘cardinal’ proportionality is a more 
complex form of proportionality that is not so much concerned with matching the crime to 
the moral wickedness of the offence, but with creating a starting point from which other 
crimes can be scaled and awarded a proportionate sentence. With this form of 
proportionality it is not so easy to distinguish parity or to set a scale for the proportionate 
punishment in relation to the level of harm done, because cardinal principles of 
proportionality are applied in order to create an ‘anchor’ or base level, that is then used to 
help determine the severity of punishment that is deemed appropriate. From this ‘anchor’ 
point scales can then be set, with consideration to the individual circumstances of the crime 
and the ‘… gravity of the criminal conduct …’466 factored in, so as to attempt to determine a 
punishment that is proportionate to the unique and complex circumstances of that 
particular offence. Put simply, this means that this form of proportionality is concerned with 
ensuring that the more severe crimes receive the more severe the sentence is, so as to 
ensure consistency and an example of this kind of proportionality was illustrated by the ICC 
in the sentencing hearing of the Lubanga case, where the court made reference to 
establishing a ‘baseline’ of approximately 80%467 of the statutory minimum sentence, that 
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could then be adjusted in accordance with the individual circumstances of a particular case, 
so as to create ‘… consistent baseline for sentences, which should not be adjusted on the 
basis that some crimes are less serious than others.’468 
 
Whilst this sub-division of the principle of proportionality, may appear to over complicate an 
already complex principle of penalty theory and practice, it is highly relevant when viewed 
in light of the complex task before the ICC and the other ad-hoc international courts and 
tribunals. Because the job they have before them requires both ordinal and cardinal 
proportionality, especially in terms of the ICC sentencing rationale, because not only is the 
ICC required to punish crimes in many socially and culturally diverse States across the globe, 
it is also tasked with ensuring accountability for crimes that are likely to be equally as 
diverse. In addition to this the ICC must also manage to ensure that some level of 
proportionate justice is carried out in line with the retributivist theory of justice, therefore it 
remains to be seen what effect the fact that one trial chamber of the ICC has opted for a 
cardinal approach to proportionality, whilst the other trial chamber has taken the ordinal 
approach. Moreover I believe this complex task is best surmised in the words of Dragana 
Radosavljevic: 
Whilst pursuing accountability goals, a balance should be reached between proportionality 
and culpability which means that consistency demands similar crimes be dealt with in equal 
measure and furthermore that the penalty imposed be proportionate to the wrongdoing.469 
 
 
 
4.4 Utilitarianism – An Overview 
Whilst utilitarianism has not really been put forward as one of the punishment objectives of 
the ICC or the ad-hoc tribunals (mainly the ICTY& ICTR) from whom the ICC is most likely to 
develop its own penalty praxis. It is necessary to undertake an exploration of utilitarianism 
in order to fully understand what proportionality is and why it is the most favoured legal 
principle in relation to punishment. As a starting point it seems appropriate to highlight the 
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biggest distinction between utilitarianism and retributivism, which is that that retributivism 
is ‘deontological’ in its nature, meaning that it has morality as its central focus. Whilst In 
contrast utilitarianism is ‘consequentialist’, in simplistic terms this means that it is 
concerned with the supposed effects of punishment rather than addressing the issues of 
morality in relation to harm or wrong done, whereas utilitarianism is more concerned with 
preventing further harm occurring.  
 
The two most notable utilitarian theorists are John Stuart Mill470 and Jeremy Bentham,471 
who developed the theory during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Whilst there 
is a distinguishable difference between Bentham’s ‘hedonistic’ theory of utilitarianism and 
Mill’s ‘rule’ version of utilitarianism, they also share a common feature, which is that they 
both have as their overriding objective of the use of punishment to attain ‘… the 
achievement of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.’472 Thus in summary 
utilitarianism, is an acceptance that harm to a few is necessary and acceptable, when it 
brings benefits to the greater good of society. 
 
 
Rule utilitarianism as advocated by Mills, acknowledges that adherence to a rule is 
necessary so long as it is ‘… likely to maximize happiness …’473 and presupposes that justice 
is merely a tool to ensure happiness for the greater number of a society’s members. 
However, to go into much greater depth of this somewhat antiquated theory of 
utilitarianism (in the sense that it is rarely cited as a sentencing objective by the 
international courts or ad-hoc tribunals), would be to diverge to far from the topic being 
discussed here, so it is to the more commonly accepted form of utilitarianism as 
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conceptualised by Jeremy Bentham, who is often described as the ‘father’ of the utilitarian 
school of thought.474 
 
 
Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism, which is commonly referred to as ‘hedonistic act 
utilitarianism’, has been described as  forward looking in that the punishment has the sole 
aim ‘... to induce others to desist from crime.’475 They key of Bentham’s theory of utility is 
that he believed that, ‘Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as 
to determine what we shall do…’476 Bentham founded this principle on the assumption that 
all people are free thinking individuals, who will ultimately choose the more preferable 
course of action or behaviour, but that when the preferable course of conduct is not chosen, 
then a pain or harm must be done to them.477 The justification for the infliction of pain is the 
greater good of society or at least the greater number of people, so as to deter that 
individual from that unfavourable course of action in future, as well as to deter others from 
choosing the same course of harmful action.478 However, it is worth noting that within 
Bentham’s theory of utility, traces of the principle of proportionality can be found; in the 
sense that Bentham who believed that ‘… [w]here two offenses come in competition, the 
punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less.’479  
Furthermore Bentham believed that if too severe a punishment was used, this would lead to 
an injustice and injustice was something that Bentham was keen to avoid, despite been a 
keen supporter of deterrence. Once more reinforcing the view that proportionality to some 
degree, must be present for justice to be fairly administered; even if only to provide a scale 
upon which the seriousness of harm done can be matched to a commensurate level of pain 
that may be administered by the States, or in the more modern scenario setting the scale 
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for an international court or tribunal and the national courts that will ideally follow by 
example.480 However it is worth noting that modern utilitarian theorists, such as Richard 
Posner, who view utility in economic terms, believe that it is acceptable for disproportionate 
punishments to handed out if the ‘… severe punishment of a few [means] it is more cost 
efficient.’481One key element that is common to all theories of utility is the justification of 
punishment by means of it being a tool to deter not only the current offender, but to also 
deter others from committing the same wrong or harm in future; which brings us to the 
type of utilitarianism, commonly known as deterrence. 
 
4.5 Deterrence a Sub-division of Utilitarianism 
Deterrence theory justifies punishment not because it is deserved, but rather because 
punishment consequentially builds a safer world482as has been apparent over the previous 
few paragraphs, in which a brief overview of the theory of utilitarianism was explored.  
Deterrence is an integral part of utilitarian justifications for punishment and is a principle in 
which it is assumed that, ‘… the actual or perceived risk of punishment must outweigh the 
potential benefits that may be derived from the offense to make certain that individuals will 
refrain from committing a criminal act.’483 
 
Therefore, whilst it may in theory seem like a viable argument for giving harsh sentences to 
a few in the hope that it will set an example and potentially deter others in the future 
(secondary deterrence). It is also flawed in the sense that it assumes that all humans share 
the same moral rationality and fear of punishment and would therefore choose to act within 
the law, for fear that they may risk the harsh consequences of acting outside the law. 
However if this were truly the case, then there would be no need for the ICC to exist, 
because with the age of globalisation and instant media access, there is no hiding the 
punishments that have been handed out by the ad hoc tribunals or the few sentencing 
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decisions of the ICC. Nonetheless, this does not seem to have deterred others from 
committing the same human rights atrocities both in those same States and in various other 
States across the globe as was evidenced in the former Yugoslavia when the Srebrenica 
massacre (1995) and the Kosovo ethnic cleansing (1998), took place whilst the ICTY was in 
the thick of its investigations and prosecutions.484 Nonetheless, it would be ignorant to 
assume that there is not some deterrent value to these investigations and prosecutions as 
there is no way to quantify how many additional atrocities would take place if no form of 
judicial action were taken at all.485 
 
 
Therefore, whilst deterrence cannot be said to anywhere near as effective as envisioned by 
the likes of Bentham, Beccaria and Mill, it must have some believed effect given that the 
Preamble to the Rome Statute 1998 makes reference to not only bringing an end to 
‘impunity’ but also to ‘… contribute to the prevention of such crime …’.486 Whilst the words 
‘deter’ or ‘deterrence’ are not  directly used, the use of the word ‘prevention’ implies 
deterrence, as the only way in which to prevent future crimes is to deter future offenders, 
by means of bringing about swift and certain justice. The ICC through its principle of 
complementarity as detailed under Article 17 of the Rome Statute 1998 could be described 
as seeking to ensure that no offences of the grave nature covered by the court’s jurisdiction 
go unprosecuted. As Article 17 states that the court will only seek to prosecute when a 
member State is unable or unwilling to prosecute, subsequently sending out the message to 
offenders or potential offenders that if you are not prosecuted at the domestic level, then 
the ICC will step in to ensure that justice is carried out. Whilst in theory this may seem to 
have a deterrent effect, in reality due to the financial and man power constraints that the 
ICC has to deal with, they are not able to prosecute every offender that goes unpunished by 
the State. However it is quite possible that the ICC believes that by ‘being seen’ to prosecute 
even a few of the higher level offenders, it may deter others from committing similar 
atrocities in future. 
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The classical conception of deterrence is no longer acceptable to modern society, as it relied 
upon harsh punishments, that are nowadays ‘… associated in people’s minds with inhumane 
kinds of penalty, and especially capital punishment.’487 However, when classical deterrence 
was first born, capital punishment was commonplace,488 but as the chapter which explored 
the trend for abolition of the death penalty illustrated, there are many international treaties 
that prohibit these forms of punishment in modern justice. However some of the older 
deterrence theorists were aware that penalties should not be too harsh or greatly 
disproportionate to the harm caused to society,489 because it was feared that if the 
penalties were too severe, it might drive men to ‘… commit additional crimes to avoid the 
punishment for a single crime.’490 This would seem logical, as Beccaria pointed out that: 
 
The countries and times most notorious for severity of penalties have always been those in 
which the bloodiest and most inhumane deeds were committed, for the same spirit of 
ferocity that guided the hand of the legislators also ruled that of the parricide and 
assassin.491 
 
Indeed this is a logical statement, because it is often in States that have become 
desensitised to the violence and inhumane treatment from those in power, that then 
become the States in which the human rights atrocities take place, as was illustrated in Nazi 
Germany during World War II and also in Rwanda, where violence becomes commonplace 
and pre-requisite for survival.492 Therefore perhaps some form of milder deterrence theory 
is what is intended by the courts and ad hoc tribunals of today, where perhaps global 
shaming and an increased certainty that these crimes will not go unnoticed or 
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unpunished493 is hoped to be enough to ensure that the potential criminal is prevented from 
‘… inflicting new injuries … and to deter others from similar acts.’494 
 
 
Therefore in conclusion whilst the ICC and the ad hoc tribunals may not have deterrence at 
the heart of their punishment objectives, it certainly is possible that through their 
transparency of proceedings combined with the impetus that their existence places upon 
States to take charge of the proceedings themselves, that future offences may already be 
being deterred (general deterrence). In addition to this by catching the key perpetrators of 
these crimes and sentencing them to lengthy if not life sentences, then through 
incapacitation, they are being prevented from committing any future crimes. Furthermore 
this brief overview of utilitarianism and more specifically deterrence theory, has served to 
illustrate that the principle of proportionality is at the heart of all modern and westernised 
conceptions of justice, as to sum up in the words of Cesare Beccaria ‘There must, therefore, 
be a proper proportion between crimes and punishment’495 in order for justice to be 
attained. 
 
 
4.6 Proportionality and Consistency at the ICC 
Having now established the importance of proportionality and its foundation in punishment 
theory, via an assessment of retributivist theory and utilitarianism, it is now necessary to 
turn to the direct correlation between consistent sentencing jurisprudence (or lack of) in the 
case of the ICC and what this means for the legal principle of proportionality, which has 
undoubtedly been established as a prerequisite to the attainment of justice.496 One of the 
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key problems that instantly becomes apparent when looking at the prosecution of 
extraordinary crimes, such as those within the jurisdiction of the ICC is because ‘… there is 
no punishment under human law sufficiently grave enough to match [their] guilt.’497  In the 
case of Adolf Eichmann’s trial,498it was held that even the death penalty was inadequate 
compared to the crimes he perpetrated and the millions he committed to death. However 
human rights legislation and international treaties prohibit the use of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishment’499 and given that the death penalty is expressly prohibited and not provided 
for in any of the statutory bodies that give power to the ICC and the other international ad 
hoc courts and tribunals, custodial sentences are all that remain at the disposal of the courts 
to try and apportion to the level of harm caused to society by these reprehensible of 
offenders. 
 
Following on from this Mark Drumbl a leading scholar in the subject area of punishment for 
abuses of human rights and atrocities, such as those within the jurisdiction of the ICC,500 has 
noted several key issues that could prove to be obstacles to the attainment of justice: 
 
1. Sentences for ordinary crimes such as murder are generally equal to if not longer in 
some States, than those attributed to extraordinary crimes, such a war crimes or 
genocide. 
 
2. There does not appear to be a general trend that the international courts and 
tribunals will be the ones to give out the harsher sentences. 
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3.  That there is a ‘… significant disparity within and among institutions when it comes 
to the severity of sentence, and this disparity is not consistently explainable on the 
basis of the gravity of the offense.’501 
 
If we take the first issue as our starting point, there is no way of disputing that sentencing 
for ordinary crimes within national legislation is often harsher than those for extraordinary 
crimes; as illustrated by the fact that none of the statutory instruments that create these 
courts and ad hoc tribunals permit the use of the death penalty, simply because the death 
penalty is contrary to international human rights norms (as established in chapter 2). 
However, whilst these statutory instruments do prohibit the international courts and 
tribunals from issuing a sentence of death, they do not prohibit the national courts from 
doing so. Thus, given that the national courts especially in relation to the ICC are presumed 
to carry out the vast majority of the prosecutions502 and as it has been established that 
States will generally apply the sentencing rationales which they apply to ordinary crimes,503 
meaning that the national courts have an increased likelihood of giving out harsher 
sentences than the international courts,504 does this paradox not create a situation where 
the sentencing constraints placed upon the ICC by Article 77 of the Rome Statute 1998 may 
undermine those of the national legislative instruments? Nonetheless until there is a global 
consensus that the death penalty no longer has a place in the process of justice, then this 
disparity of penalties between ordinary and extraordinary crimes will continue to exist. 
 
 
Leading on from this point, the second issue raised by Drumbl highlights that there does not 
appear to be a trend whereby the international courts or tribunals give harsher sentences 
than the national courts, which are prosecuting offenders for similar crimes. This does seem 
highly surprising given that the international courts are more likely to be only prosecuting 
the higher ranking and therefore more culpable offenders due to being able to only 
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undertake a small percentage of the cases and as has been illustrated by the level of 
perpetrator that they have to date investigated or commenced trial proceedings 
against.505Whilst the national courts who are expected to take on the bulk of the 
investigations and prosecutions either because the crime took place within their State or 
through universal jurisdiction, will hopefully prosecute not only the higher ranking and 
therefore most culpable perpetrators but also the lower level perpetrators that the ICC 
would not deem of high enough rank and therefore not be deemed to be of ‘… sufficient 
gravity to justify further action …’506  and will potentially be applying harsher sentences than 
the ICC.  
 
When this inconsistency of sentencing practice between the national and international 
jurisdictions is considered in the context of the ICC, which will need to take into 
consideration the often conflicting views about justice held by its member States when 
making sentencing determinations, so as to ensure reconciliation will follow and that they 
satisfy the victims ‘… thirst for vengeance …’.507 It is easy to see why drafters of the Rome 
Statute 1998 have chosen to take a moderate and exemplary human rights stance towards 
punishment, as they will never be able to appease everyone, especially whilst there is still a 
divide on the death penalty debate and one that seems unlikely to reach a unanimous 
consensus culminating in global abolition of the death penalty at any point in the near 
future. However, perhaps as Drumbl has stated, by taking the exemplary human rights 
stance in accordance with the accepted customary norms of what is deemed humane 
punishment at the international level, perhaps the ICC can use its elevated status as an 
international institution and become a ‘… trendsetter for [its] national and local 
counterparts.’508  
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If we briefly look to the examples of the ICTY and ICTR as an illustration for the potential 
sentencing disparity that may lie ahead for the ICC, we see a ‘sentencing paradox’ in which 
the higher level offenders who are tried before international courts or tribunals receive 
milder sentences than those lesser ranking offenders who have been tried before the 
national courts.509 For example, many of the former Yugoslavian States have sentences of 
forty years upwards on their statute books for extraordinary crimes,510 whilst the ICTY has 
an average final sentence for convictions brought about under Article 7(1) of the ICTY 
statute511 of eighteen years.512 Furthermore, greater disparity is found when a direct 
comparison is made with the ICTR, which has a final sentence average for the same crimes 
under Article 6(1) of the ICTR statute513 as does Article 7(1) of the ICTY statute, only the ITCR 
has an average sentence length of 46.9 years514 of imprisonment.  This disparity, Mark 
Drumbl has suggested will only serve to undermine the ‘… supposedly enhanced retributive 
value of punishment at the ICTY.’515  
 
 
Similarly in relation to the ICTR and the disparities with Rwandan domestic prosecutions, the 
figures suggest that the ICTR has handed out more life sentences on average than the 
Rwandan courts. However, when we factor in that prior to the abolition of the death 
penalty in 2007 in Rwanda, 10% of genocide convictions in the national courts received the 
death penalty (this is not to say that all of the executions were carried out, only 22 are 
known of),516 this severely distorts the figures and means that the national courts appear to 
have a harsher sentencing jurisprudence than the ICTR. Furthermore, in the case of the 
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Prosecutor v. Bisengimana [2006] Prosecutor v Bisengimana (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-00-
60-T  (13 April 2006),517 the ICTR duly noted that had the offender been tried by a domestic 
Gacaca court, due to his social status, he would have received a sentence upwards of 
twenty five years to life. However, the ICTR despite acknowledging this, the ICTR ignored the 
domestic sentencing policy of Rwanda and opted to give a lesser sentence of fifteen years, 
in accordance with its own sentencing guidelines.518 The reason this often happens is due to 
the fact that, mitigating circumstances and plea bargains are often factored into the 
sentencing and when an offender admits guilt and therefore shows remorse, as occurred in 
the Case of Prosecutor v. Bisengimana519 the court will be more lenient in its sentencing. 
Nonetheless, this is not to say that mitigating factors are not considered by the national 
courts, but as Drumbl520 and Schabas521 have noted the national courts are often ‘fettered’ 
in sentencing determination due to being bound by constraints within their legislation that 
ascribes sentence length522 or ‘… set out a precise and detailed range of sentencing 
options.’523 An example of this can be seen in Rwanda where Articles 14-18 of Organic Law 
No 08/96 of 30 August 1996524 seriously curtail the discretion of the judges, by stipulating 
what the punishment should be for category 1 and 2 offences525 and where a confession or 
guilty plea is entered a minimum and maximum sentence is given,526 once again fettering 
the discretion given to the judges when trying to incorporate mitigating circumstances into 
the sentencing rational. 
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4.7 Plea Bargains, Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances 
 
Plea bargains and the acceptance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances as grounds for 
a reduced or increased length of sentence during trials before the ICC, are provided for in 
Articles 65 (1)(c) and 78 of the Rome Statute 1998 and also Rule 145 of the ICC Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence 2002,527 and these various provisions provide scope for a great deal 
of judicial discretion over the sentence determination.528 A plea bargain is an ‘… agreement 
between the prosecution and the defence by which the accused changes his plea from not 
guilty to guilty in return for an offer by the prosecution (for example to drop a more serious 
charge against the accused) or when the judge has informally let it be known that he will 
minimize the sentence if the accused pleads guilty.’529 Plea bargains, therefore often allow 
those being prosecuted to avoid prosecution for the more serious of the offences that they 
stand accused of and subsequently to avoid the lengthier sentences. However, Plea bargains 
have also been cited as being positive in light of the fact that the apology and recognition 
that often goes hand in hand with such confessions, is deemed to conducive to 
reconciliation530 and allowing the victims the opportunity to receive an apology and possibly 
provide forgiveness in return;531 all of which are helpful in rebuilding a post-conflict nation.  
 
 
However, Drumbl has also noted that at the national level judges have often ‘… award[ed] 
huge discounts for guilty pleas in the name of administrative economy …’,532 because to not 
have to take case to trial not only saves time and staff resources, but also money and 
creates what appears to be efficiency within the judicial system. In addition to plea bargains, 
the ICC under Article 78 (1) of the Rome Statute 1998 as will many national courts, take into 
consideration mitigating circumstances (factors that encourage the court to be more lenient 
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with sentencing)533 and also aggravating circumstances (factors that are deemed to 
heighten the gravity of the crime),534when determining the appropriate sentence for the 
crimes being prosecuted. Rule 145 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence 2002535 sets 
out some of the factors that the ICC can consider to be mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances when making their sentencing determination.   
 
 
These three general grounds upon which the court is given discretion to potentially reduce 
or increase the sentence, are all variants which only serve to undermine the principle of 
proportionality and consistency because it ‘… vitally creates uncertainty concerning 
benchmark sentences.’536 And without certainty and consistency, how will the ICC be able to 
lead the way and set an example for the national courts537 by illustrating in a consistent538 
and transparent539 manner what is deemed at the international level to be a proportionate 
penalty for these extraordinary crimes. Without benchmark sentences and a more 
structured and consistent penalty praxis, which as we have already seen not only makes 
deterrence very unlikely because potential offenders have no way of knowing what type of 
punishment they might expect to receive should they commit a certain type of crime. 
Furthermore, this flexibility in sentencing ‘… does not promote consistency and therefore 
could confuse public perception as to the gravity of the crime.’540 This is concerning, as it 
would be counter to the retributive function of the ICC seeking to bring an end to crimes of 
this nature through punishment. Therefore, whilst I do not propose a rigid system of fixed 
sentences, it would be helpful to possibly look to set some benchmarks within the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence of the ICC, which would set minimum sentences for the various 
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crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC. In setting a minimum sentence for each 
category of crimes, the aim would be to still provide a generous level of judicial discretion in 
sentencing determination facilitated through plea bargains and mitigating or aggravating 
circumstances; but would provide a starting point from which the ICC judges and then 
hopefully the national courts would look to for guidance as a starting point to achieve 
consistent and proportionate sentences for these extraordinary crimes. Nonetheless, whilst 
this would be a very interesting topic to discuss in greater depth, this is a topic that could be 
a thesis in its own right and will therefore not be explored in greater depth within this 
thesis, but merely serves to illustrate how the current sentencing practice could be 
improved upon, without placing rigid constraints upon the judges of the ICC. 
 
 
4.8 The Plasvic Paradox 
 
A famous example, where the offender received a sentence that was gravely 
disproportionate to their crimes and was also sent to serve their sentence in Western 
prison, was the case of Prosecutor v Biljana Plasvic (Sentencing Judgement) IT-00-39 & 40/1-S (27 
February 2003), who was a former Bosnian Serb leader. Biljana Plasvic a much respected 
biologist from Bosnia who had many academic accolades, went on to become the co-
founder of the Serbian Democratic Party in 1990 in conjunction with Radovan Karazdic, 
where she swapped her communist values for those of ‘... ethnic nationalism’s.’541 She was 
charged with eight counts of violating Articles 7 (1) and Article 7 (3) of the ICTY Statute,542 
which included crimes against humanity and genocide, but was eventually convicted of only 
one of the eight counts initially brought against her, despite her actions or some cases 
inactions resulting in the death of thousands.543 This is because Plasvic entered into a plea 
agreement with the ICTY Prosecutor,544 which meant all charges were dropped against her, 
except for the one count, which was count three ‘… persecutions, a crime against humanity 
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…’545; subsequently her trial was separated from that of Momcilo Krajisnik.546 At her 
sentencing hearing, she was portrayed as ‘… neatly coifed with color-coordinated purses 
and dresses … a civilized contrast to the male hard-liners in the wartime government.’547 
Plasvic had voluntarily surrendered herself to the ICTY on the 7 January 2001, and 
subsequently received a controversially short sentence of eleven years548 for her crimes. 
The justification for this short sentence was described as being due to: 
… having acknowledged the mitigating factors, in particular the acknowledgement of crimes, 
acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse from a former leader, points out, 
correctly, that these factors must be appropriately balanced against the gravity of the crime 
and the factors in aggravation …549 
The mitigating factors that were listed at the sentencing hearing consisted of the entry of a 
guilty plea showing remorse and a desire for reconciliation, voluntary surrender, post-
conflict conduct and her age.550 The reference to post-conflict conduct relates to her work 
with a Mr Hollingsworth from the UNHCR, who sought to provide humanitarian aid to 
Bosnian Muslim villages.551 Her guilty plea  was described by the sentencing hearing as being 
evidence of remorse and illustrating a desire for reconciliation, has since been described as 
‘… strangely superficial …’552 in that it seemed almost detached and rehearsed; furthermore 
the ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte, has since admitted ‘… I listened to her admissions in horror, 
knowing she was saying nothing.’553 Furthermore, Plasvic’s refusal to testify against others 
was not held to be an aggravating factor, whilst in the case of Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic 
(Judgement) IT-95-10-T (14 December 1999), Jelisic received a forty year sentence for the 
crimes of violating the laws or customs of war and of crimes against humanity554 and in 
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paragraph 133 of his trial hearing, it was stated that without the aid of testimony from 
people like Jelisic, the ICTY would not be ‘… able to achieve their ends …’555 and his failure to 
testify against others was held to be an aggravating factor.556 This disparity between the two 
cases is inexplicable, but serves to illustrate that even with the same court, there can be 
vast inconsistencies, that serve to undermine justice. 
  
Whilst the relatively short sentence undermines the gravity of the crimes that Biljana Plasvic 
was convicted of, more controversial is the fact that she was sentenced to serve this in a 
Swedish prison which is reported to have a sauna, steam rooms and even a horse riding 
arena.557 Further undermining the already lenient sentence is the fact that on the 27 
October 2009, Biljana Plasvic was released early, after having only served two thirds of her 
sentence, but the early release was in accordance with the law of the State in which she was 
serving her sentence (Sweden); she was now eligible for parole.558 The provision for the 
sentence to be served in accordance with the legislation of the country in which the 
sentence was carried out, undermines the gravity and seriousness of the offence, given that 
there are many people who have been found guilty of the ordinary crime of murder across 
the globe; and who are currently or who have served sentences that actually meant life. 
However the most remarkable part of the whole Biljana Plasvic case is that the ICTY granted 
her early release, even after she retracted her confession in an interview to Banjaluka TV 
and published a two volume memoir called ‘I Testify’.559 Even more alarming, was that in an 
interview in January 2009 with Vi magazine (the same year that she was granted early 
release), she unequivocally stated that the only reason she entered the guilty plea, was to 
have the genocide charges dropped and to reduce the length of the trial.560 What is most 
concerning, is that despite all of this evidence including a direct retraction of her guilty plea 
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and statements of remorse, the then ICTY Prosecutor Patrick Robinson,  in the September of 
2009 stated that he thought Plasvic ‘… appears to have demonstrated substantial evidence 
of rehabilitation and had accepted responsibility for her crimes.’ 561 It has been suggested by 
Jelena Subotic that the biggest failing of this whole case, was that it allowed a ‘… high-
ranking official to perpetrate fraud on the international community …’.562 However, what 
this failure of justice serves to illustrate is that, plea bargains have no place in trials for 
crimes of this magnitude and only serves to illustrate that the need for a level of 
punishment that is equal to, at least on some scale comparable to the gravity of the offence 
is the only way to ensure justice is achieved. Whilst remorse does play a part in 
reconciliation and possibly provide some comfort to the victims or their families, it is not 
necessarily a factor that should be attributed such weight in sentencing determination, as 
there is no way to ensure that the remorse is genuine nor that it will not be retracted after 
the trial, as occurred with Biljana Plasvic.563 Moreover, whilst the ICTY has handed down 
some heavy sentences, such as the forty year sentence given to Goran Jelisic, the lack of 
consistency and the tendency to be lenient where the defendant has been cooperative or 
remorseful, will certainly do little to deter future offenders, as they will be willing to take 
the risk, given that there is a chance they could receive a fairly lenient sentence. And whilst 
the ICC has yet to clearly illustrate how much weight it will attribute to statements of 
remorse either made in plea bargains or non-negotiated admissions of guilt when 
determining the appropriate level of sentence, the fact remains that these admission of guilt 
or remorse can easily be given falsely or retracted at a later date, which can undermine the 
retributive value of the sentence. Especially when it is known that some States have 
continental systems, whereby admissions of guilt are viewed with ‘… deep suspicion and 
courts are expected to rule on guilt and innocence based on the evidence, irrespective of 
such a plea.’564 Whilst in contrast, States that have common law systems  allow  guilty pleas, 
whether given freely or as part of plea bargain, to be given in exchange for ‘commitments 
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from the prosecutor as to the severity of the sentence’565 as has been the stance taken by 
the ICTY and ICTR. Nonetheless, the ICC does strike a ‘… healthy balance …’566 between the 
continental and common law approaches to guilty pleas and allows the judges the discretion 
to decide whether they feel the admission of guilt is appropriate based upon the 
prerequisites set out in Article 65(1) of the Rome Statute 1998 and can therefore proceed to 
the sentencing or where they do not feel the prerequisites have been met, they can request 
ordinary trial proceedings be undertaken.567 However, the prerequisites of Article 65(1) of 
the Rome Statute make no reference to whether the ICC must feel the confession of guilt is 
remorseful or genuine, just that it should be freely given and that is be supported by the 
facts, so the Plasvic paradox may occur in cases before the ICC as well as in national 
common law prosecutions, which further adds uncertainty to the sentencing rationales of 
the courts prosecuting these ‘… most serious crimes.’568 
 
 
4.9 What Can the ICC Learn from This? 
 
Having now clearly established that there is indeed too much scope for disparity of penalties 
at the international level, it is to the ICC and its guiding provisions as detailed in the Rome 
Statute 1998 that we turn in order to see whether the same issues that have arisen for the 
ICTR and ICTY may potentially exist for the ICC. Furthermore, given that, ‘… the ICC is dealing 
with the “most serious crimes known to man” it really should be a leading example of 
justice’. 569 However, how well the ICC can be said to achieve this can only be theorised at 
this point, because to date there are not enough completed prosecutions, in order to 
facilitate a quantitative assessment. 
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The concept of international criminal law is a relatively new one and it has often been 
suggested and assumed that the key principles of national criminal law have transcended to 
the international level, in an attempt to help establish and legitimise this new legal order.570 
One of these key principles is that the penalty be proportionate to the wrong or harm done, 
which has been directly transferred into the international criminal legal context; is 
construed to mean that the ‘Punishing of human rights violations [is carried out] with 
penalties proportionate to the gravity of the crime.’571 The only noticeable difference from 
the national legal interpretation of this principle, is the insertion of the word ‘gravity’ which 
is in simplest terms is due to the fact that there is no punishment imaginable or available, 
that could be directly proportionate to any of the crimes for which the ICC or any other 
international court or tribunal, will be called upon to prosecute.   
 
 
However given that the ICC is very much in its infancy, it is imperative that it establishes 
itself as a stable and authoritative criminal legal body as soon as is possible so as to assert its 
credibility and legitimacy. Furthermore it has been suggested by many that in order for the 
ICC to do this, it must follow the national criminal law practice, whereby: 
Whilst pursuing accountability goals, a balance should be reached between proportionality 
and culpability which means that consistency demands similar crimes be dealt with in equal 
measure and furthermore that the penalty imposed be proportionate to the wrongdoing.572 
 
But so long as the ICC continues to have such a vague penalty policy, as briefly outlined in 
Article77 coupled with Article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998, which permits member States 
to apply their wide and varying penalty regimes including the death penalty when 
prosecuting domestically, then sadly there is little hope that uniformity or consistency of 
penalties will be achieved and with it the likelihood of the penalty being proportionate to 
the crime is lessened. This is problematic for a multitude of reasons and these will become 
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apparent when explored in greater detail in the next chapter, which is a case study of the 
disparity of penalty regime between the ICTR and the Rwandan national courts and the 
problems this caused. The outcome of which, was that eventually the Rwandan domestic 
legislation was amended to bring it roughly in line with that of the ICTR, so as to facilitate 
more proportionate and consistent sentencing, as well as to allow for greater 
interdependence between the ICTR and the Rwandan national courts. But for now as has 
clearly been established in this chapter, proportionality is a  principle that undeniably needs 
to play a central role in the sentencing practice of the ICC and without it the ‘… potential for 
systematic dysfunction of sentencing practice is significantly enhanced by the absence of 
mechanisms designed to secure consistency.’573  
 
Furthermore, without consistency in sentencing practice the ICC will lose legitimacy and 
without legitimacy, the ICC is likely to encounter many obstacles and objections from its 
member States, which could make its current hybrid role in the international legal system 
untenable. Thus, whilst proportionality and consistency are not the same thing they do go 
hand in hand with one another as illustrated by the fact that national and international 
courts often talk about seeking to apply both in their sentencing determinations, as has 
recently been illustrated by the ICC in the Thomas Lubanga case.574 Furthermore, if a 
consistent approach to sentencing is maintained by the ICC, then it may well help the 
unstable or diminished legal systems of the States in which the crimes occur to rebuild their 
legal systems and enforce their rule of law on the ground, because they will have a 
transparent and consistent role model to follow.575 
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Chapter 5: The Rwanda Case Study 
Until now the thesis has explored the theoretical problems that potentially face the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), such as being a complementary and not a  court with 
primacy over the national courts, which is problematic in the sense that whilst the ICC aims 
to step in and prosecute where the State is ‘… unable or unwilling …’576 to do so themselves, 
the reality is that those States which will require the assistance of the ICC, are unlikely to be 
in a position to undertake the prosecutions themselves.  This is primarily due to the fact that 
these States will be in the midst of or suffering the aftermath of some form of internal 
conflict, genocide or humanitarian crisis and are therefore unlikely able to help themselves 
or to take responsibility for ensuring justice is achieved.577  
 
Another key theoretical issue that has been highlighted, is the lack of proportionality and 
consistency of sentences that is likely to occur in the current situation, where the ICC will be 
following one set of sentencing practices; whilst in contrast the national courts will be 
following their own widely varying domestic legislation and sentencing practices (as 
facilitated by article 80 of the Rome Statute 1998). Some of which may provide for more 
lenient sentences than provided for by the ICC applicable sentences as outlined in Article 77 
of the Rome Statute 1998, whilst others will potentially be going to the other end of the 
spectrum and handing out the death penalty. Given that these two highlighted issues could 
potentially undermine the serious nature of the offences being dealt with and also damage 
the status of the ICC due to it being in its formative years subsequently causing it to lose the 
respect of its member States, it is essential to take a look at how one of the predecessors to 
the ICC dealt with vast differences in sentencing and punishment between the national and 
international courts.  
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Whilst the ad-hoc courts and tribunals that existed prior to creation of the ICC, differed in 
the sense that they had primacy rather relying upon the more complex principle of 
complementarity, they do nonetheless illustrate why consistency and proportionality of 
justice at both the national and international level is important. Whilst the ICC is not 
intended to dictate to the national courts how they should determine their own sentencing 
rationales or dictate the types of sentence the national courts should be looking to apply, as 
Mark Drumbl has suggested, the ICC should be looking to act as a role model and attempt to 
be a ‘trendsetter’578 especially to those States that are in their newly formative years 
following a change of regime of leadership in the aftermath of atrocities. Because only then, 
will there begin to be some consistency and subsequently a level of proportionality in the 
sentencing for the majority of prosecutions for these extraordinary crimes at both the 
national and international level.  
 
5.1 Why Rwanda?: Background and Context 
The case study that has been selected is that of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the Rwandan national courts in the years following the genocide of 
1994. The reason for choosing this example as a working case study is because it is well 
documented, with the ICTR case law and UN resolutions that govern it being readily 
available and also because the Organic laws of Rwanda are easily accessible and available in 
English. Furthermore, it serves to highlight the obstacles the ICC may potentially encounter, 
so long as it permits its member States to retain and continue to use the death penalty, 
because the ICTR along with the ICTY is one of the most similar legal bodies to the ICC. In 
the sense that their objectives and powers are very similar, with the biggest exception being 
that the ICC has been formed by means of a multilateral treaty which States may freely opt 
to sign meaning that they ‘ … chose to accept the jurisdiction …’,579 whilst in contrast the 
ICTR was created by a UN Security Council resolution which granted the ICTR primacy over 
the Rwandan national courts, unlike the ICC which only has a complementary one. 
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Nonetheless, what makes the ICTR and Rwandan case so relevant is the fact that in 2007, 
the Rwandan government abolished the death penalty in its entirety, with the enactment of 
Organic Law 31/2007 of 25/07/2007.580 There are many theories as to why this occurred 
and they will be explored at some length in this chapter, however the most commonly 
accepted theory is that the Rwandan senate enacted this legislation for fear that if they did 
not bring their own sentencing policy in-line with that of the ICTR, then as the ICTR begun to 
wind up its business, it would pass any outstanding cases to other legal bodies or national 
jurisdictions and this was something that the Rwandan government could not tolerate. 
 
As the Registrar to the ICTR stated in address to the delegates of the XXXVIIth International 
Council stated in 2003: 
The tragic events of 1994 in Rwanda have been well documented by the media and 
academics. Suffice to say that since that time the ICTR has been working closely 
with the Rwandan authorities to ensure not only justice for the victims but also 
reconciliation of the nation. Our core function is to provide a forum for all the 
parties to adjudicate on the issue of guilt or otherwise of individuals. As a result of 
this work the ICTR has set many precedents in its judicial decisions and judgments. 
As you all may be aware, precedents are of vital interest to lawyers. Even to this day 
reference is made in the ICTR deliberations to the jurisprudence of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo war crimes trials of the 1940’s. It will also be the case that future 
international criminal justice organisations will refer to the work of the ICTR. 
Hence, it is vital to permanently retain a complete record of our judicial work.581 
Invaluable lessons can be learnt from the actions of the courts and international tribunals 
that have gone before us, and I strongly believe that the ICC can learn a great deal from 
interaction between the ICTR and the Rwandan government and its national and Gacaca 
courts, as there is a distinct similarity to the present situation between the ICC and Uganda, 
with their traditional Acholi justice. In addition to this, lessons regarding the issue of 
complementarity or as more recently identified, positive complementarity, can be drawn 
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from the work of the ICTR and its outreach programmes. These programmes in which the 
ICTR along with non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) sought to help Rwanda rebuild its 
legal system, so as to facilitate them to help themselves, will be explored at greater length 
in this chapter. However, before embarking upon the actual case study it is important to put 
the gravity of the role of the ICTR and the immense changes the Rwandan legal system has 
undertaken in such a relatively small period of time, into the correct context by providing a 
very brief background to the genocide, which is in essence the sole reason for the existence 
of the ICTR.  
 
In simplest term that events of 1994 in Rwanda were sparked off by President 
Habyarimana’s (the then president of Rwanda) plane being shot down on the night of the 6 
April 1994582 in which he was instantly killed. What ensued as a direct result of this was  one 
hundred days of systematic killing in which it is estimated that between 500,000 to 800,000 
men women and children were killed;583 in essence it has been described as the most 
organised and systematic mass killing since the Nazi Holocaust.584 However it must be 
acknowledged that this systematic killing that was so efficiently orchestrated using the 
medium of radio,585 which did not simply occur because the President of the country was 
assassinated. Indeed the genocide occurred as the result of years of political design 
compounded with other social and economic factors586 such as the pre-existing class divide 
between the Hutus and the previously ruling elite Tutsis, that was further exacerbated by 
Belgian colonisation and their program of eugenics,587 coupled with economic factors588 and 
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naturally occurring event such as famine.589  In addition to this, the Arusha Peace Accords 
(1993)590 which sought to reintegrate hundreds of thousands of Tutsi refugees who had fled 
to neighbouring countries following the Hutu uprising of 1959,591 angered Hutus to the 
extent that the anti-Tutsi Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR) secretly began to 
work on a Nazi style ‘… final solution …’592 to the Tutsi problem.593 However, the background 
to the genocide need not be explored in any greater depth as to do so would add nothing to 
the discussions of this thesis, but the figures and information outlined briefly above serve to 
illustrate that crimes of this magnitude do not occur in isolation or due to one single 
event594 and may therefore be avoided if a country is stabilised and has a strong rule of 
law.595 It also serves to highlight the level of destruction that can often go hand in hand with 
crimes of this magnitude, especially in terms of infrastructure making it unlikely for the 
State involved to be able to take control of the prosecutions and investigations themselves 
in the immediate aftermath, as well as illustrating the enormity of the task before the ICC 
which will be called upon to intervene in more than one single State to facilitate justice. 
 
 
5.2 The World Finally Takes Action and Creates the ICTR 
Following the systematic killing within Rwanda where ‘… [the] dead of Rwanda accumulated 
at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was the most efficient 
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mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.’596 Yet despite this the 
rest of the world stood back and did nothing other than to provide minimal intervention 
towards the end of the genocide, which took the form of Operation Turquoise, as mandated 
by UN Security Council resolution 929.597 This has been described by Nicholas J Wheeler to 
be a predominantly French-led multinational humanitarian 598 force that supposedly acted 
out of guilt due to their previous support of the Habyarimana government,599 which had 
ultimately orchestrated the genocide. It has also been suggested that the French chose to 
instigate an operation to intervene because they wanted to preserve some semblance of 
the old Francophone influence,600 which would be lost if the RPF forces succeeded in driving 
all of the Hutu’s, especially the Hutu political figures out of Rwanda.  
 
In the aftermath of such a shocking event, the world could no longer stand by and do 
nothing to assist the people of Rwanda, therefore the UN Security Council at the beginning 
of July 1994, instructed a Commission of Experts601 to investigate the situation, as they had 
done previously with the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The decision of the Commission 
was that in accordance with the UN’s powers under Chapter VII of the UN charter, the UN 
should establish an International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring Stated between 1 January 
1994 and 31 December 1994.602 Almost parallel to the conclusion by the Commission of 
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Experts, was a request from the Rwandan government via a letter from Manzi Bakuramusta, 
the permanent representative, for Rwanda to the President of the Security Council, dated 
28 September 1994.603 In the letter the Rwandan government noted that they were fully 
aware of the lack of assistance from the rest of the world and asked the UN for the 
following: 
We request the international community to reinforce government efforts by: 
(a) Ensuring that all aid earmarked for Rwanda is directed inside the 
country. The resulting improvement in welfare will encourage refugees to return 
and help those who have already returned to get settled. The majority of 
Rwandese are inside the country and they need assistance; 
 
(b) Committing funds to the Government to improve its efficiency and 
capacity to implement programmes, for instance, in areas of security, especially 
the police. It would be very important to assist in training, investigation 
procedures and in any other fields; 
 
(c) Setting up as soon as possible an international tribunal to try the 
criminals; 
 
(d) Giving factual and objective information on Rwanda;604 
 
Earlier on in the letter, the Rwandan representative stated that the Rwandan government 
was aware that there seemed to be a distinct reluctance to create an international tribunal, 
to bring to justice the perpetrators of the genocide. However the creation of such a tribunal 
was something that they felt was ‘… tantamount to diluting the question of genocide that 
was committed in Rwanda.’605 Given that transitional justice is commonly accepted as being 
essential to reconciliation606 and in this instance crucial to aiding the rebuilding of a nation, 
it is not surprising, that the newly formed Tutsi government of Rwanda felt the need for this 
outside help, particularly with the prosecution of those responsible, so as to make those 
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who had fled the country feel safe enough to return to their home nation,607 and to assist 
with rebuilding its infrastructures and diffuse any accusations of victors justice that could 
encourage ‘… divisive mentalities…’ 608 The necessity of justice to aid reconciliation was also 
affirmed by Dr Kinglsey Chiedu Moghalu, who stated that, ‘When justice is done, and seen 
to be done, it provides catharsis for those who physically or psychologically scarred by 
violations of international humanitarian law.’609 
 
 
5.3 Rwanda Objects to the Creation of the ICTR 
However when the UN Security Council put resolution 955610 to the vote on the 8 November 
1994, thirteen States voted in favour, one State abstained (China) and surprisingly one 
voted against, this State was Rwanda.611 It has been reported, that the Rwandan delegate 
voted against the resolution for several reasons, which will be briefly detailed below: 
 
1. Rwanda was unable to accept the very limited ratione temporis granted to the 
tribunal, because the jurisdiction of the tribunal was restricted to acts which 
occurred between the 1 January 199 and 31 December 1994. It has been stated612 
that the reason for this, is believed to be because the Security Council considered 
the shooting down of President Habyarimana’s plane on the 6 April 1994, to be the 
trigger to the genocide and thus feel that four months prior to this is more than 
enough to encapsulate the planning stages.613 Whilst it is undisputable that the 
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events that led up to the genocide of 1994, started long before the early months of 
1994, it is quite plausible that the UN Security Council felt the need to restrict the 
scope of the court’s jurisdiction as they had neither the resources or desire to create 
a permanent court. Similarly when the ICTY was created, the French representative 
suggested temporal jurisdiction for crimes committed should be restricted to only 
those crimes that did not ‘…[predate] the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia  and 
the outbreak of the current conflicts.’614The reason given for the ITCY’s restricted 
temporal jurisdiction was that under Chapter VII615 ‘…the establishment of a tribunal 
would be authorized only for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace, not in 
order to punish earlier crimes.’616 Similarly the UN Security Council felt that in the 
case of Rwanda, under Chapter VII617 they were only obliged to prosecute in order to 
restore peace and was construed as being only the events that immediately led up to 
the genocide of 1995618 and not the years of internal conflict that had plagued 
Rwanda. 
 
2. Secondly ‘… Rwanda stressed that the Tribunal’s structure was inadequate for the 
task facing it. ‘619 It was deemed inadequate in the sense that it was only to have two 
trial chambers of its own, which would consist of a total of six judges, whilst it would 
have to share an appeals chamber and prosecutor with the already established ICTY. 
Furthermore these were both situated back in the Netherlands at the Hague, which 
would make the justice process even further removed from the country in which the 
crime occurred. 
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3. There was concern over the way in which the other crimes, that the ICTR had 
jurisdiction over were not ranked by priority, it was feared that the tribunal may for 
instance deal more with the lower level offences, such as pillaging,620 rather than 
dealing primarily with the instigators of the genocide, which was the crime ‘…that 
brought about its establishment.’621 
 
4. The fourth issue that Rwanda raised in opposition to UN resolution 955, was that 
Rwanda objected to countries that ‘…had supported the genocidal regime [being 
able to] participate in the process of nominating judges.’622 A Prime example of this 
was France, who had provided training and arms to the army of Habyarimana’s 
regime, which formed the basis of the militias that led the genocide.623 Whether this 
was done in ignorance of the true purpose of the Rwandan desire to increase the 
size of its armed forces, is something that is not of concern to this discussion, but 
merely serves as an illustrative example of how States who now wanted to 
participate in prosecution of those responsible for the genocide, had been either 
deliberately or inadvertently involved in aiding those they now sought to hold 
accountable. 
 
5. Rwanda was not happy that third party countries would host those convicted and 
sentenced, as it has often been felt that western countries, especially those in 
Europe have ‘holiday camp’624 style prisons and there has also been criticism of  
what has been viewed some as the  ‘…lavish lifestyles enjoyed by Genocide convicts  
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incarcerated in Mali…’625 Because this situation has been described as creating an 
‘…obscene situation…in which those primarily responsible for the killing were living 
in relative comfort; while most of their surviving victims continued to live in 
poverty.’626  
 
  
6. The sixth objection raised, was in relation to the issue of capital punishment and the 
disparity of penalties that this creates,627 with the death penalty being absent from 
the penalties available to the ICTR628 whilst the Rwandan domestic legislation still 
applied it.629  This was problematic because: 
 
… Rwanda regarded this disparity in sentences as not being conducive to national 
reconciliation, as this would amount to a situation in which the leaders, planners,  
and organizers of the genocide would escape capital punishment, in contrast to 
those individuals who ‘simply carried out their plans 630 
 
This is an issue that has also been highlighted by others, such as the US Institute of Peace631 
and Jens David Ohlin632 who have concluded that the disparity of penalties between the 
ICTR and the Rwandan national courts would ‘… severely undermine any sense of justice or 
fairness …’633 in any of the trials, because ‘…the death penalty remained in force for regular 
crimes under Rwandan Law, victims of genocide considered capital punishment an essential 
element of the judicial program.’634 
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7. The seventh and final ground for objection raised by the Rwandan delegate was that 
the ICTR was to be situated outside of Rwanda.635 At this point the location of the 
ICTR had not been finalised, but the Rwandan government felt that if the ICTR were 
to sit within Rwanda then not only would it help stamp out the culture of impunity 
that had become inherent within Rwanda since 1959636 but it would also ‘…promote 
the harmonization of international and national jurisprudence.’637 This final 
statement made by the Rwandan delegate serves to illustrate how some member 
States of the ICC may feel that they are unable to prosecute in a complementary 
manner, when there is no harmonisation of jurisprudence between the national and 
international courts. 
 
Having now established the reasons why Rwanda, the one State who stood to benefit the 
most from the creation of the ICTR, yet objected so strongly when the time came to create 
the tribunal, it is now to the actual function and work carried out by the ICTR, that we now 
turn to see, whether those concerns raised by the Rwandan delegate became a reality. Thus 
the wording of the ICTR statute that will provide a starting point, before moving on to a 
brief overview of what the ICTR has achieved to date. 
 
5.4  UN Security Council Resolution 955 
UN Security Council resolution 955 states the following objectives as being central to the 
purpose of the ITCR: 
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice 
the persons who are responsible for them, Convinced that in the particular circumstances of 
Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the process 
of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace638 
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Whilst this is very similar to the preamble of the ICC’s Rome Statute 1998, one notable 
difference is that Resolution 955 talks of ensuring ‘national reconciliation and restoration of 
peace’,639 which could be interpreted as suggesting that the UN Security Council envisaged 
that the ICTR may need to play a role in nation building. This could possibly be because like 
the ICC, the ICTR did not have the capacity to prosecute the majority of those accused of 
participation in the genocide of 1994 and it may possibly have been felt that the UN needed 
to help the Rwandan people to seek their own justice in order to further reconciliation and 
so as to stabilise the country that was in a volatile transitional period.640 However, how far 
the ICTR went in achieving this will be discussed in greater depth in the section dealing with 
the outreach programmes of the ICTR. Nonetheless, Resolution 955 provides a very good 
place to start our brief overview of the ICTR as it clearly puts justice, reconciliation and 
restoration as the key objectives of the ICTR, so we now turn to the actual practice of the 
ICTR in order to see if any or all of these objectives have been achieved. 
 
Despite the ICTR having theoretically been created in the November of 1994, the tribunal 
has often been criticised for being very slow to act,641 as it was not until January of 1997 
that the first trial actually took place.642 At first glance this may seem exceptionally slow and 
this inaction could have been misconstrued by some, as implying that the prosecution of the 
key perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide was not considered a high priority. However 
when viewed in light of the obstacles that the tribunal had to overcome whilst establishing 
the basics, such as offices and courtrooms,643 it does not seem so unreasonable. The first 
dilemma that faced the UN Security Council was where to physically situate the tribunal? 
Kigali (Rwanda) was ruled out, because not only was it lacking in facilities and suitable 
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premises, but also because the UN Secretary General feared that the unsettled and highly 
volatile situation in Rwanda at the time, would prove to be too great of a security risk to 
bring prisoners into Kigali for their trials644 and that in the interest of ‘justice’ and ‘equity’ 
the trials should take place on neutral territory.645 The other two proposed locations were 
Nairobi in Kenya and Arusha in Tanzania, unfortunately the Kenyan government were 
unable to provide a location that could accommodate such a tribunal,646 but Tanzania 
offered the use of the Arusha International Conference Centre and in February of 1995 
Resolution 977 was passed,647 making Arusha the home of the ICTR. However it should be 
noted that things in Arusha were far from straightforward, Erik Mose648 has described the 
conditions which met the tribunal staff in Arusha, as being very ‘primitive’649 as there were 
few working phone lines, tarmacked roads were scarce and electricity was far from 
consistent. Add to this, the fact that the Arusha Conference Centre was set up for office 
space and conference rooms, it is easy to understand why it took until January of 1997 to 
transform what was previously office space into what is now recognised as courtroom one 
and courtroom two of the ICTR; as the location must have made it a logistic nightmare. 
However by the time the tribunal was ready to hear its first case, there was also a detention 
centre, in place which the UN states as being ‘… constructed in accordance with 
international prison standards and includes 89 individual cells, a kitchen, medical facilities, 
library, a classroom and a gymnasium …’650 and is located within the grounds of the 
Tanzanian detention centre only 10km from the ICTR. 
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5.5 How is the ICTR Structured: How Well has this Facilitated its Prosecutions? 
Article 12 bis (3) of the ICTR Statute states that: 
The permanent judges elected in accordance with this article shall be elected for a term of 
four years. The terms and conditions of service shall be those of the permanent judges of 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. They shall be eligible for re-election651 
 
These four year terms in office as an ICTR judge have been more commonly referred to as 
‘mandates’ and the first mandate begun in 1995, which seems a little surprising given that 
the first trial did not take place until 1997.652 However there was much work to be done 
before the ICTR could begin its trial proceedings, for although the ICTR and what has now 
become known as its sister tribunal the ICTY shared many common factors, including a 
Prosecutor and Appeals Chamber, the ICTR would be the first court/tribunal to prosecute 
the crime of genocide since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials after the Second World War 
and was also the first time genocide had been prosecuted since creation of the Genocide 
Convention in December of 1948.653 This is significant because the ICTR would not have any 
court to look to for guidance on sentencing rationale or what could be deemed a sentence 
that would be proportionate to a crime of this gravity, because the post-World War II 
tribunals654 had the death penalty at their disposal, whilst the ICTR did not.  Whilst the 
Genocide Convention (1948) clearly defines the act of genocide in Articles 2 and 3, which 
mirrors Article 2 of the ICTR Statute, the Genocide Convention (1948) unfortunately remains 
silent on what is deemed as suitable punishment for these crimes, so it is not surprising that 
the ICTR and ICC statutes also remain silent on this point.  
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Therefore, the first mandate of the ICTR can be accredited with having ‘… tackled the issue 
of the appropriate punishment for genocide (the crime of crimes), and its sentencing 
jurisprudence has established many important precedents …’655; which is quite an 
achievement given that the judges could glean very little guidance from the ICTR Statue with 
regards to any form of comprehensive sentencing praxis. For example Article 23 of the ICTR 
Statute, much like Article 77 of the Rome Statute 1998 is very vague and provides less 
guidance than Article 77 of the Rome Statute 1998 does,  because other than stating that 
prison sentences are the only form of penalty available,656 that the judges should to take 
into account the sentencing practices of the Rwandan national courts and that the ICTR 
judges should also ‘… take into account such factors as the gravity of the offence and the 
individual circumstances of the convicted person.’657  Article 23 of the ICTR statute clearly 
provides wide and vague considerations for the ICTR judges to factor when making their 
sentencing determinations, which up until 2007 when Rwanda abolished the death 
penalty658 included trying to take into consideration the sentencing practices of a State that 
still enforced the death penalty, not to mention the fact that Rwandan organic laws were 
still constantly evolving and subsequently changing the categories of offences and their 
punishments. Thus the achievements of the first ICTR mandate were in reality not as poor as 
they would first appear on paper, because the sentencing jurisprudence it created now sets 
a precedent for many international courts and tribunals,659 including the ICC.  
 
 
Nonetheless, whilst the first mandate of the ICTR may appear to have done very little if this 
thesis were to use number of trials completed as the bench mark for success, but when 
viewed in the context that the tribunal chambers were not completed until halfway into the 
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first mandate, coupled with the fact that one of the six trials completed in this period, was 
one of the ICTR’s biggest to date,660 serves makes their achievements not seem so 
insignificant. The high profile case mentioned above was that of Prosecutor v Jean 
Kambanda (Judgment and Sentence) ICTR 97-23-S (4 September 1998), who was the Prime 
Minister of Rwanda during the period leading up to and during the genocide of 1994. Mr 
Kambanda pleaded guilty to six counts,661 four of which included committing the act of 
genocide, conspiracy and incitement to commit genocide along with two counts of crimes 
against humanity.662 This type of high profile trial has been viewed by many as a benchmark 
success in which the ICTR was able to ‘… establish individual guilt and thereby move 
suspicion and blame from one group to the individual.’663 Which if true would mean that a 
lot of the blame placed on the whole Hutu social group would have been lifted, however 
given the instability that eventually led to the genocide in Rwanda and still to some degree 
continues today,664 this seems somewhat questionable. 
 
 
Moving swiftly on to the second and third mandates of the ICTR, the tribunal continued to 
see the number of cases completed doubling665 with each new mandate and with this came 
some amendments to the structure of the tribunal. The first big change was the realisation 
that two trial chambers would be wholly inadequate, so UN Security Council Resolution 
1165 of the 30 April 1998666 granted the creation of an additional trial chamber. This third 
trial chamber was subsequently added to the ICTY in May 1998, under Resolution 1166.667 
and the new trial chamber was constructed in record time and was complete and ready for 
use by the end of 1998, when the number of judges was increased from eleven to fourteen 
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to man this new trial chamber668. The next innovative amendment for the ICTR, was the 
change to the use of a morning and afternoon trial shift system, during the second mandate, 
which spanned the period from 1999-2003.669 The purpose of this split shift system was to 
allow two trials to run in each trial chamber concurrently, providing a more equal split of 
time given to both cases in each trial chamber. In August of 2002670 it was identified that the 
trial chambers required more judges that could step in should one of the elected judges, be 
unable to attend and it was requested that a pool of ad litem judges be created and 
Resolution 1431 (2002)671 created this pool, which consisted of eighteen judges of which 
originally four at any one time could be attached to the trial chambers, this now stands at 
nine judges at any given time, as amended by Resolution 1512 (27 October 2003).672   
 
The biggest changes to the structure of the ICTR occurred in 2003, following the adoption of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1503 (28 August 2003), which set out the completion 
strategy dates for both the ICTY and ICTR. The original strategy stated that all trials should 
be completed by the end of 2008 and that all appeals before the then shared Appeals 
Chamber at The Hague in the Netherlands; were to be complete by the end of 2010.673 
Given the enormity of this task the UN Security Council decided to give the ICTR its own 
Prosecutor, and through Resolution 1505 (2003) appointed Hassan Bubacar Jallow as the 
sole Prosecutor of the ICTR. Since appointment as Prosecutor to the ICTR, Mr Jallow has had 
to amend the completion strategy several times, to ensure that the complex trials that have 
and are currently being processed by the ICTR can be carried out to the highest standards of 
procedural fairness as stipulated in Article 20 (2) of the ICTR. This article guarantees that all 
who are tried before the ICTR, have the unequivocal right to a ‘… fair and public hearing 
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…’674 and what constitutes a ‘fair’ hearing is detailed in Article 20 (3) of the ICTR statute. 
Therefore, the current completion strategy states that as of the 10 May 2013, the ICTR has 
completed all of its work at the trial level, totalling 93 individuals who have been indicted675 
by the ICTR and that the final case in the Appeals Chamber is due to be completed by the 
end of July 2015.676 This delay, which sees the current completion strategy, five years 
behind the original plan, is due to issues with witnesses failing to attend, alleged illness, 
problems with getting translations from the commonly spoken native language of 
Kinyarwanda into the two official languages of the ICTR, which are French and English. This 
was further exacerbated by various other issues related to collecting evidence, from often 
less than willing witnesses and victims, which has been suggested is in part due to the 
continuing although lower levels of violence that continues to plague Rwanda677and 
compounded by the fact that, the ICTR is situated outside of Rwanda and people are 
unwilling to travel so far, especially when they feel detached from the justice that is being 
metered out at the ICTR in Arusha. Thus whilst many including the UN feel that the ICTR has 
succeeded in the sense that: 
There can be no doubt that the Tribunal’s proceedings relating to persons in very high 
positions have sent a strong signal to the world, including the African continent, that 
impunity will not be accepted by the international community.678 
 
Whilst there can be no doubt that the decisions of the high profile case load of the ICTR 
certainly have sent a message to the world, by illustrating that crimes against humanity and 
more importantly the crime of genocide will not go unpunished and have also set a 
precedent (especially with regards to sentencing and sentencing rationale) for future 
prosecutions by both the ICC and national courts. There still remains the question, why if 
this message has the deterrent affect that it was hoped to have and that the ICC states 
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within its preamble to the Rome Statute 1998 as being one of its continuing objectives, are 
similar atrocities still taking place in Darfur, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Uganda? However, how to truly address this problem is not the purpose of this 
case study, but serves to provide an illustration of the problems that the ICC will potentially 
face when trying to enforce its principle of complementarity, when dealing with a State that 
mandates harsher sentences that those available to the ICC. Therefore whilst the ICTR, 
certainly has provided some invaluable lessons for the ICC, such as the fact that any national 
prosecutions that offer harsher penalties than the ICC may potentially undermine the 
credibility of the ICC’s prosecutions or that for justice on the scale required in a post-
genocidal or post-conflict State to be achieved, the ICC will need to work with the national 
courts to achieve this.  With particular attention being paid to trying to develop some form 
of consistency and subsequently a level of proportionality in sentencing between the 
national courts and the ICC, so that those deemed to be of a higher level of culpability 
receive the harsher sentences to be consistent with the increased perceived gravity of their 
crimes. Nonetheless, this is not something that a single court or tribunal can reasonably be 
expected to undertake, as was highlighted by Kathy Ward, who stated that: 
The ICTR cannot bring justice to Rwanda on its own. It is a limited tribunal that will try only 
the senior architects of the 1994 atrocities. It is meant to work in coordination with 
Rwandan domestic efforts to serve justice.679 
 
This neatly brings the discussion to the next section of the case study, which is an overview 
of what the Rwandan courts have done to ensure justice for the genocide of 1994, as the 93 
offenders tried by the ICTR, certainly does not even begin to scratch the surface of the 
estimated 125,000 offenders currently sitting in Rwandan prisons.680 Furthermore, by 
looking at the national courts in Rwanda both during the immediate aftermath of the 
genocide of 1994 and also as they progressed and branched out into more traditional routes 
of justice, the difficulties that can occur when the international and national courts do not 
seem to have the same ideals or standards of justice, punishment and respect for human 
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rights will become apparent.  It will also highlight the amount of time and level of work 
required to facilitate a State in the aftermath of crimes of this gravity, to be in a position to 
be able to take on the responsibility for prosecution at the national level, which 
subsequently will illustrate why the ICC does need to actively pursue positive 
complementarity if it hopes to only be a court of last resort.681 
 
 
5.6 Rwandan National Justice 
In Rwanda we are trying our best. We are really trying our best as far as the judiciary is 
concerned … in post-genocide traumatized society you will not expect us to be on 
international standards like that in the U.S. or Canada, but you will expect us to be on 
international standards on the continent of Africa.682 
 
In the aftermath of a genocide in which it is estimated that approximately three quarters of 
the Rwandan Tutsi population were killed,683 along with an estimated twenty five thousand 
to sixty thousand Hutus684who lost their lives, it is not surprising that Rwanda effectively had 
become ‘… a country whose social fabric and infrastructure were destroyed during the 
genocide.’685 Add to this the fact that the country had been in a state of civil unrest and 
amidst a brutal political struggle for at least the past forty years; it is hardly surprising that 
there was next to no recognisable or functioning legal system in place in Rwanda by the end 
of July 1994.686 Moreover, rebuilding a legal system following in the wake of what had 
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occurred in Rwanda, during the course of 1994, would have proved a big enough challenge, 
but in view of the fact that:  
… [T]he previous justice system did not provide a foundation upon which the government 
could rebuild the desperately needed social institution. The Rwandan judiciary would have 
to be constructed from scratch in an environment that presented extraordinary 
conditions.687 
   
To provide an illustration of just how decimated the Rwandan legal system was, reference 
can be made back to Table 1 in the chapter one of this thesis, where it was illustrated that 
almost three quarters of the legal profession in Rwanda was gone following the genocide. 
Furthermore, some reports have suggested that even less of the legal system remained 
following the genocide and one report suggested that ‘… only 40 jurists were said to remain 
in the entire country …’,688  whilst others have reported as few as sixteen689 or twenty690 
jurists and only twenty six police inspectors, which throws doubt as to the accuracy of some 
of the information, but nonetheless highlights that the majority of the legal profession and 
those bodies who would be necessary for investigation and prosecution via the national 
channels, were just a shadow of their pre-genocide numbers. In addition to the lack of legal 
professionals, Kigali had been left in ruins691 and what little that did remain of the wheels of 
justice in Rwanda, was desperately lacking in basic resources, such as copies of their own 
legislation and in the case of the six remaining police inspectors, not one of them had any 
form of transport, for transporting them to the scenes of crimes, in order to collect evidence 
and witness statements.692  Also the ‘… court buildings had been damaged and they lacked 
the most basic infrastructure as the former government stripped all its offices on its way 
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into exile …’.693 This level of destruction is evidenced by the fact that in September of 1994, 
the then Minister of Justice Alphonse-Marie Nkubito, tasked with the job of deciding what 
the best course of justice would be for the Rwandan people; did so from his office, which 
had no remaining windows and whose wall were decorated with bullet holes.694  
 
Due to the enormity of the crimes committed during the one hundred days of genocide and 
in the years preceding the genocide, it would be hard to imagine any legal system in the 
world, even that of the largest and most developed democratic States, that would 
realistically be able to deal with the case load (it has been approximated that there were 
around 200,000 Rwandan perpetrators)695 that stood before the Rwandan national courts. 
Moreover, given that the ICTR temporal jurisdiction was restricted to only the events that 
took place during 1994 and neglected to cover to what the newly formed (RPF) government 
saw as the genocide planning, that took place in the years prior to 1994, this meant that the 
Rwandan government would have to shoulder the burden of dealing with not only the lower 
level offenders not covered by the ICTR statute, but also the those who fell outside of the 
very limited temporal jurisdiction. 
 
 
5.7 Rwanda Starts Over 
As previously mentioned, it has been stated that: 
No judicial system, anywhere in the world, has been designed to cope with 
the requirements of prosecuting genocide. Criminal justice systems exist to deal with 
crime on an individual level.696 
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However given that the newly formed Rwandan (RPF) government was determined to take a 
hard line in order ‘… to eliminate the culture of impunity that had taken root …’697 it comes 
as no surprise that by 1998 there were approximately 130,000698 prisoners in Rwandan 
prisons awaiting trial for the crimes that they were alleged to have committed during or in 
the years preceding the genocide of 1994. To further exacerbate the situation, the prisons 
that then existed in Rwanda were only built to accommodate fifteen thousand inmates.699 
Such levels of overcrowding and lack of funding, can only conjure up horrific images of the 
inhumane conditions in which these people were awaiting trial. As illustrated in one village 
prison, where there was only space for the four hundred inmates to sleep side by side and  
the level of overcrowding necessitated that all prisoners be allowed out of the prison 
boundary during the day, as there was no space for them to actually move.700  
 
 
However as mentioned previously, no legal system is equipped to deal with this level of 
prosecution; especially one that wishes to adhere to norms of procedural fairness and based 
on this fact, it has been estimated that for the Rwandan national courts to prosecute all of 
those detained by 1998 would take approximately four hundred years.701 Based on the 
assumption that it would take the Rwandan courts another four hundred years to prosecute 
the 130,000 perpetrators in custody by 1998, and assuming that the majority of those in 
detention were fairly young and had at least another thirty years life expectancy remaining, 
this would have meant that only 9,750 of the 130,000 in custody by 1998702 would have 
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potentially gone to trial before they came to the natural end of their lives.  Thus ensuring 
that the majority people would potentially die in prison, without ever having the chance to 
defend themselves against the claims and charges issued against them or to ever receive 
any form of sentence, which completely undermines the concept of justice. This breach of 
the Code de Procedure Penale703 was something the newly formed Rwandan government 
was highly aware of, as was illustrated by the following statement: 
 
We Rwandan national judiciary could not respond to the crisis by ordering the release of all 
the genocide suspects in detention. We were, and still are, of the view that the failure to 
respect procedural requirements for the arrest and detention of the suspects was the result 
of a very grave and unprecedented national crisis which could not, and had not, been 
foreseen. We took the view that the legislation should be passed to extend the period 
within which prosecutors could complete formalities legalizing the detention of these 
suspects.704 
 
This makes reference to the fact that in 1994, the Government of Rwanda invoked Article 4 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states that:  
 
‘In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of 
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures 
derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations’705 
 
They invoked this Article 4 of the ICCPR, so as to avoid breaching Article 38 of the Rwandan 
Code de Procedure Penale or international legal norms,706 whereby a defendant should not 
be detained unless the party detaining them is able to prepare a case against them and 
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within a set period of time. The Code de Procedure Penale stipulated that a person must 
appear before a judge within five days of an arrest warrant having been issued, the judge 
could then decide whether detention was necessary, but could only issue a demand for 
detention for a maximum of thirty days at a time, which could be renewed if necessary.707 
However given the influx of prisoners, even within the first six months immediately 
following the genocide, there is not a legal system on earth that could possibly uphold such 
a rigorous detention policy, in the face of such a rapid detention rate. 
 
 
5.8 No Crime of Genocide 
It is common knowledge that the legal basis upon which any national or international court 
derives their power to prosecute the crime of genocide and also provides a basis for the 
legal definition of the crime,708 does so from the Genocide Convention of 1948. The 
Genocide Convention states in Article VI, that: 
Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article 3 shall be 
tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, 
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those 
Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction709 
 
The responsibility to undertake the prosecution of the crimes by, the State in which it took 
place, was one that the Rwandan government took very seriously, but was sadly also one 
that was plagued with many obstacles. To begin with, in 1994 when the first alleged 
offenders were being rounded up and imprisoned in Rwanda and also whilst the UN Security 
Council was in the process of creating the ICTR, the Rwandan government realised that it 
had no legislation in place to actually try those imprisoned for the crime of genocide.  Whilst 
Rwanda had ratified the Genocide Convention of 1948 on the 16 April 1975, the level of 
                                                          
707
 Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure (Code de Procedure Penale) of 23 February 1963, amended by Decree 
Law No 07/82 of 7 January 1982; amended by Law No 31/1985 of 8 November 1985 and more recently Law No 
13/2004 of 17 May 2004 Art 38 
708
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 Art II 
709
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277  Art VI 
139 
 
political instability that had occurred in Rwanda during the years following ratification, it is 
not surprising that either the Habyarimana government, which had taken power by means 
of a coup only three years prior to the ratification of the Genocide Convention and had not 
considered it a priority to enact the legislation, so as to give effect to it in national law. Thus 
resulting in the dire situation that Rwanda found itself in, wherein there was virtually no 
infrastructure to facilitate the lawful investigation, detention or prosecution of those 
involved in the genocide; coupled with no legislation capable dealing with these 
extraordinary crimes, which made for a an impossible situation, that is best described in the 
words of a survivor of the genocide, from Butare: 
All the survivors had a profound need of justice, but a justice that was effective. But 
there was no law about genocide in Rwanda’s justice system, so all we could do at the 
beginning was to take a genocide suspect who had been captured to the nearest police 
station or commune office, and to look for witnesses to reinforce the prosecution’s 
dossier. But we, the survivors, were the only people interested in testifying against them, 
even though the information we had was incomplete. Those who had the necessary 
information did not want to testify because they were related to the genocidaires. The 
other people who could have helped us are those who came back from exile. 
Unfortunately, they had no idea what had happened here during the genocide, and they 
had not mastered the justice system in Rwanda. So because of all this, the genocidaires 
themselves, or their relatives, were working in the institutions of justice. And they took 
advantage of their presence there to make files disappear, and to get rid of evidence.710 
This interview not only highlights the lack of any effective form of justice or relevant 
legislation, but also highlights the fact that of those law enforcement officers, judiciary and 
prosecutors many were survivors of the genocide or previously displaced Rwandans 
returning, who had no knowledge of how the Rwandan legal system worked. Furthermore, 
this serves to highlight the bias, intimidation and revenge justice that was taking place in 
Rwanda in the months immediately following the genocide. 
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Nonetheless this did not discourage the Rwandan government from seeking to bring an end 
to the violence and impunity through the facilitation of justice on such a mass scale and has 
been viewed by some, such as the UN General Assembly and also William Schabas, as an act 
of stubbornness711 in the sense that they were determined to pursue criminal prosecution 
of all potential perpetrators. This view was further compounded by the sentiment expressed 
by the newly appointed Minister of Justice for Rwanda, Marthe Mukamureni, who made it 
abundantly clear upon appointment to office, that Rwanda did not want foreign jurists sent 
into Rwanda, but would prefer, to have help to train new Rwanda jurists, so that they could 
carry out justice for themselves.712 Further to this, in October of 1995 the Rwandan 
government convened, what has become known as the ‘Kigali Conference’ which was an 
international conference held between the 31 October and the 4 November, the aim of 
which was to ‘… explore the various dimensions of accountability …’713 prior to Rwanda 
creating a national piece of legislation to deal with the crime of genocide and other related 
offences.  
 
 
The outcome of the Kigali conference (1995)714 was that, specialised chambers within the 
Rwandan national courts were recommended to deal with these extraordinary crimes,715 a 
symbolic distinction that would distinguish them as crimes more serious than the ordinary 
crimes dealt with under the ordinary Rwandan penal code716 and in the ordinary courts. In 
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addition to the recommendation that specialist trial chambers be created, it was also 
advised that in order to ensure procedural fairness and uphold the basic principles of 
justice, such as the retributive principle of proportionality and ‘just deserts’, that the crimes 
be scaled so as to cover varied levels of offending.717 All of these suggestions were 
embraced and came into effect with the enactment of Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 
1996, which tiered the levels of offender and divided them into 4 categories. Whilst this 
piece of legislation was in-line with recommendations made at the Kigali international 
conference, one fact that is often overlooked in relation to the creation of Organic Law No. 
08/96 of 30 August 1996, is that it creates the offences retrospectively, something that the 
Rwandan government were very conscious of, as it is mentioned in the preamble to the 
piece of legislation:  
…[G]iven that that crime of genocide and crimes against humanity are provided for 
specifically in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
of 9 December 1948, the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of Civilian Persons in 
the Time of War 12 August 1949 and its additional Protocols, as well as the Convention on 
the Non-Applicability  of Statutory Limitations  to War Crimes  and Crimes Against Humanity  
of 26 November 1968; Given that Rwanda has ratified these three Conventions and has  
published them in an Official Gazette, but without having provided for penalties for these 
crimes; Given that, as a consequence,  the prosecutions must be based on the Penal 
Code…718 
Here in the preamble, the Rwandan government is evidently conscious of the fact that by 
creating this retrospective piece of legislation, they have breached one of the fundamental 
principles of justice and procedural fairness, namely the principle of Nullum crimen sine 
lege. The definition of Nullum crimen sine lege is that there is ‘… no crime without law … a 
principle that conduct does not constitute crime unless it has previously been declared to be 
so by the law …’;719 whilst acknowledging the breach of the Nullum crimen sine lege 
principle, the Rwandan government attempted to justify the breach by highlighting that 
none of the punishments are any greater than provided for under the Rwandan Penal 
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Code,720which at the time did proscribe the death penalty for the ordinary crime of 
homicide. In addition to this the Preamble states that the obligations created by ratification 
of the three conventions mentioned, were clearly stated to the public by publishing them in 
an official gazette, just that the Rwandan government had not had the opportunity to enact 
it. Nonetheless, the crimes which it seeks to cover are so reprehensible and clearly defined 
in international law, that the validity of the Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996 has 
never been challenged, so it is now to a brief overview of what the piece of legislation 
meant in reality for the Rwandan national courts, or what are often referred to as the 
National Genocide Tribunals (NGT’s). 
 
5.9 Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996  
Articles 19 – 23 of the Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996 created the specialised 
chambers in Rwanda and the articles provide information on how the chambers are to be 
constructed, the function of the various members and they clearly set out the crimes which 
they have jurisdiction over (those stated in Article 1).  Unfortunately very little is said about 
why there was a need to create these specialised chambers, but it would seem fair to 
assume that it was at least, in part due to the extraordinary nature of the crimes being dealt 
with, as well as a desire to not put any further strain on the ordinary courts, that were being 
rebuilt from the bottom up. However the most important part of the piece of legislation is 
Article 2 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996, which details the 4 categories of 
offence as below: 
 
Category 1. 
a) Person whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of 
a crime against humanity: 
 
b) Persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, perfectoral, communal, 
sector or cell level, or in a political party, the or fostered such crimes; 
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c) Notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they 
committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they 
passed; 
 
d) Persons who committed acts sexual torture; 
 
Category 2: 
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among 
perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault 
against the person causing death; 
 
Category 3: 
Persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of 
other serious assaults against the person; 
 
Category 4: 
persons who committed offences against property. 
 
 
What is interesting is that not only does it categorise the type of offence, but also the 
command responsibility, which is coupled with a pretty comprehensive outline as to the 
level of punishment to be given for those found guilty of each category of offence in Articles 
14-18 of Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996, as well as detailing variances for 
mitigating circumstance such as the timely entry of a guilty plea as outlined in Article 15. 
The significance of this, being that ‘… the discretion of judges in fixing sentence is thereby 
fettered, unlike at the ICTR where judges are accorded broad discretion regarding the length 
of sentence to be imposed.’721 Whilst this is a positive factor in that it guarantees greater 
consistency and predictability, which in turn adds to the credibility722 of the specialised 
chambers, it also created some problems, as the Organic Law No. 08/96 of August 30 1996  
does not permit early release, whilst in contrast Articles 26 and 27 of the ICTR statute723 do 
make early release a possibility, where it is in accordance with the law of the State in which 
the sentence is being carried out724 and is approved by the President of the ICTR.725 This 
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creates a disparity in the sense that the most culpable who will be tried before the ICTR may 
serve far shorter sentences than those sentenced by the national Rwandan courts, but are 
not deemed as culpable or highly ranked.  
 
Linking in to the disparity of sentencing between the ICTR and the Rwandan national courts, 
one of the largest differences between the ITCR and the Rwandan courts, was that until 
2007 and the enactment of Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007,726 which formally 
abolished the death penalty in Rwanda for all crimes, the death penalty had remained a 
viable penalty for the Rwandan courts. The significance of this is once again the disparity of 
penalties that existed prior to this harmonisation, because prior to 2007 those deemed of a 
lower culpability ranking, by way of political or military ranking and also by the seriousness 
of the offence, could potentially face a death sentence whilst those who were more 
culpable and therefore prosecuted by the ICTR would at most face a life sentences (and 
where parole was not exclusively ruled out).727 This dilemma became an actuality in 1998, 
when 22 persons convicted of Category one offences under the Organic Law No. 08/96 of 
August 30 1996, had their death sentences been carried out publicly by means of firing 
squad on the 24 April, in several football stadiums across Rwanda.728 This not only caused 
many problems in that it went against the growing trend towards abolition of death penalty 
as established in chapter two, as well as having the potential spark an uprising of further 
violence within Rwanda729, but the issue of most significance to this thesis is that it also 
undermined the efforts of the ICTR, thus: 
… [P]roducing the paradoxical result that the worst offenders – the architects who were 
tried at the International Tribunal- received lighter sentences, than those who were 
convicted by Rwandan courts for mere participation in the genocide.730 
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This paradox and surrounding issues will become more apparent later on when Rule 11bis731 
is explored in relation to ICTR handing over of outstanding investigations to the Rwandan 
courts. Nonetheless in the immediate context, this could potentially have caused many 
obstacles to justice, had the Rwandan government decided to carry out the hundreds of 
death sentences handed down by the specialised chambers, which is estimated to have 
been approximately 14.4%732 of those convicted. It is undeniable that ‘… international peace 
and security is the central good of International Criminal Justice …’733 and such a paradoxical 
form of justice for one of the worst incidents of genocide, could have been enough to tip an 
already unstable State back into the throes of violence and mass atrocities, as it has been 
suggested by Jens Ohlin that, ‘For the Rwandans, true national reconciliation would be 
possible only if there was justice for the genocide, and justice by their terms meant 
execution for the guilty.’734 However, the fact the Rwandan government showed great 
restrain in not carrying out the sentences of many people who were sentenced to death 
during the trials for genocide and crimes against humanity, shows a concerted effort to 
change the culture in Rwanda; one that was reinforced in the new Rwandan Constitution, 
which came into force on the 2 June 2003. The Rwandan Constitution,735states in part two 
of its preamble that the Rwandan government seeks to ‘… fight the ideology of genocide 
and all its manifestations and to eradicate ethnic, regional, and any other form of 
division.’736 This coupled with the many radical changes made to the Rwandan legislation 
and especially the Organic Laws of 2004,737 which drastically shook up the judiciary, public 
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prosecutors and other legal personnel, effectively causing them to have to reapply for their 
jobs and ascertain a set standard of legal qualification in order to retain their jobs, is truly an 
effort worthy of commendation. Add to this the various legal reforms that from 2007 
onwards, that will be discussed at greater length in the section investigating the Rwandan 
government’s quest to satisfy Rule 11bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence,738 in 
order to facilitate transfer of ICTR cases back to the Rwandan courts. Nonetheless: 
It must be recognized, however, that the Rwandan justice system remains in a state of 
transition that is nowhere near completion. With the constitution as a foundational guide 
for future developments, there exists the potential for positive outcomes in the future.739 
 
 
5.10 The Gacaca Courts – Giving Justice to the People?  
As previously mentioned Rwanda had been detaining alleged perpetrators at an astonishing 
rate, but more worrying was the fact that based on the rate at which the specialised 
chambers of the Rwandan national courts were able to prosecute those under the Organic 
Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996, which covered the crime of genocide; it was going to take 
them anywhere between two hundred740 and possibly four hundred years741 to complete 
their case load.742 This was unacceptable for the simple reason that it put Rwanda in the 
position whereby it ‘… was simply incapable of respecting the provisions of its own criminal 
law, not to mention its obligations under international human rights law and international 
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criminal law.’743 The reference to Rwanda’s own criminal law, pertains to the Rwandan Code 
of Criminal Procedure (1963) (Code de Procedure Penale) where it is stipulated that the State 
has no right to detain a suspect unless they have ‘indices serieux de culpabilite’ (serious 
grounds suggesting guilt)744 and even then, the detention could only be enforced by a court 
of first instance. However an exception to this was made in Organic Law 9/96 of 8 
September 1996745 which stated that in the case of those being detained for genocide and 
related crimes, they could be detained, so long as case files against them were prepared by 
the end of 1997.746 
 
This derogation is quite obviously a breach of procedural and of human rights norms, an 
example of which being Article 9 (3) of the ICCPR (1976), which states that:  
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge 
or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial 
within a reasonable time or to release747 
 
Whilst Article 4 of the ICCPR (1976) does permit a derogation in times of ‘… public 
emergency…’, it does so only to the extent necessary as required by the ‘… exigencies of the 
situation …’and only so long as such action was not contrary to the norms of international 
law. Moreover it is highly unlikely that there exists a norm within international law that 
permits the arbitrary detention of a suspect where they may never actually face trial before 
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their natural life comes to an end. Thus in answer to this problem, the Rwandan 
government on the 18 June 2002 launched the contemporary Gacaca court system.748 
 
It has been suggested that: 
In institutionalizing gacaca, the Rwandan government has launched one 
of the most ambitious transitional justice projects the world has ever seen. 
Based on a traditional form of dispute resolution, gacaca is a local, participatory 
legal mechanism that seeks to blend punitive and restorative justice.749 
Indeed the word Gacaca is Kinyarwanda for ‘grass’ or ‘lawn’ and was a traditional form of 
community led justice in which civil matters were adjudicated by village elders and those 
who were held to be of high moral integrity.750 The village elders who would be known as 
‘inyangamugayo’ (people of integrity) would resolve disputes relating to family matters, 
property issues  and other civil matters of concern to the local community.751 The 
participation of the traditional Gacaca process was voluntary and would not involve prison 
sentences, but would provide an outcome that would seek to ‘… salvage social peace and 
cohesion in the village.’752 However the new hybrid form of gacaca (hybrid in the sense that 
it is an amalgamation of the traditional gacaca justice and ‘…typical criminal justice system 
decentralized to the village level …’,753 as created by Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 16 January 
2001754 differs from the traditional form of Gacaca in three obvious ways. The first of which 
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is that participation had now become mandatory, as all members of the community were 
compelled to attend or face government enforced fines and since 2007 and all Rwandan 
citizens must carry a book in which they gain a stamp each time they attend Gacaca.755 
Failure to attend and ascertain the requisite number of stamps, results in a fine of $4, which 
is extremely high given the monthly average household income in the more rural areas can 
be as little as $20.756 Secondly the elders presiding over the cases were originally given 
discretion as to what the appropriate form of resolution would be, whereas now it is set out 
for them in great detail in Organic Law No 40/2000 of 26 January 2001 in Articles 68 – 75; 
what is notable here is that there is not a great deal of flexibility afforded to the 
inyangamugayo when deciding on the appropriate sentence. Finally, the most notable 
difference is the government centralisation of what was originally local ad-hoc hearings, but 
had now become regulated by national legislation and were far more complex in their 
organisation and structure. 
 
 
5.11 Modern Day Gacaca 
The modern form of Gacaca was created specifically to deal with the large numbers of those 
imprisoned and accused of the crimes of genocide has a very complex structure. The 
Rwandan government estimated that the new Gacaca courts would be capable of hearing 
somewhere in the region of 1,000,000 cases,757 which is impressive, but also alarming, given 
that there is no legal representation for the either side, and the training of the judges is 
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minimal (approximately three days).758 Organic Law No 40/2000 of 26 January 2001 has 
been so effective, due to utilising the very comprehensive and extensive layers of local 
government that had been instigated by the Belgians. This system of local governance is 
split into cells/cellule at the lowest level, of which there are at least 9000 in Rwanda, the 
cells are then grouped into sectors, of which there are 1500 and then the sectors are 
grouped into districts,759 which equates to approximately 11,000 Gacaca courts or 
jurisdictions.760 Within each jurisdiction there will be a general assembly, which consists of 
all those in that cell or sector that are over the age of eighteen. Then there is the ‘seat’ or 
bench which consists of the judges, which under the Organic Law of 2001761 there were 
nineteen in each jurisdiction, these were to be ‘honest’ people who had good morals and 
had not been party to the genocide, which posed an obvious problem, given that very little 
of the Rwandan population had not been a part of the genocide in one form or another.762 
This provision generated some 250,000 judges, which was eventually streamlined in 2004 by 
means of Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19 June 2004, which reduced the number of judges 
from nineteen in each jurisdiction, to just nine. This meant a reduction from 250,000 to 
170,000763 judges ready for the roll out of Gacaca across the whole of Rwanda. This 
reduction in the number of bench judges was deemed necessary following the trial period 
where the Rwandan government discovered ‘… widespread absenteeism among judges that 
led to the inability to achieve a quorum forth Bench in many cells …’,764which in turn caused 
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delays in delivering judgements and decisions on sentencing. Therefore the reduction in the 
number of judges within each jurisdiction which meant that not only would it be easier to 
attain a quorum so as to increase the frequency of hearings, but it would also permit greater 
training and instruction as there would be fewer judges to provide this for.765 
 
 
It is worth briefly mentioning that Organic Law No 16/2004 of 19 June 2004766 also 
expanded the category one offences to include torture, indignity to a dead body and sexual 
violence (namely rape).767 The purpose of this was to remove some additional crimes from 
the remit of the Gacaca courts and to pass them to the specialised chambers, who were 
better equipped to deal with such complex trials. In addition to expanding category one 
offences, Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19 June 2004 also merged categories two and three 
from the 2001 Organic Law, thus giving the Gacaca only two categories to be responsible for 
and only two sets of sentencing guidelines to have to follow, rather than three tiers, which 
could have proved too complex for non - legally trained judges. The final level of the Gacaca 
system was the ‘coordinating committee’ which were five of the elected judges, who would 
deal with the administrative functions of the courts768. 
 
The way in which the Gacaca system then set about beginning trials, was through national 
data collection, which commenced, in January 2005769 so as to compile a list of the crimes 
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committed in the various sectors and cells of Rwanda. Given how effective the localised 
system of government was at collating and disseminating information on the whereabouts 
of Tutsis and Tutsi collaborators during the genocide, it seems logical to presume that it will 
have been effective at collecting data on the alleged crimes and perpetrators.  
 
An example of the efficiency of this data collection is illustrated by the fact that during the 
trial period which took place between 2002 and 2004; in which only ten percent of the 
overall number of Rwanda’s cells were involved in data collection, an additional 63,447 
suspects were identified.770 However, despite the associated problems, the fact remains 
that, ‘It has always been expected that as some form of democracy or majority rule took 
over in Rwanda, there would be no heart for further prosecution.’771 Given that the RPF 
based government has remained resolute in its quest to stamp out impunity for the crimes 
of genocide and war crimes that took place during 1994, by means of not allowing anyone 
to escape some form of justice, it would seem to suggest that despite Rwanda having 
become a democratic State, they have not lost the drive or determination to continue with 
the prosecutions. However as the preamble to Organic Law No. 16/2004 of 19 June 2004 
makes it abundantly clear, the reason why this mass justice is deemed necessary is due to 
the fact that the crimes were ‘… publicly committed before the very eyes of the population 
…’772 and therefore the population in the form of the general assemblies of the Gacaca ‘… 
must recount the facts, disclose the truth and participate in prosecuting and trying the 
alleged perpetrators.’773 Therefore it is not surprising to learn that in the 1st phase of 
Gacaca, the data collection involved required all the general assemblies at the cell level to 
complete six surveys over a period of several months, with the aim collating a list of who 
lived in the area prior to the genocide, who from the are died during the genocide, details of 
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property damage/loss and finally the creation of a list of those alleged to have committed 
these crimes. This has been described as a ‘grassroots’ retelling of the events of 1994 and 
also of the years leading up to 1994, starting from 1990 onwards, as specified in the 
temporal jurisdiction given to Gacaca in the Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001.774 
 
The next phase of the process is then conducted out of the view of the public, whereby the 
judges elected by the general assembly meet to consider the testimony and data collected 
during the first phase and use this information to allocate the trials to the relevant court. 
Under Organic Law No. 10/2007 of the 1 March 2007,775 the cell level Gacaca court has 
authority to deal with ‘… the first and last resort, with offences relating to 
property.’776Those accused of crimes that fall into the second category will have their case 
decided before the sector level Gacaca courts and this level of Gacaca will also hear the 
appeals against cell level decision.777 This category was created by merging categories two 
and three from Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996, which originally defined the 
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity within Rwanda. And then finally the sector 
level appeal chambers will deal with appeals against decisions made at the sector level and 
will also deal with appeals for those whose sentence was given in their absence. It is worth 
noting that whilst there is a hierarchy within the Gacaca system, there is still no formal legal 
training for any of the judges, other than the three days of training that they receive prior to 
commencing work as a judge.778 However the coordination committees that look after the 
administrative functions of the Gacaca’s work must be able to read and write in 
Kinyarwanda,779 thereby ensuring some minimum level of competency and record making of 
the workload of the Gacaca courts.  
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The final phase of the Gacaca process is that of the actual trial phase and sentencing, where 
neither the prosecution nor the defence have legal representation.780 The hope at this level 
is to ascertain the truth through confessions, to learn the names of any accomplices and to 
lean towards more lenient sentencing or possibly social reintegration,781 where the person 
has already served their time, whilst awaiting trial. This form of justice not only serves the 
much needed objective of drastically reducing the number of those imprisoned in Rwanda’s 
dangerously overcrowded prisons, but also goes someway to ensuring restorative justice is 
carried out, through ‘… reintegrative shaming …’782 something that Western styles of justice 
do not pursue, but is essential when a large percentage of the population of a nation were 
party to the crimes. As without forgiveness and reintegration Rwanda cannot hope to 
rebuild itself, whilst a large percentage of its population is imprisoned and costing the State 
money, rather than contributing to rebuilding the State and its economy. 
 
 
5.12 Gacaca Not Without its Flaws 
One of the key criticisms of Gacaca is that its openness may have caused more harm than 
good, as many fear reprisals because of their testimony and tension and suspicion amongst 
the population still remains present.783 Furthermore, many victims who have testified have 
reported in a Redress report784 that they have received ‘…threats, taunts and reprisals …’785 
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and have been left feeling ostracised from their own communities in addition to still living in 
a state of fear.786 There are also concerns about ‘… the potential for trauma as victims and 
witnesses recount and relive the horrors that they experienced …’787 and are then forced to 
co-exist in close proximity. An illustration of the Rwandan government’s ignorance or choice 
to prioritise quantity of justice over quality of justice attained was evident in the decision to 
return the crime of rape to the Gacaca system under the Organic Law No. 13/2008 of the 19 
May 2008, Article 6.788 Whilst Article 6 does state that any confessions or testimonies of the 
crime of rape are to be made ‘in camera’ and not in public, the lack of procedural 
safeguards and legal training, has made all parties to this specific crime particularly 
nervous.789 As many women fear the stigma that they will carry within their community if 
they are discovered to be a rape victim or far worse, they should they be forced to face the 
person who raped them.790  
 
It is believed that the Rwandan government took the drastic step to re-categorise the crime 
of rape and to place it back within the jurisdiction of the Gacaca, not to devalue the 
magnitude of the offence, but simply to ensure that justice was carried out, in a more 
prompt fashion and also before it became too late.791 This can partly be attributed to an 
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awareness whereby the more time that passes between the prosecution and the act, 
naturally the memories of witnesses and defendants become less certain and have the 
potential to be influenced or clouded. This is problematic when the sole basis of a 
prosecution is witness testimony, rather than any form of scientific evidence, as is the norm 
in Western investigations of the crime of rape. Furthermore, the Rwandan government 
were very conscious of the high numbers of people suffering from HIV/AIDS; with many of 
them being rape victims, who contracted the disease following the events of 1994.792 Given 
the lack of easily accessible and affordable anti-retroviral drugs, many of the rape victims 
and the alleged rapists have short life expectancies and without the key witness or the 
perpetrators, the Gacaca courts or even the specialised chambers would be hard pressed to 
form a case on such scant evidence.793 Thus once again the Rwandan government chose to 
forfeit the quality of justice, especially from the victim’s perspective, in favour of boosting 
its own prosecution statistics. 
 
 
Overall, whilst there are many potential flaws to the Gacaca system, such as the lack of 
procedural safeguards especially given that trials are based upon hearsay, witness testimony 
and the confessions of those accused, plus the fact that the Gacaca system created issue of 
‘double jeopardy’ whereby people who had been acquitted by the specialised chambers, 
could find themselves before a Gacaca court and facing an equally lengthy sentence if found 
guilty, it did have some positives. Such as the fact that by the time Gacaca trials were 
drawing to a close in 2010 they had processed somewhere in the region of two million 
people at a cost of $40 million, which is pretty impressive compared to the comparative 
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sixty nine trials conducted by the ICTR at a cost of over $1 billion.794 Whilst there can be no 
direct comparison between the work of the ICTR and the work of the Gacaca courts, as they 
both had very different objectives, it is undeniable that the Gacaca has brought about mass 
justice for Rwanda. However, how the Rwandan government seeks to remedy the inevitable 
injustices that have occurred in the Gacaca court system still remains to be seen, so a final 
judgement on the way in which the Rwandan national courts have overall achieved their 
objective of ensuring that all or the majority of those who committed the crimes of 
genocide or crimes against humanity will not go unpunished, still remains to be seen. 
 
 
It is not necessary to go into greater detail about the case history of the Gacaca or to 
critically assess whether the Gacaca successfully achieved its goals as set out in the 
preamble to Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001, where it is stated that the aim of 
Gacaca is: 
… to achieve reconciliation and justice in Rwanda, to eradicate for good the culture of 
impunity and to adopt provisions enabling to ensure prosecutions and trials of perpetrators 
and accomplices without only aiming for simple punishment, but also for the reconstitution 
of the Rwandese society made decaying by bad leaders who prompted the population to 
exterminate one part of that society.795 
 
 
The key lesson to be learnt from all this is that whilst Gacaca does not conform to 
conventional ideals of justice, such as the procedural safeguards, levels of fairness and due 
process of the ICC and ICTR. It does however, serve to highlight one of the issues the ICC 
may encounter when trying to follow its principle of complementarity, in the sense that 
whilst Gacaca or similar native and unconventional methods of justice (for example Acholi 
justice of Uganda or the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa), certainly will 
not provide anything near the level of justice offered by the ICC. They are held to be 
satisfactory forms of justice in the countries in which these war crimes and  acts of genocide 
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take place, as to prosecute on the scale commensurate with the level of participation 
required for these crimes to have occurred, is neither a practical reality or a desirable 
outcome. The reason for this need for reconciliation over conventional ideals of justice is 
something that was succinctly put by President Paul Kagame of Rwanda at the launch of the 
Gacaca courts in 2002, when he stated that: 
 
… [I]f we all together support Gacaca Courts, we’ll have shown the love we have for our 
country and Rwandans. Justice that reconciles Rwandans will be a fertile ground for unity 
and a foundation for development …796 
  
Moreover, it is a form of justice that the ICC would be hard pushed to justify intervention 
against, as the national legal channels would technically be taking action and even where 
the ICC was able to justify intervention, it would most likely be met with hostility from the 
State in which the crimes took place as they could potentially feel that their State 
sovereignty had been unfairly breached simply because their ideals of justice did no 
conform to the more Westernised ideals of the ICC. Furthermore, as has been illustrated in 
Rwanda and will be further highlighted in the assessment of the changes Rwanda has made 
to its national legislation, so as to facilitate transfer of ICTR case load to its national courts, it 
is very difficult not to undermine justice and avoid leaving the victims feeling cheated, when 
the higher level offenders receive proportionately weaker sentences, than the lower level 
offenders. Thus flowing on from this, it is to the changes made to Rwanda’s national 
legislation, particularly the abolition of the death penalty in 2007, to which the discussion 
now turns. 
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5.13 Abolition of the Death Penalty: Social Progress or a Slave to Rule 11bis? 
Prior to the genocide in Rwanda, whilst the death penalty had remained a potential penalty 
for those found guilty of the crime of murder, there had not been an actual execution 
carried out since 1982.797 In addition to this President Habyarimana had commuted the 
death sentences of all those detained in Rwandan prisons in 1992 and changed it to a 
sentence of life imprisonment.798 Thus it does not come as a surprise that the UN Secretary 
General in a report entitled ‘Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards 
Guaranteeing the Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty’,799 which he 
presented to the Economic and Social Council on the 8 June 1995, stated that Rwanda was 
one of the States across the globe, that was considered to be abolitionist de facto. However, 
the response given by the Rwandan Special Representative in November of 1994 in 
opposition of the then proposed ICTR, which stated: 
Since it is foreseeable that the Tribunal will be dealing with suspects 
who devised, planned, and organized the genocide, these may escape 
 capital punishment whereas those who simply carried out their plans  
would be subjected to the harshness of this sentence. This situation 
is not conducive to national reconciliation in Rwanda.800 
This statement and objection to the creation of an international tribunal, which did not have 
the death penalty as a potential punishment, must surely have indicated that Rwanda was 
thinking about using the death penalty in its own domestic prosecutions for the genocide of 
1994. Therefore the events of the 24 April 1998 should not have been a great surprise to the 
international community, when the execution of 22 persons convicted of category one 
offences under Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996, took place in five stadiums across 
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Rwanda.801  It must be noted that these were the only executions, officially carried out by 
the Rwandan government for the crimes of genocide and whilst many more were sentenced 
to death after this date, none actually had their sentences carried out. However the most 
interesting factor about the way in which Rwanda has set about dealing with its own 
national prosecutions for the crime of genocide, came about in 2007 when it enacted 
Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007802 which formally abolished the death penalty for 
all crimes in Rwanda and made Rwanda the 90th officially abolitionist State worldwide.803 
Whilst this must have appeared to be a surprising change of attitude to many; especially 
given that at the time of abolition Rwanda had approximately 600 inmates on death row.804 
The question has to be asked, was it really a great surprise? Or was it merely a reaction to 
the ICTR’s reaction to the Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 2007805 and the concerns 
over whether or not the ICTR was satisfied that rule 11bis if the ICTR’s Rule of Procedure 
and Evidence had been satisfied? 
 
 
5.14 Rule 11bis 
As previously mentioned the original completion strategy for the ICTR was created in August 
2003, via UN Security Council Resolution 1503, which stated in its preamble that the UN 
Security Council was: 
Urging the ICTR to formalize a detailed strategy, modelled on the ICTY 
Completion Strategy, to transfer cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank 
accused to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda, in 
order to allow the ICTR to achieve its objective of completing investigations by the 
end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of its 
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work in 2010.806 
 
Furthermore UN Security Council Resolution 1503 also made reference to the need for the 
national judicial systems to be strengthened prior to any contemplation of handing over the 
outstanding ICTR prosecutions to the national courts: 
Calls on the international community to assist national jurisdictions, as 
part of the completion strategy, in improving their capacity to prosecute cases 
transferred from the ICTY and the ICTR and encourages the ICTY and ICTR 
Presidents, Prosecutors, and Registrars to develop and improve their outreach 
Programmes;807 
 
 
Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that in 2003, the UN Security Council, certainly felt 
that the Rwandan national judiciary and Rwandan legislation, still needed to develop and 
become more in keeping with the western ideals of justice, that have become norms of 
international criminal and human rights law. Especially, before they would contemplate 
handing over the remaining case load of the ICTR to the national courts of Rwanda, or the 
courts of other relevant nations, such as France. The section of the ICTR statute that governs 
the transfer of cases is Rule 11bis of the Rules of Evidence and Procedure and it states that it 
will only be able to refer a case to a State if they have the ‘relevant jurisdiction’. What 
constitutes relevant jurisdiction is defined in Rule 11bis (A)(i) which stipulates that a State 
will have jurisdiction when the crime was committed within their territory or alternatively, 
as stated in Rule 11bis (A)(ii) when the accused was arrested within their territory. In 
addition to setting out, when a State can be said to have sufficient jurisdiction, so as to 
satisfy the requirements for the referral, Rule 11bis (C) also states the following: 
In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), 
the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial 
in the courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty will not be 
imposed or carried out.808 
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This requirement that the trial procedure be fair has always been an obstacle in the referral 
of cases to Rwanda, as the speed with which the Rwandan specialised chambers have 
processed cases, has led human rights organisations such as Amnesty International809 and 
also the ICTR810 to question, whether due process and procedural safeguards are being 
adhered to, when cases are being processed so quickly and with such insufficient levels of 
evidence and investigation. However the biggest concern for the ICTR was the issue of the 
death penalty, which ICTR President Erik Mose remarked in a report on the ICTR completion 
strategy. In the report he remarked that he believed that the forty cases that the prosecutor 
was looking to transfer to the Rwandan courts, was not viable, because ‘… at the moment , 
transfer is made difficult  by the fact that Rwandan law prescribes  the death penalty as a 
sentence for certain crime.’811 However, it is worth noting that the issue relating to the 
death penalty, being a major obstacle to the referral of cases to national courts, was an 
amendment that was made to Rule 11bis in May 2005.812 Prior to this Rule 11bis had simply 
stated that the ICTR Trial chamber must only be satisfied that ‘… that the accused will 
receive a fair trial with due process in the courts of the State Concerned.’813 Therefore, the 
retention of the death penalty has often been noted as the biggest obstacle to cooperation 
between the ICTR and the Rwandan national courts and until 2007, it also appeared to be 
the main obstacle to Rwanda receiving the outstanding case load of the ICTR as it prepared 
to wind down and enforce its completion strategy. 
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5.15 Why Did Rwanda Abolish the Death Penalty? 
It has been suggested that Rwanda’s apparent change of heart with regards to the use of 
the death penalty, for both ordinary and extraordinary crimes can be attributed to ‘… the 
desire to have access to the leaders of the Rwandan genocide…’814 whilst others have 
suggested that the legislative changes are simply another example ‘… as a mere result of 
top–down pressure from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.’815 Whilst neither 
of these two reasons suggest that the decision to remove the death penalty completely 
from the statute books of Rwanda, came from a bottom up pressure from within or 
consensus amongst the general population of Rwandan that it signalled social and cultural 
advances in the historically volatiles political situation in Rwanda. It should be noted that 
even in developed Western States such as France816 and Great Britain817 there was no public 
consensus that the death penalty should be abolished, at the time when their respective 
governments took the decision to remove it from their statute books. Nonetheless, the key 
issue remains the same; namely that Rwanda decided to join the many other States across 
the globe and become completely abolitionist. Thus the motivating factors become 
irrelevant, so long as Rwanda continues to adhere to this legislative change and keeps the 
death penalty out of its legal proceedings. 
 
Whilst some believe that Rwanda’s move towards abolition of the death penalty was a 
direct response to amendments made to Rule 11bis in May 2005,818 which came about 
following the creation of UN Security Council Resolution 1503 that tasked the ICTR with 
implementing a completion strategy aimed at having the ICTR complete all of its work by 
2010 and hand over any outstanding cases or investigation, ideally to the Rwandan 
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courts.819 However, because the Rwandan courts were not the most equipped or legally 
advanced courts, it may have been added so as to ensure due process and procedural 
fairness to the same standard as is common in Westernised stats, because geographically 
and culturally the Rwandan courts are best placed to ensure that the prosecutions 
contribute to the goal of bringing an end to impunity.820 Others such as Audrey Boctor argue 
that the signs were already apparent in Rwanda and that they were leaning towards an 
abolitionist stance821prior to the top down pressure which stemmed from the ICTR’s 
completion strategy and the numerous refusals by the ICTR trial chambers to refer ICTR 
cases, especially those with indictments to the Rwandan courts.822 Boctor stated that:  
To be sure, pressure from the ICTR and the concerns over the internal consistency of the law 
undoubtedly formed part of the rationale, but these justifications take a backseat to those 
connected with a larger objective to be perceived as a progressive, democratic state 
committed to the Rule of Law and the promotion and protection of Human Rights.823 
Here Boctor is arguing that to take the view that the Rwandan government only changed its 
legislation on the death penalty, so as to facilitate the transfer of ICTR cases to its own 
national courts would be a narrow minded stance to take, as the decision to abolish the 
death penalty may also have occurred due to the natural progression of an emerging 
democratic State.824 Furthermore, Rwanda was a highly conscious of the fact that due to the 
many corrupt political regimes, which had controlled Rwanda for many years, resulting in all 
respect for the sanctity of human life having been lost and subsequently attributed to the 
events of 1994;825 it was strongly believed that this could not be rectified so long as the 
death penalty was still used.826  
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In addition to this, certain events following on from the execution of the twenty two 
persons convicted of genocide, which took place publicly on the 24 April 1998,827 signalled a 
change in attitude towards the death penalty. Whilst no further executions took place, the 
death penalty did continue to be handed out to those convicted of category one offences 
under the Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 and by the time of abolition in 2007, it 
was estimated that there were approximately 600 people on death row in Rwanda 
convicted on the crime of genocide.828 Similarly, in a speech given by President Kagame at 
the eighth commemoration of the genocide in April of 2002, he highlighted the fact that the 
death penalty was an issue that needed to be addressed ‘… in a wider context, not 
necessarily because it is related to the transfer of ICTR trials to Rwanda …’.829 Therefore, 
highlighting and affirming Boctor’s assertion that the Rwandan government had been 
considering removing the death penalty from their statute books prior to the 
implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1503830 when it increasingly became 
more of an act of necessity if the Rwandan courts were to have any chance of ensuring that 
outstanding cases from the ICTR were handed over to them rather than other national 
courts, as the ICTR implemented its completion strategy.   
 
5.16 The Organic Laws of 2007 
The first piece of legislation to be passed in 2007 within Rwanda, was Organic Law No. 
11/2007 of 16 March 2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States. As would be expected 
from the full title of this particular organic law, it sets out how the Rwandan national courts 
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would proceed to conduct a trial, should a case be referred to their jurisdiction from the 
ICTR and in the main tries to assure the ICTR, that their rules relating to evidence and 
witnesses will be adhered to, rather than the Rwandan procedures. However we are not 
concerned with these sections and will skip to Article 6 of Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 
March 2007, which deals with the penalties that the national courts would impose in the 
case of an ICTR referral. Article 21 states that, ‘Life imprisonment shall be the heaviest 
penalty imposed upon a convicted person in a case transferred to Rwanda from ICTR.’ 
Similarly Article 22 of Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 2007 states that credit will be 
given for any time already served whilst in custody and Article 23 stipulates that the 
detention conditions for ICTR referral cases, will be in accordance ‘…with the minimum 
standards of detention stipulated in the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection 
of all persons under any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 43/173 of 9 December, 1998.’831 The distinct lack of any reference to the death 
penalty suggests that Rwanda was already more than willing to accede to international 
pressure with regards to prosecution of ICTR cases, so it comes as no surprise that only four 
months later a second piece of legislation was created, removing the death penalty in its 
entirety from Rwandan law. 
 
In July of 2007, Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 relating to the abolition of the 
death penalty was passed and in Article 2 it quite simply states ‘The death penalty is hereby 
abolished.’832 Furthermore, Article 3 of Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 states that, 
‘In all the legislative texts in force before the commencement of this Organic Law, the death 
penalty is substituted by life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions as 
provided for by this Organic Law.’833 Thus substituting the death penalty for a life sentence 
and for the crimes as set out within Article 5; which includes rape, torture, genocide and 
crimes against humanity, amongst several others, furthermore those convicted of these 
crimes, will receive life with ‘special provisions’. Article 4 explains what ‘special provisions’ 
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means and in summary, it is life imprisonment whereby conditional release, mercy or any 
form of rehabilitation is not permitted until a minimum of twenty years of the sentence has 
been served. In addition to this Article 2(2) of Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 
states that a convicted person, who has been sentenced to life with special provisions, will 
be ‘… kept in isolation …’834 and due to the ambiguity of the organic law, it would seem to 
suggest that the period of isolation could last the stipulated twenty years, before they 
became eligible for early release or at least rehabilitation, via reintegration into the 
mainstream prison population. 
 
Whilst there has been no definitive ruling that long-term isolation is a breach of human 
rights, the International Human Rights Committee noted in General Comment No. 20 on 
Article 7 of the ICCPR (1994), that, ‘… prolonged solitary confinement of the … imprisoned 
person may amount to acts prohibited by Article 7.’835 And Article 7 of the ICCPR states that 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’836 and further to this Article 15 of the Rwandan Constitution837 also states ‘… 
no person shall be subjected to torture, physical abuse or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment.’838 Therefore the contradictory pieces of Rwandan legislation caused much 
confusion and alarm amongst the ICTR, because normally the general rule would be that the 
most recent piece of legislation would take precedence and this is the stance the ICTR Trial 
Chambers have taken, meaning that ICTR suspects referred from the ICTR to Rwanda will 
potentially be to be sentenced to life with special provisions and this is something which the 
ICTR does not feel it can permit. Furthermore, this serves to illustrate that even when a 
State abolishes the death penalty, they may still have forms of punishment that are deemed 
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unacceptable at the international level, further highlighting more potential obstacles to 
proportionality and consistency of penalties between the ICC and the national courts. In 
addition to this it also raises the question, of how a court that is created to champion 
human rights and lead in the fight against impunity could then standby and watch those 
deemed of lower rank and subsequently less culpable  be sentenced to forms of punishment 
that are deemed contrary to international norms of human rights? 
 
 The ICTR’s concern about the potential for human rights abuses via the new Rwandan 
penalty for the crimes of genocide and the other related offences was illustrated in several 
ICTR referral cases during 2008; one of which being Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana 
(Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal against Decision on Referral under Rule 11bis) ICTR-
00-55B-R11bis (4 December 2008) where it was argued that the ambiguity caused by the 
two organic laws of 2007,839 meant that the ICTR Appeals Chamber, could not be certain 
that the defendant would not possibly face life imprisonment with special provisions and 
felt that because: 
Hategekimana may face life imprisonment in isolation without adequate safeguards, in 
violation of his right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment…. The 
Appeals Chamber is therefore unable to conclude that the ambiguity as to the applicable 
punishment under Rwandan law for transfer cases has been resolved.840 
 
In addition to the above mentioned case, there were an additional two similar cases841 
during 2008, where the decisions of the Trial Chambers not to transfer to the Rwandan 
courts were upheld, based on the ambiguity of the penalty.  One of which was the case of 
The Prosecutor v Yussuf Munyakazi (Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision 
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on Referral Under Rule 11bis) Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis (8 October 2008) where it was 
also stated that: 
Since there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment provision would apply to transfer 
cases, and since, therefore, the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a 
penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases, pursuant to the 
Abolition of Death Penalty Law, the Appeals Chamber finds no error in the Trial Chamber’s 
conclusion that the current penalty structure in Rwanda is not adequate for the purposes of 
transfer under Rule 11bis of the Rules.842 
 
 
In an attempt to rectify this ambiguity which the ICTR believed existed, the Rwandan 
government felt compelled to enact Organic Law No. 66/2008 of 21 November 2008 despite 
the existence of Article 24 of Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 2007 which clearly 
stated that: 
 
This Organic Law applies mutatis mutandis in other matters where there is transfer of cases 
to the Republic of Rwanda from other States or where transfer of cases or extradition of 
suspects is sought by the Republic of Rwanda from other States. 
 
Thus, what occurred as a result of the creation of Organic Law No. 66/2008 of 21 November 
2008, enacted specifically so as to amend Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 was not 
necessarily the objective the ICTR was seeking, because instead of abolishing the penalty of 
life with ‘special provisions’, it created a dualist system wherein those transferred from the 
ICTR will receive a maximum of life imprisonment, whilst those subject to ordinary Rwandan 
law could receive a life sentence with twenty years of that potentially spent in isolation. 
Once again creating a significant disparity of penalties between the national courts and the 
international, which could be interpreted as sending mixed signals as to the culpability and 
gravity of the offences being prosecuted, because surely those receiving the harsher 
sentences must be the more culpable? And if not, what kind of message would this send to 
potential future perpetrators, surely not one of deterrence. 
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5.17 Dualist System: A Satisfactory Outcome? 
Overall whilst the death penalty has been removed from the equation, the fact remains that 
there is now a new double standard of penalties, between ICTR referral cases and the 
Rwandan cases. What this will mean for the stability of Rwanda and its quest to bring an end 
to impunity still remains to be seen, as it is only in the last few years, that the ICTR has 
finally acceded and begun to transfer its caseload to the Rwandan courts. Nonetheless, it 
has served to highlight that difficulties that an international court that is bound by 
multilateral human rights treaties as well as customary norms of human rights, when  trying 
to work alongside a national court which does not adhere to the same standards of human 
rights, due process, procedural safeguards or similar sentencing policy. Furthermore, this 
can only serve to illustrate the potential difficulties the ICC will encounter when dealing with 
countries where the death penalty still remains an applicable penalty, because that will 
potentially create an even larger penalty disparity than was illustrated between the 
Rwandan legislation and that of the ICTR as the ICTR began to wind down and prepared to 
hand some of its outstanding or ongoing cases and investigations to Rwanda. Therefore, if 
the ICTR were unhappy to transfer cases to the Rwandan courts for fear that life 
imprisonment with special provisions843 may be imposed by the national courts, then why 
should the ICC tolerate national courts prosecuting in a ‘complementary’ manner844 and 
applying the ultimate penalty of death? However it has been argued that whilst the 
international criminal tribunals (ICTY and ICTR) have failed to lead by example and inspire 
the national courts to follow their example,845 through the strict requirements for case 
referral, as detailed in Rule 11bis of the ICTR and ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
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they have provided a ‘…carrot and stick…’846approach resulting in coaxing the national 
governments to adhere to international norms of criminal law, as well as having a ‘… 
legitimating effect …’847 on these relatively newly formed governments and their legal 
systems.  
 
Some ICTR judges have stated, that they feel it was never the job of the ICTR to help 
Rwanda to rebuild its legal system, but rather to provide an ‘… international response …’848 
which would in turn provide legal precedents and a system of comprehensive case law for 
the Rwandan courts, other national courts and now more importantly for the ICC to follow. 
Moreover ‘… the international court has operated on the assumption that the domestic 
courts are, or should be, pursuing the ICTR's objective of developing the application of 
international criminal law.’849 And whether or not this is an arrogant stance, it is at least in 
part true because the Rwandan government and judiciary have been left with little option 
that to follow international legal norms, due process and to ensure adherence to human 
rights and other sentencing norms. Thus it would seem fair to surmise that ‘… Rule 11bis 
decisions are not only an issue of transfer, they [have also been] a call for 
transformation.’850 
 
The transformation which has been brought about within Rwandan national courts and legal 
system, has certainly paid off and is evident in the number of cases that the ICTR is currently 
or has prepared to hand over to Rwanda as part of their completion strategy. This change of 
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attitude first became evident in the case of the Prosecutor v Jean-Bosco Uwikindi (Referral 
Chamber) ICTR-2001-75-R11bis (28 June 2011) which saw the newly created ICTR referral 
bench approve the transfer of a case to the Rwandan national courts. Uwikindi was a Pastor 
of a Pentecostal Church in Kanzenze, Rwanda and is charged with three counts of genocide, 
conspiracy to commit genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity.851Since the 
Uwikindi case852 the ICTR have upheld the transfer of one other case to the Rwandan courts 
where the perpetrator was in detention853 and six fugitive cases.854  The other case that has 
been transferred, where the perpetrator was already in detention was the case of The 
Prosecutor v Bernard Munyagishari (Referral Chamber)  ICTR-2005-89-R11bis (6 June 2012) 
where despite the defendants counsel attempting to argue on many points that the 
Rwandan national courts are not competent of ensuring Munyahgishari receives a fair trial, 
the ICTR has nonetheless concluded that they are ‘… satisfied that the judges of the High 
Court and Supreme Court of Rwanda are competent, qualified and experienced.’855 The ICTR 
chamber then went on to further reinforce its belief in the competency of the Rwandan 
national courts and commend the Rwandan reforms, by stating: 
‘Following an analysis of the Rwandan legal framework applicable to the judiciary, the 
Chamber concludes that it is consonant with international fair trial standards. It offers clear 
procedures and objective criteria for the appointment, remuneration, tenure, promotion, 
suspension and dismissal of the members of judiciary and disciplinary sanctions taken 
against them. Furthermore, it welcomes the legislative amendments permitting the 
appointment of international judges and a quorum of three judges as a positive step 
towards further strengthening and maintaining the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary in relation to transferred cases.’856 
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This statement encapsulates the high standard of procedural fairness and safeguards as well 
as the many legislative changes that the Rwandan government and its judiciary have had to 
bring about, just to ensure that it could receive at least some of the caseload of the 
outgoing ICTR. Therefore, if the ICC were to stand by and watch national prosecutions that 
do not adhere to the commonly accepted standards of procedural fairness and human rights 
norms, after the international criminal tribunals strived to lead by example and bring about 
procedural and legislative changes within the states involved, would this not signal to its 
member States that a few trophy high profile cases are more important than seriously 
attempting to bring an end to the impunity? 
 
 
5.18 Outreach Programmes: Did They Reach Far Enough? 
The mandate of the ICTR as detailed in UN Security Council Resolution 955, stated in 
addition to prosecuting the most culpable offenders of the 1994 genocide, they were also to 
assist the Rwandan judicial system to rebuild itself; with the aid of international assistance 
in the form of what is presumably State assistance and NGO’s. This additionally 
responsibility upon the international community as a whole, is evident in paragraph two of 
Resolution 955,857 where it was stated that the UN was ‘Stressing also the need for 
international cooperation to strengthen the Courts and Judicial System of Rwanda, having 
regard in particular to the necessity for those Courts to deal with large numbers of 
suspects’858 
 
However, as previously mentioned, whilst the ICTR did very little to assist the Rwandan legal 
system to help rebuild itself from the ground up on a practical level, the ICTR instead chose 
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to see their responsibility as being that of ensuring that the most culpable were held 
accountable, so as to ensure that justice was seen to be done.859 And most importantly, to 
set the bar for the prosecution of the crime of genocide and create a legal precedence and 
establish case law for future national and international courts to follow, which is indeed an 
important job in itself. Furthermore, in spite of the legal precedents it set as well as drawing 
global attention to the situation in Rwanda, it has been suggested by some, that the mere 
fact that the ICTR managed to function at all, could be claimed as its biggest success: 
I think the successes of the tribunal is that it exist[ed] at all and that if it does result in 
people who were active in or complicit in mass murders being tried in proper courts, having 
a proper defence, had a fair trial hearing, and being punished in appropriately humane, but 
severe way, that will be an achievement.860 
 
Nonetheless, the ICTR has not been perceived in a positive light by all, with particular 
reference made to the small number of prosecutions (seventy seven completed)861 that it 
has completed in comparison to the magnitude of the crimes committed in Rwanda, which 
has been criticised as lamentable and a mere drop in the ocean.862 Which is a criticism that 
the ICC has also endured in recent years, as is evidenced by various articles in the press, 
where the ICC and its success has been judged based on the number of prosecutions 
completed in comparison to the money it has cost.863 In addition to this, the people of 
Rwanda did not need a foreign court in a faraway country with foreign lawyers going about 
their business behind closed doors, subsequently isolating itself from the society it was 
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created to bring justice to.864Whilst the events of 1994 and the genocide in Rwanda 
provided the UN through the ICTR with the opportunity to ‘… infuse [a] broken community 
with a new view of justice and law …’865  it does appear at the surface level, that this was an 
opportunity the ICTR chose to pass on and like the ICC with its positive complementarity 
stood back and allowed NGO’s and other States to help Rwanda rebuild and subsequently 
help itself. Moreover, what the ICTR has managed to do for the Rwandan legal system is a 
question that has varying answers, depending upon who you ask. The common view within 
Rwanda, has been that many people know very little or nothing about the work of the 
ICTR,866 and feel that whatever purpose it has served, has had very little or no impact upon 
their lives, which leads to question, what purpose have the outreach programmes of the 
ICTR serve?  
 
The ICTR’s information and outreach officer Tim Gallimore has argued that ‘… the most this 
legal institution can do is to assist with reconciliation in limited ways as an ancillary 
contribution to its main judicial function of trying the cases before it.’867 Gallimore, like 
many supporters of the ICTR has only seen the role of the ICTR, to be that of ensuring that 
the most culpable are brought to justice and through this they hope that the rule of law will 
be established within Rwanda, thus bringing about peace and reconciliation. As was evident 
from his statement made at the ICTR conference on ‘challenging impunity’ in Kigali 
(November 2006), where he stated that: 
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By prosecuting those who committed genocide and other serious violations against human 
rights, the ICTR intends to break the cycle of impunity by re-establishing the fundamental 
rule of law, under which the guilty are held accountable for their offences. It is expected 
that the outcome of these prosecutions will also promote national reconciliation and 
restore peace in Rwanda.868 
This statement made by Gallimore sets out the reality of what the ICTR has seen its true 
mandate to be, which is setting an example of how justice should be conducted for these 
serious crimes and by creating a body of case law which sets a legal precedence. The part of 
the UN mandate from resolution 955,869 to actively rebuild the Rwandan legal system was 
noted by Gallimore at the UN conference ‘Challenging Impunity’ held at Kigali (2006) but 
was dismissed because there was no specific mandate requesting that the ICTR get involved 
in ‘… institutional or social reconstruction …’870 these were objectives that Gallimore 
‘expected’ to occur as a mere by product to the trial work of the ICTR.871 Whilst it had been 
hoped that the ITCR outreach programme would evolve and actively engage in rebuilding 
the Rwandan legal system, via methods such as undertaking ‘… initiatives to train Rwandan 
judges and lawyers as well as Rwandan human rights activists …’872 this however, was not to 
be the case.  
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The ICTR’s outreach programme, along with that of the ICTY was not established until 
1998,873 a few years after the inception of the ad-hoc tribunals and the aim of their outreach 
programme is to bring the work of geographically distant tribunals, directly to the general 
populace of the countries which it seeks to help,874 namely Rwanda and the former 
Yugoslavia.875 It is hoped that by achieving this dissemination of information about the 
tribunals and their work, that the people of Rwanda will see that individuals and not 
collective ethnic groups are being held to account, at least by the international community 
and that this would then have the desired effect of aiding national reconciliation, by closing 
the gaps of the age old Hutu and Tutsi rivalry.876  So we now turn to look at exactly how the 
ICTR’s outreach programme has disseminated this information to the citizens of Rwanda as 
well as their media and legal professionals. 
 
5.19 The Essence of Outreach 
One of the largest triumphs that the outreach programme has heralded, is the creation of its 
‘Umusanzu mu Bwiyunge’ which is Kinyarwanda for ‘contribution to reconciliation’, which is 
a document and information centre that the ICTR opened in Kigali during the September of 
2000.877 The document centre contains the following resources: books, journals, 
newspapers, legal documents, audio-visual materials and information briefings, internet 
access and facilities for conferences, press conferences and meetings.878 Furthermore, since 
2000 the ICTR has been able to translate all of its documentation including case files into the 
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native language of Kinyarwanda,879 which should help make the information accessible to a 
wider audience. However, whilst these resources are available in hard copy at the library 
within the document centre and also online, the fact that most of Rwanda does not have 
regular electricity and therefore no access to the internet, still provides a substantial 
obstacle to making the information accessible to all as well as to the vast majority of the 
Rwandan judiciary.880 In order to try and combat this problem, it was announced in 2006 
that the ICTR in conjunction with the Rwandan government, was hoping to open a further 
ten document centres around Rwanda,881 which it was hoped, would be open by the end of 
2007. Sadly this does not appear to have happened anywhere near as quickly as envisaged, 
as the only documented evidence of additional document centres being opened in Rwanda, 
is an ICTR newsletter dated 23 February 2009.882  An ICTR newsletter883 reports that on the 
18 and 20 February 2009, the ICTR Prosecutor Hassan Bubacar Jallow officially opened 
document centres in the Nyamagabe and Muhanga Districts in the Southern Province of 
Rwanda and that the first of the ten additional document centres was only opened in 
October of 2008, as was opened in the Gasabo district of Kigali city.884  
 
With regards to the other seven document centres, the newsletter simply reports that ‘… 
other centres are expected to be open soon …’885 in the following seven locations across 
Rwanda and  are to be located at the Intermediate Courts of Instance in  Nyagatare, Rusizi, 
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Karongi, Ngoma, Musanze, Rubavu and Gicumbi.886 Adama Dieng in a 2011 journal article887 
reported that all ten provincial document centres were up and running and were ‘… 
equipped with internet access and television screens where the Districts’ residents may 
follow ICTR court proceedings.’888 It is worth noting that these centres were heavily 
subsidised by the European Union, as was stated in the ICTR newsletter889 and that the new 
centres are all located at Intermediate Courts of Instance, meaning that they are directly 
aimed at providing access to the ICTR’s wealth of case law and jurisprudence for the 
national courts that will be taking over the work of the ICTR, following its completion 
strategy. Whilst this certainly does go some way in aiding the Rwandan legal system to 
uphold the rule of law and carry out prosecutions to an internationally acceptable standard, 
they still do not really facilitate dissemination of information to the general public; who are 
central to beating the culture of impunity, because it was the general public who committed 
the majority of the crimes and it is the members of the general public who are necessary to 
facilitate reconciliation and the rebuilding of Rwanda.890 
 
As previously established within this chapter, whilst Rwanda generally lacked most modern 
forms of media transmission the use of radio was commonplace, but at the outset of the 
outreach programme the ICTR only ‘… provided financial support to allow journalists from 
the Office Rwandais de l’Information (ORINFOR) and the Ministry of Justice to report from 
Arusha.’891 However, the ICTR outreach programme has since been able to facilitate other 
journalists from Rwanda to broadcast on a daily basis from the ICTR’s home in Arusha, 
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hopefully allowing a wider audience to be kept abreast of the ICTR’s progress with 
prosecutions.892 In addition to the radio broadcasts, the ICTR in conjunction with an 
American owned organisation called Internews, have shot documentaries for the ICTR in the 
native language of Kinyarwanda.893 These documentaries have then been shown to both 
members of the public in communes across Rwanda and have also been shown to those 
detained in the prisons of Rwanda and were usually followed by a question and answer 
session.894 The success of the type of documentary that Internews produces, has been 
evidenced recently by the fact that their latest set of documentaries aimed at encouraging 
reintegration and  demobilization of Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR),  
have been attributed with convincing a minimum of thirty six former FDLR combatants to 
return to Rwanda.895 Whilst not directly linked to the documentaries that they have created 
for the ICTR outreach, it still serves to show how powerful their documentaries can be. Thus 
overall, it would appear that the ICTR certainly have reached out to the vast majority of the 
Rwandan public, but what is not so clear is how much of the complex and the relatively  
foreign896 workings of the ICTR’s processes have actually been understood. 
 
 
In addition to the dissemination of information about the ICTR and its judicial decisions, the 
outreach programme has also actively encouraged legal professionals, law students and 
their lecturers to physically visit the tribunal at Arusha. In particular the ICTR has a strong 
bond with the National University of Rwanda, which sends up to six law students each 
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year,897 who are able to attend for eight weeks to conduct research and learn first- hand 
about the way that the ICTR works. Furthermore, several academics from the National 
University of Rwanda also attend Arusha to undertake research or to merely observe the 
trials.898In addition to staff and students from the Rwandan National University, the 
outreach programme also organises regular visits for journalists,899 lawyers, human rights 
advocates, civil society representatives and members of the clergy.900 Furthermore, in 
October of 2009 the ICTR extended its outreach programme to the youths and teachers of 
Northern Rwanda with a programme aimed at creating a: 
… [S]econdary-school level based genocide awareness network that will help enhance the 
youth awareness about ICTR achievements and challenges. The Project will also promote 
the respect of human rights values and sharing of knowledge and best practices generated 
by the ICTR as part of its legacy in strengthening the unity and national reconciliation in 
Rwanda.901 
 
Whilst the ICTR had been running workshops in schools across Rwanda since 2005, this was 
the first tailor made outreach programme, to educate the youth of Rwanda about the work 
of the ICTR and to explain why it is imperative to the role of preventing genocide. However, 
whilst educating people about the work of the ICTR and its significance in relation to 
preventing future human rights abuses is admirable and helps to bring justice closer the 
victims, but this not enough to help the judiciary in Rwanda, who are the people tasked with 
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enforcing the rule of law902 in a transitional State and bringing the remaining but many 
perpetrators of the 1994 genocide to justice.903 
 
5.20 The Realisation that Capacity Building is Essential 
On the 23 December 2005, the UN General Assembly issued a new mandate in Resolution 
60/241904 to reaffirm the original mandate as set out in Resolution 955, the new Resolution: 
… [R]eiterated the mandate and requested the Tribunal to increase its capacity-building 
efforts for the judiciary of Rwanda and to carry out an effective outreach program to assist 
with reconciliation by increasing the understanding of the Tribunal’s 
work among Rwandans.905 
 
However prior to this affirmation from the UN Security Council, that the ICTR was to assist 
the Rwandan judiciary in rebuilding itself; which was no doubt brought about by concerns 
over the impending completion strategy of the ICTR906 and the realisation that the Rwandan 
legal system as it stood in 2006, would never be able to take on the outstanding cases of the 
ICTR as it set about implementing its completion strategy.907 The outreach programme of 
the ICTR had already in November of 2005 with the assistance of the European Union,908 
funded a workshop for ICTR officials and members of the Rwandan judiciary and the aim of 
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this workshop, was to, ‘… set an agenda for cooperation, to assess the needs of the justice 
sector and to devise a strategic plan for the ICTR to deliver capacity-building and other 
assistance to Rwanda.’909 
 
As a result of the workshop in November 2005, a new relationship was formed between the 
ICTR and the Rwandan government, in which there appeared to be a renewed vigour to 
ensure that a the ICTR and the Rwandan courts would work together to try and ensure that 
justice was carried out in a standardised manner,910 and one which had the rule of law and 
human rights preservation at its core. Stemming from this workshop and its agenda, there 
have been numerous lectures and seminars for students and judges to educate them about 
the work and case law of the ICTR,911 and there have also been training sessions on 
information and evidence management for the Rwandese court registrars.912 All of which 
has gone some way to building upon the work that other charities and Non-governmental 
organisations, such as the American Bar Association, the MacArthur Foundation913 and 
many others,914 who have strived to help Rwanda build its legal system up, following the 
devastating events of 1994. However, the advantage of the ICTR conducting some of the 
education is that they can train the judiciary to think like their judges and to interpret and 
apply their case law in the relevant context and this would certainly seem to have had the 
desired influence if the legal reforms that took place during 2007 and 2008 in Rwanda 
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(abolition of the death penalty and transfer law) are viewed to be at least partially a product 
of this training and information sharing.915 
 
However, one of the most successful pieces of capacity building by the outreach programme 
has been facilitated by the librarians of the ICTR, with their online training in research, with 
particular attention paid to researching international criminal law and916 in 2005, the ICTR 
library ran ‘… two training workshops in Rwanda in automation of library and information 
centres.’917 These workshops consisted of educating the Rwandan legal professionals on 
how to use the library automation software CDS-ISIS, as developed by UNESCO and also 
trained them on how to use the WINISIS software.918 This training was so successful that it 
led to the ICTR library staff creating similar training tailored specifically to the needs of the 
Rwandan judiciary. 919In addition to the successful provision of online training, which no 
doubt owes its success in part to the increased number of document centres, at the 
Intermediate Courts of Instance across Rwanda, the ICTR has also conducted workshops for 
Rwandan journalists,920 to educate them about how best to report on the judicial matters of 
the ICTR, in an effective manner, so as to then facilitate wide spread education about these 
issue across Rwanda. 
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In addition to these capacity building efforts, the United Nations has also established a 
residual mechanism called the ‘Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals’ (MICT) and 
was created on the 22 December 2010 (Resolution 1966)921, with the intention that it 
should, ‘… [continue] the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions (UNSC 
Resolution 1966) of the ICTR and the ICTY; and [maintain] the legacy of both institutions.’922 
The branch of the MICT that will deal with the residual functioning of the ICTR is based in 
Arusha and commenced its duties as of the 1 July 2012.923 The overlap between the start of 
the MICT and the completion of the ICTR is deliberate, so as to ensure a smooth handover 
from the ICTR to the Rwandan judiciary and any other national judiciary dealing with 
outstanding ICTR indictments, such as France. Whilst the MICT has many functions and 
responsibilities, the most notable one is that of  ‘Assistance to national jurisdictions’,924 
which will take the form of ‘… transferring dossiers, responding to requests for evidence, 
variation or rescission of protective measures for witnesses and responding to requests to 
question detained persons.’925 In addition to providing the national courts with the above 
mentioned information, the MICT will be responsible for updating and maintaining the 
ICTR’s archives and databases, which is crucial if the online training that the outreach 
programme have undertaken is not to be wasted once the ICTR has wound up its business. 
In addition to this, the function of appeals and requests for retrials to be conducted by the 
MICT, this means that the Rwandan national courts will continue to feel an international 
legal presence and hopefully this will encourage adherence to ICTR jurisprudence and the 
continued application of the rule of law and human rights standards. 
 
5.21 Case Study Conclusion 
The aim of this Rwandan case study has been to illustrate the potential issues, which the ICC 
is likely to encounter as it gradually takes over from where the ad-hoc courts and tribunals 
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have or are currently preparing to finish up. Therefore, it would seem fair to agree with 
former ICTR President, Judge Eric Mose when he stated that: 
… over the span of a single decade, international criminal tribunals went from being 
a vague idea to an active reality, and have grown into institutions existing in their own 
right. Henceforth, the international community’s main concern should be to hold alleged 
perpetrators of human rights abuses individually responsible for their actions, in cases 
where States are loath to punish such violations, or where they simply cannot do so. 
International tribunals are establishing practice and contribute to a culture of refusing 
impunity for human rights violations.926 
  
However, as has been stated many times, the ICC cannot do this alone and is only intended 
to act as a court of last resort, that exists to complement the national courts, when they are 
‘… unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution …’927 for 
themselves. Moreover, the Rwandan case study has served to illustrate that even when an 
international court or tribunal intervenes to prosecute those individuals who carry the 
highest levels of responsibility for these crimes, the country in which the crimes took place 
will also feel the need to seek out their own form of justice in order to prevent the country 
from destabilising once more,928 and as Rwanda illustrated, much assistance will be required 
from the global community to facilitate this, which is where positive complementarity 
comes into play. Furthermore, as the case study highlights is quite commonplace that 
following the occurrence of the types of crimes which the ICC will investigate, the 
infrastructure of a State and its legal system will be decimated or severely corrupt and in 
need of drastic reform.929 If these States are left unguided and unassisted it is likely they will 
seek out a form of justice, that does not follow the accepted norms of international criminal 
law, with undue process and no adherence to commonly accepted standards of human 
rights (especially in terms of penalties and detention conditions) and if this is allowed to 
occur then there is a strong probability that the justice the lower level of perpetrators will 
                                                          
926
 Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera, ‘The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation’ (2005) 3(4) JICJ 944, 944  
927
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9 Art 17 (1)(a) 
928
 Francois-Xavier Nsanzuwera, ‘The ICTR Contribution to National Reconciliation’ (2005) 3(4) JICJ 944, 948 
929
 Ariel Meyerstein, ‘Between Law and Culture: Rwanda's Gacaca and Postcolonial Legality’ (June 2007) 32(2) L 
& Soc Inquiry 467, 468 
187 
 
receive, will be excessive in comparison to that which the most culpable receive at the ICC. 
As occurred in Rwanda, where twenty two lower ranking offenders were executed in April 
of 1998,930 which is a much harsher penalty than any given by the ICTR, where the harshest 
sentence given was thirty five years imprisonment in the case of Prosecutor v Augustin 
Ngirabatware (Judgement and Sentence) ICTR-99-54-T (20 Dec 2012). Another illustration of 
where those prosecuted solely by the Rwandan courts receive harsher penalties than those 
prosecuted by the ICTR is whereby under Organic Law No. 31/2007 of 25 July 2007, there 
now exists a dual system where those indicted and prosecuted by the Rwandan legal system 
face life imprisonment in isolation, whilst those transferred under Rule 11bis931 do not face 
imprisonment in isolation.  
 
This lack of consistency and lack of clarity as to what factors influence the sentencing 
determinations of the ICTR, has the potential to seriously undermine all of the good work 
that the ICTR has done in seeking to stamp out the culture of impunity that is inherent 
within Rwanda. Because as Barbara Hola argues, the inconsistent and unclear sentencing 
rationale of the ICTR is a ‘… practice [that] makes it extremely difficult to identify any 
patterns as to the sentencing ranges applicable to individual offences or the contribution of 
individual sentencing factors to sentence length.’932 But as Barbara Hola933 has indicated, 
this could have been avoided had the ICTR been more consistent and transparent in its 
sentencing determinations.934 Which in turn means that not only could the ICTR have 
avoided inconsistencies in penalties, which at times can also equate to lack of 
proportionality in relation to the gravity of the crime amongst the ITCR sentencing, but it 
also made it very difficult for national courts and in particular the national courts of Rwanda, 
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to follow the ICTR’s sentencing. This lack of consistency and transparency in sentencing 
determination is something which the ICC can ill afford, as it will seek to assert its authority 
not just in one fractured State, but in many across the globe and if it wishes to lead by 
example so as to ‘… guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international 
justice.’935  Furthermore, the fairly vague provisions in the Rome Statue 1998936 and the 
relevant sections ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2002) on the factors the ICC should 
consider when making their sentencing determinations and how much weight should be 
attributed to them, means that it is quite probable that the ICC’s sentencing jurisprudence 
will be lacking the consistency and transparency that Hola deems essential if it is to be 
followed by others.937 However it should be noted that Rule 145 of the ICC’s Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence does go a little further than that those of the ICTY and ICTR’s by 
providing some examples of what is considered to be an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance, but this is still not enough guidance to ensure consistency. Nonetheless, this 
thesis at the same time does not propose that the ICC be constrained by rigid sentencing 
guidelines, such as those provided for in Rwandan Organic Law No 08/96 of 30 August 1996, 
as such constraints are not feasible for a treaty based court the norms of customary 
international law are constantly changing and developing with society, because changing 
the multilateral treaty would be a lengthy and difficult process. It is simply regrettable that 
the Rome Statute 1998 and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence (2002) did not seek to at 
least clarify the objectives of the punishment beyond938 the vague objectives given in the 
preamble to the Rome Statute 1998, because then at least the judges of the ICC would have 
had a clearer understanding of what should drive their sentencing determinations and in 
turn this may have facilitated a more consistent approach 
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This neatly leads to second lesson that the ICC can learn from the example set by the ICTR 
and also the ICTY, because in addition to attempting to have a consistent sentencing 
practice which would make it easier for national courts to follow, the ICC need to make sure 
the that their work is transparent and easily accessible at the national level. But in addition 
to the need to make the work of the ICC readily available, there also needs to be a sufficient 
national legal system in place to be able to utilise the information through legal proceedings 
of their own and therefore it has been suggested that: 
In future international prosecutions, some of these 
difficulties could be addressed earlier, by more effective outreach to domestic 
audiences, and by more systematic efforts to design focused, well-conceived 
domestic capacity-building programs939 
 
Indeed this would seem very true of the case in Rwanda, because had the ICTR not chosen 
to shy away from the part of its mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 955940 which 
required outreach and involvement in capacity building at the outset of its mandate, then 
we may well not have seen the penalty disparities between the ICTR prosecutions and those 
of the Rwandan specialised chambers and even the Gacaca. Because as mentioned above, if 
outreach had played a central role from the outset in the form of making legal resources 
readily available within Rwanda as well as providing training for the Rwandan legal 
professionals, then perhaps prior to the drastic Rwandan legal reforms of 2007 and 2008 we 
would have seen an alignment between the ICTR and Rwandan sentencing practices, that 
would have ensured that the justice for the genocide was both consistent and proportionate 
at both the national and international level.  
 
The importance of outreach and capacity building (not necessarily conducted by the ICC) is 
thankfully a lesson that the ICC appears to have drawn upon from the experiences of the 
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ITCY and ICTR,941 as it has actively pursued outreach since its inception, possibly because it 
relies upon complementary prosecutions and therefore needs to do everything in its power 
to ‘…build stronger links between the work of international and hybrid criminal courts and 
improvements in domestic rule of law.’942 Because in doing so, it would facilitate more 
prosecutions at the national level, which as it is commonly accepted that a weak or 
diminished legal system is unlikely to have the will or capacity to undertake such complex 
prosecutions of extraordinary crimes and the with ICC being a complementary court it is 
therefore reliant upon the national courts to carry the majority of the burden.943   
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the criticisms or failings of the ad-hoc tribunals to achieve not only 
consistent and proportionate sentencing amongst their own judgements, but also their 
failure to realise the potential outreach has in allowing them to impart the norms of 
international law into the national systems of the States they were involved with. The hope 
of this thesis and the critical analysis undertaken is to ultimately add to the existing 
literature that makes many hypotheses about whether the ICC will learn from the mistakes 
of its predecessors and set about ensuring that not only will it be a sustainable court by 
facilitating States to help themselves.944 Because International criminal law has been 
described as ‘… the fusion of two legal disciplines: international law and domestic criminal 
law’945where the focus of the ICC’s mandate has been suggested as being ‘… to translate 
global legal obligations into functional justice at the local level.’946  But whether the ICC will 
take up this responsibility to impart international legal norms into national justice, remains 
to be seen because the ICC has only completed two cases947 and as the comparison of the 
sentencing rationale of these two cases in Chapter 5 illustrated, there once again seems to 
be confusion even amongst the ICC judges as to what the purpose of sentencing is and what 
objectives should be weighed up in the sentencing calculations.  
 
In the Lubanga948 case the trial chamber took a very scientific and logical approach by 
setting a baseline sentence and then adjusted it in accordance with mitigating and 
aggravating circumstances,949 whilst in stark contrast in the Germain Katanga case,950 the 
trial chamber seem to have be confused as to what their sentencing rationale was, because 
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they cite retributive, deterrence, reconciliation and rehabilitative purposes951 as being 
included in their sentencing rationale. Whilst it is hoped that the startlingly opposite 
approaches taken to sentencing determination by the ICC in its two completed cases, is just 
a result of the court trying to find its feet, it may well also be due to the inconsistent 
precedents they have from the ICTY and ICTR coupled with the fact that the Rome Statute 
1998 remains silent on the subject. However, only time will tell as to whether the ICC will 
seek to learn from the mistakes of the ad-hoc tribunals and assert a comprehensive body of 
case law with consistent and proportionate sentencing at its centre, so that the national 
courts may if they choose to, opt to follow the sentencing practice of the ICC so as to ‘… 
result [in] the squeezing out of local approaches that are extralegal in nature, as well as 
those that depart from the methods and modalities dominant internationally.’952 
 
6.1 The Death Penalty Paradox 
Ban-Ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General in his report to the UN Human Rights Council, of 
July 2012 stated: 
Over the past few decades, the balance has shifted between a substantial majority of States 
that maintained the death penalty to these States becoming minority. Furthermore, it may 
be noted that states that have abolished the death penalty or are moving towards abolition 
represent different legal systems, traditions, cultures and religious backgrounds.953 
This statement implies that it is no longer just the European or Westernised States that are 
abolitionist, but makes reference to the growing number of African States that have joined 
the abolition cause; of which sixteen had become abolitionist by 2011.954 However, an 
Amnesty International report in 2013 Stated that in 2012 ‘At least 40 executions were 
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carried out in five countries in sub-Saharan Africa …’955 which is disconcerting because all of 
the current nine States that the ICC is currently investigating,956 all are within Africa and the 
State of Sudan where the ICC has ongoing investigations, it was reported that at least 19 
executions in 2012 and at least 199 death sentences957 were issued. Which means that 
many national contributions to justice in the current situations where the ICC is 
investigating, may involve the death penalty at the national level of prosecution, meaning 
that there is potential for large inconsistencies in the justice attained by the national courts 
and the ICC as well as not being a positive signal for the global quest for abolition of the 
death penalty. Furthermore, because the ICC is a complementary court rather than one that 
asserts primacy over the national courts as the ICTR did,958 then in order to try and implant 
the international rule of law and norms of sentencing practice at the national level, then it 
will have to rely solely upon education and by taking the opportunity to get involved with 
NGO’s and other States capacity building to facilitate better links and more consistent 
approaches to sentencing from the ground up. 
 
6.2 Outreach as a Means to Implant the  Rule of Law and ICC Sentencing Practices into the 
National Courts  
As illustrated by the Strategic Plan for Outreach of 2006,959  the ICC certainly has been far 
more organised and dedicated to ensuring the dissemination of information about the ICC’s 
work and investigations to the people within the affected States. This could possibly due to 
having a bigger budget, more staff and resources, thus facilitating the ICC to be able provide 
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translations of documents into the many native languages, but it must be remembered that 
the ICC can be involved in investigations in multiple States at any one time, whilst its 
predecessors only had to provide outreach to only one State, so the ICC’s resources are still 
overreached. The 2006 Strategic Plan for Outreach report explains the efforts that have 
been made to provide outreach to the States in which ICC was then investigating, via a 
variety of means and many of which have been used by the ad-hoc tribunals, such as radio, 
televisions, newspapers, workshops and seminars for current of future legal professionals, 
simplified pamphlets and cartoons, discussions in schools and at community meetings, 
amongst many other forms of communication.960 However, as was highlighted by the 
Rwandan case study, outreach is indeed a very important part of an international court as 
not only does it provide access to a wealth of free legal information, which is readily 
available from the ICC via the online Legal Tools961 (which contains over 44,000 documents) 
and the software platform known as the Case Matrix Network, which provides case law to 
the legal professionals in the affected States, an invaluable tool when looking to undertake 
national prosecutions.  
 
The 2010 Review Conference of the ICC held at Kampala, established that in order for the 
ICC to achieve its mandate, particularly in relation to acting as a court that is 
complementary to the national courts, the ICC would need more than just the legal tools 
and the case matrix network that had existed since 2003,962 to build help these conflict torn 
States to re-establish their legal systems and as Jane Stromseth963 and Mark Drumbl964 have 
indicated, if the ICC could at the same time help impart their own sentencing practices and 
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establish due process965 as standard practice within the national legal systems that they play 
a role in rebuilding by means of providing training and education for legal professionals. 
Then by being a transparent role model, it is hoped that the national courts will be inspired 
and encouraged to follow the ICC’s example. In summary what this thesis proposes that the 
ICC seek to achieve through outreach was cited at the Kampala Review Conference (2010) 
when ‘positive complementarity’ was described as encapsulating:  
… [A]ll activities/actions whereby national jurisdictions are strengthened 
and enabled to conduct genuine national investigations and trials of 
crimes included in the Rome Statute, without involving the Court in 
capacity building, financial support and technical assistance, but 
instead leaving these actions and activities for States, to assist each 
other on a voluntary basis966 
Thus what the Association of States Parties was saying here, is that the ICC needed to take a 
more ‘… systematic approach to empowering national legal orders …’967 but at the same 
time they make it unequivocally clear that this additional task is not one that the ICC would 
or should be undertaking and that is a view that this thesis also concludes as no single entity 
has the manpower or resources to take this level of responsibility on.  
 
Furthermore, as the report drafted by Denmark and South Africa968 in preparation for the 
Kampala conference illustrated, there were already many European and NGO’s initiatives in 
place that have been seeking to educate or rebuild  the legal systems of the affected 
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States.969 Some of the most notable detailed in this report, include the Avocats Sans 
Frontieres ‘Integrated Project on Fighting Impunity and the Reconstruction of the Legal 
System in the DRC’, which has received funding from the EU, The Belgian Government and 
The MacArthur Foundation and also the Danish government initiatives in Uganda.970  These 
projects have been running training sessions for the judiciary and legal professionals as well 
as providing capacity building, aid and 971a continued presence on the ground in the 
affected States. All of these are the necessary groundwork that is required in these 
politically corrupt or war torn States, before the ICC can even begin to conceive of 
undertaking any complementary investigations of prosecutions. Therefore this thesis 
stresses that the ICC needs to ensure that it heavily influences the training provided by 
NGO’s and States, because to do so would be a long-term investment that should ultimately 
repay itself wherein the ICC would begin to see more and more prosecutions occurring at 
the national level. Subsequently this thesis predicts that if more of the prosecutions occur at 
the national level, then the need for outreach should slowly decrease because if the 
majority of justice occurs at the national level then there will be less need for dissemination 
of information about the trials to the affected populations in order to facilitate 
reconciliation because justice will be visible to them. Similarly if more of the currently 
unstable States where the ICC investigations and prosecutions are currently taking place, 
have a stabilised legal system, then potentially there are likely to be less extraordinary 
crimes that occur, because as the Rwandan case study illustrated, these crimes often occur 
in unstable States where political corruption and other events coincide to create the ideal 
circumstances in which these crimes are most prevalent. 
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Finally as noted by the Supreme Court of Israel in the trial of Adolf Eichmann:  
We know only too well how utterly inadequate the sentence of death is as compared with 
the millions of unnatural deaths he decreed for his victims. Even as there is no word in 
human speech to describe his deeds such as the deeds of [Eichmann], so there is no 
punishment under human law sufficiently grave to match his guilt…972 
This acknowledgement that there is no punishment proportionate to these extraordinary 
crimes adds to the argument that the death penalty has no place in international criminal 
law. However, if the ICC can successfully encourage States through outreach to follow their 
sentencing jurisprudence then at least justice would be proportionate to a scale, 
transparent and consistent,973 but this very much relies upon the assumption that the ICC 
will begin to develop a more uniform approach to sentencing than its current two 
sentencing judgements have illustrated. And whilst more structured penalty guideline in the 
Rome Statute 1998, may seem a good way to achieve that consistency, this thesis concludes 
that given international law and customary norms are constantly evolving, to constrain the 
ICC judges by have a very restrictive sentencing policy would not be future proof.  However, 
as many academics who have looked at the ICC and its potential for the future in relation to 
its outreach and sentencing practice have stated before, this is an unknown whereby, ‘the 
success of these institutions and whether they can achieve their ambitious objectives … will 
depend upon them being able to communicate their work to, and gain the support of the 
local communities concerned.’974 
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